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ABSTRACT
Do conservatives and liberals have differing sensitivities to avoidance, inhibition,
and negative emotion? Do psychological factors beneath our conscious awareness
underlie the political ideologies we embrace? Political science researchers have broken
new ground over the past ten years in our understanding of the psychology and
physiology of political ideology. However, large questions remain about how political
ideology may be related to avoidance motivations and negative emotion. This work
expands our current knowledge in this area by presenting three studies with multiple
methodologies: original survey data, electroencephalographic measurements, and
behavioral experiments in a lab setting. Working in the tradition of J.A. Gray’s dual
systems of behavioral motivation, I explore how political ideology is related to several
related dispositional measures of behavioral avoidance, behavioral inhibition, and
negative affectivity. Overall, and in contrast to literature expectations, my evidence
suggests that liberals and conservatives do not have persistent differences in avoidance
sensitivity or negativity bias. While strong evidence remains demonstrating important
dispositional differences between liberals and conservatives, additional research will be
required before researchers can conclude that conservatives are uniquely motivated by
psychological avoidance or negative affect.

vi

CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
According to the Oxford New Monitor Corpus in October 2014, insults levied at
Democrats and Republicans have taken an especially explosive turn in recent times. A
sample of 1200 negative phrases gathered from online sources reveals incredible
negativity and no small amount of creativity (Martin 2014). The right accuses the left of
being loons, twits, nitwits, trash, hippies, morons, hypocrites, fools, scum, and elitists.
The left responds in kind against the conservatives with labels such as fanatics,
obstructionists, extremists, misogynists, ideologues, zealots, nut-jobs, thugs, and
crazies. The only thing they seem to agree about is that the other guys can best be
described as “idiots.”
Although the lists of commonly used insults includes terms such as “extremist”
and “ideologue,” accusing someone of being an ideologue is not the same insult that it
once was. The most common ideological labels used in American politics—liberal and
conservative—are typically used as descriptors, not insults. Political candidates in the
modern era often run toward these labels, particularly Republicans towards the term
“conservative.” Democrats often prefer “progressive” instead of “liberal” but the two
terms are indistinguishable in terms of meaning. These ideological labels function as a
kind of summary statement of the beliefs held by an individual. The summary
1

statements are readily used to bolster credentials and signal intentions. Politicians self-
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identify as either conservative or liberal, using these labels to help their political brand.
But this is a modern innovation. As I will explain in Chapter Two, for two
centuries, political ideology itself was an insult, a slur thrown at you by your political
rivals. An accusation of ideology meant you had tremendous bias, close-mindedness,
and living in false consciousness. Your political opponents used these charges to
galvanize their supporters towards (or against) political revolution. Being called an
“ideologue” was an incendiary accusation that you made a practice of systematically
distorting facts, figures, and events to obfuscate the truth and manipulate people.
Political ideology was thought to be a blinding worldview which made one unreliable
and untrustworthy.
The modern understanding of political ideology
Beginning with Philip Converse’s seminal paper (1964), political ideology came to
take on a useful technical definition. Converse described political ideology as a
structured collection of abstract values by which one understands the political and
social environment. Political ideology crystalizes and communicates shared values in
political outlook. In other words, political ideology is a lens by which to understand the
world.
Converse famously introduced the idea of constraint to political ideology. If a
person is truly ideological, holding viewpoints on some issues ought to constrain their
viewpoints on others. For example, imagine your friend is pro-gun, pro-religion, pro-free

trade, anti-minimum wage, and pro-small government. Scanning that list of issues, you
might surmise that your friend was motivated by several abstract principles, including
favoring the free market, distrust of national government, and favoring freedom,
individualism, and responsibility.
Given that belief structure, now take a moment to predict your friend’s stance
on nationalized healthcare. Given the abstract values described above, and the
closeness of these views to American conservatism, you might guess they would be
opposed to nationalized healthcare. Are you right? Probably, yes. While it is possible
that your friend’s viewpoints are not motivated by abstract principles—perhaps they
have randomly acquired their views purely by luck or purely in mimicry of another
person—it seems unlikely they would have acquired this interrelated portfolio without
an underlying set of abstract political values to build on. This is political ideology. As I
will discuss further in Chapter Two, while Converse found that few people outwardly
recognized their beliefs as ideological, we have good reason to suspect that many
people hold beliefs in recognizable ideological patterns without being able to articulate
them.
How common is political ideology? Converse, writing in the 1960s, estimated
that only 1 in 10 Americans were truly ideological, a very low number that seems to
have surprised him and our discipline. To assess their political beliefs, Converse
interviewed a sample of Americans and had independent judges assess whether
abstract political values were directly expressed during the conversations. Michael
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Lewis-Beck and colleagues, updating Converse into the 2000s with a deliberately similar
technique, note that this number had doubled to 1 in 5 Americans (Lewis-Beck et al.,
2008). The remaining Americans held political beliefs not anchored to abstract values,
but instead clustered around either group interests or the current state of the country.
Or they simply had no issue content whatsoever to the political views they reported (for
example, identifying with a political party but being unable to articulate even a vague
understanding of what the party stood for).
Still, if only 20 percent of the American public is ideological, why are political
scientists so interested in political ideology? As noted by social psychologist John Jost, a
person need not be consciously aware of their ideology (Jost et al. 2006). They are not
required to recognize or understand their own belief structure for it to be guiding their
political behavior. Ideological principles may be latent or implicit to the individual, an
unidentified engine under the hood of a car driven to work every day. The studies of
Converse and Lewis-Beck put a high burden on participants. These participants must
have sophisticated political awareness to be able to verbalize how their abstract
conception of politics fits into representational political schema. Jost argues that a
latent belief structure can guide attitude formation without the individual actually being
aware of it, or without them being able to name it. One does not need to be able to
describe or categorize the physics of internal combustion engines in order to drive the
car. Regardless of your understanding of what is happening under the hood, your ride is
still deeply affected by the engine. Consistent with this argument, as will be detailed in

Chapter Two, researchers today have found considerably more evidence that the mass
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public is ideological than what Converse was able to detect earlier.
The concept of ideology as an abstract belief structure has proven to be
exceptionally useful for political scientists. According to one estimate, more than 50
percent of all papers published in the American Political Science Review (the top journal
in our discipline) include the word ideology (Knight 2006, 620). One central concern in
the political psychology subfield is the question of where do beliefs come from, and
many literatures within the political behavior subfield have found use for Converse’s
definition of political ideology.
Political ideology, emotion, and political psychology
Where does political ideology come from? Our best answer is that political
ideology is shaped by culture, environmental forces, elites, personal relations,
personality dispositions, and evolutionary origins. Our field is increasingly taking a wide
viewpoint on the origins of political attitudes. On the cutting edge of these questions
are the new political behaviorists who are integrating insights from many scientific fields
to improve our understanding of political attitudes, fields including political science,
social psychology, political psychology, and cognitive neuroscience.
For example, political scientists are increasingly noticing the connection between
emotion and politics. George Marcus and colleagues proposed the Affective Intelligence
theory, demonstrating how emotional states of enthusiasm and anxiety have a large
impact on political learning and political information processing (Marcus et al. 2000).

Ted Brader’s study of campaign advertisements outlined how politicians can (and do)
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use emotionally infused advertisements to affect political attitudes and behavior
(Brader 2005, 2006).
But nowhere has the study of ideology been more riveting than in the political
psychology and biology of political ideology. Kevin Smith, John Hibbing, John Alford, and
their colleagues and students report study after study of the physiological correlations
to political attitudes (e.g. Alford et al. 2005; Alford and Hibbing 2008; Smith et al. 2011),
drawing particular attention to the role of threat and negative affect in political
conservatives (Oxley et al. 2008; Dodd et al. 2012). John Jost and colleagues have
connected threat, fear and uncertainty to political conservatism, arguing that political
ideology is motivated by the individual’s cognitive, emotional, and social needs (Jost et
al. 2003). This recent wave of heavy lifting on the subject of political ideology has been
initiated by political scientists growing access to methodologies, training, and data from
other disciplines.
Political scientists have long been interested in how political attitudes are
formed, and now we are realizing the importance of understanding how emotion relates
to political attitude formation. Psychologists and neuroscientists have waged pitched
battles over the relation of cognition to emotion (Zajonc 1980; Lazarus 1982; Zajonc
1984; Leventhal and Scherer 1987; Gray 1990; Pessoa 2008), and these arguments have
defined significant portions of psychology and cognitive neuroscience (these six papers
listed immediately above have over 11,000 citations). We are still waiting for the dust

to settle on a conclusive understanding of emotion and cognition, but it has become
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increasingly clear that emotion has a highly integrated role in cognitive processing. And,
so, political science—a “borrower” discipline from its very founding—will also need to
consider more fully the importance of emotion for cognition.
Rising study of physiological politics in political science
The core project of the political psychology of ideology is to understand how
differences in political ideology are related to the vast array of cognitive, emotional, and
physiological factors that predict or explain political attitudes. Broadly, most of the work
from researchers in this field operate from one of two different perspectives.
The first perspective was developed by political scientists John Hibbing, Kevin
Smith, John Alford, and the University of Nebraska-Lincoln Political Physiology Lab.
Their theory, which I call the Negativity Bias Theory, focuses on emotional sensitivity,
specifically the theory that conservatives are dispositionally more sensitive to negative
emotion. Their perspective on the psychological differences between liberals and
conservatives has been shaped by dozens of studies that look at genetic and
physiological differences in people. In 2014, Hibbing and colleagues published a paper
called “Differences in Negativity Bias Underlie Variations in Political Ideology” which
summarizes a great host of their work, and integrates the findings into a central theory.
The second perspective comes out of social psychology. The ‘Motivated Social
Cognition Theory’ is based on the work of psychologist John Jost and many colleagues,
and it argues that conservatism is motivated by a network of psychological factors

related to fear, threat, and reducing uncertainty. According to Jost and colleagues, two
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primary factors divide liberals and conservatives: first, advocating versus resisting social
change (as opposed to tradition) and second, rejecting versus accepting inequality (Jost
et al. 2003, Jost 2006, Jost and Amodio 2012). In their important seminal paper (Jost et
al. 2003), they conduct a meta-analysis on the psychology of political conservatism, and
they discovered that these two factors are highly correlated with personality traits,
dispositions, and psychological motivations related to fear, threat, and reducing
uncertainty.
In our literature so far, these two perspectives have been considered largely
complementary. The findings and theories have substantial overlap and there is much
cross citation. In my view, however, the two theories are conceptually different.
Hibbing and colleagues have focused on physiological differences between liberals and
conservatives, and they tie their theory together through emotions. Psychologist John
Jost’s work focuses on differences in psychological processes and motivations, but does
not home in on negative affect specifically. Jost’s work has a strong connection to
motivational avoidance. Both of these projects are tremendously important to work on
political ideology by political psychologists. However, given the breadth of psychological
factors and physiological dispositions that humans have, it is not surprising that a great
deal of additional work must be done to deepen our understanding of the political
psychology of ideology. Our theories can only mature by enlarging the scope of
psychological factors that are being investigated.

Purpose of Dissertation

9

This dissertation has one primary objective: to expand our knowledge about how
negative emotional sensitivity and avoidance motivations are related to political
ideology at the root level of the individual, operating before (or outside of) political
stimuli. I propose one useful place to expand our understanding of negative affect and
avoidance motivations is through the work of Jeffrey Allen Gray, a British psychologist
and cognitive neuroscientist. Gray developed a dual model of behavioral motivation to
explain how and why cognition and emotion lead to behavior. According to Gray,
animals have a appetitive system of behavioral activation that engages in goal pursuit,
while also having a aversive system of behavioral inhibition that monitors the
environment for changing information and threats. As I will explain, Gray’s theories
combine cognition and emotion in a way that would benefit the theories of Hibbing’s
Negativity Bias Theory and Jost’s Motivated Social Cognition Theory. By exploring the
meaning of Gray’s theories for political ideology, we will have an opportunity to sharpen
several elements of the political psychology theories that have been proposed.
This dissertation presents data from three studies aimed to clarify the specific
role of avoidance motivation and sensitivity to negative emotion in political ideology.
These sets of questions have always been interdisciplinary in nature, and this
dissertation is no different. I employ survey methodology alongside cognitive
neuroscience methodology to approach these important questions from multiple

perspectives. Along the way, I take the opportunity to outline how the theories of
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Hibbing and Jost have similarities and a few important differences in predictions.
This dissertation will proceed as follows. Chapter Two details the use of political
ideology by political scientists and clarifies how the biology and politics research
program contributes to these important questions. Chapter Three summarizes the core
theories of the political psychology of ideology that are under investigation in this
dissertation. Chapter Four describes and characterizes the participant pool for two
behavioral experiments while also testing for dispositional correlations. Chapter Five
presents the results of an electroencephalography study of frontal cortical asymmetry
and its implications for political ideology. Chapter Six presents additional
electroencephalography work, this time from a behavioral experiment called the Go/NoGo task. Chapter Seven concludes the dissertation with a discussion of implications.

CHAPTER TWO
LITERATURE REVIEW
Do psychological factors beneath our conscious awareness underlie the political
ideologies we embrace? Political science researchers have broken new ground over the
past ten years in our understanding of the psychology and physiology of political
ideology. This chapter outlines a general research program for studying dispositional
differences in liberals and conservatives. My approach is interdisciplinary, and I borrow
from political science, social psychology, and cognitive neuroscience to better
understand the study of political ideology.
A brief preview of the chapter’s findings may be useful here. The reader should
see the importance of political ideology for understanding political attitude formation
and should better understand the complexity of measuring ideology in the mass public.
The reader will also see that while political scientists have made serious advances in the
past two decades to understand the cognitive and affective processes of political
attitude formation, we still have many questions remaining. We will see that political
psychology literature increasingly finds that political conservatism is correlated with
negative affect and/or avoidant behavioral motivations, but these associations leave
several important questions unexplored. Finally, the reader will also note the
importance of multidisciplinary work for this research program. Psychology and
11

cognitive neuroscience have considerably more advanced techniques and theories to
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investigate cognitive and affective differences between individuals. However,
psychology often neglects to fully consider the multidimensionality of political ideology,
which compromises the applicability of those findings for political science questions.
Approaching our questions from multiple disciplines bolsters several weaknesses in
analysis.
There are two major theories concerning the psychological differences between
political liberals and conservatives. First, the Motivated Social Cognition Theory posits
that differences in psychological factors (traits, dispositions, cognitive styles) suggest
conservatives are more motivated by needs to reduce uncertainty, ambiguity, threat,
and disgust than liberals (Jost et al. 2003). Later, I outline an interpretation of this
theory as describing conservatives as being motivated by avoidance. Second, the
Negativity Bias Theory argues that conservatives have more sensitivity to negative
emotion.
These two theories do not directly compete; in fact, there appears much
common ground between them, including considerable cross-citation. At their core,
however, I believe they are studying different psychological mechanisms and potentially
ought to have different predictions about the physiology of political ideology. I will
argue below that avoidance sensitivity and negativity bias are different processes, and
they need to be studied as such, with a kind of precision that is available to us from
other disciplines. In this research program of the psychological and biological
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determinants of political ideology, it is time for researchers to be more precise with how
specific psychological mechanisms may, or may not, be related to political beliefs.
This dissertation takes up that charge by employing Jeffrey Allen Gray’s theories
(1972, 1981) on behavioral motivation, which have direct connection to both avoidance
sensitivity and negativity bias. J.A. Gray hypothesized that animals have two
complementary systems that underlie cognition, affect, and behavior. The behavioral
activation system (BAS) facilitates behavior towards the completion of an objective or
goal. We use this system hundreds of times a day; from reaching for a cup of coffee, to
opening a doorknob, to speaking with a friend. The behavioral inhibition system (BIS)
halts ongoing behavior in response to the introduction of novel information. This is a
surveillance system, helping us react to unexpected changes in the environment. For
example, we may be in the process of drinking coffee when we see a dead fly floating at
the top of the cup. Seeing the fly cues a disgust reaction, and we halt our planned
action to drink a sip of coffee. Introducing Gray’s theories to the study of political
ideology will help specify and articulate the mechanisms underneath both of the
established theories.
Establishing the place of this project within the larger literature of political
science and political psychology requires several steps. First, we engage the current
political science literature on political ideology, including the history, relevance, and
structure of political ideology in the literature. Second, we move into the current state
of the psychological and physiological findings on political ideology, including an

investigation into the two major theories in the literature—the Motivated Social
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Cognition theory and the Negativity Bias Theory. Third, we discuss the political
implications of Gray’s behavioral motivation systems, and how it intersects with the
current political psychology theories of political ideology.
Political Ideology: History and Present
Political attitudes are ubiquitous, and they have created the sociopolitical world
around us. Political communities are characterized by sharp disagreement on societal
rules, values, and expectations. These differences in opinion occur within regional areas,
within small communities, within social groups, within economic classes, and even
within families. Larger, more heterogeneous populations have larger differences in
opinion. Even in small political communities, where shared backgrounds and mutual
experiences yield a fairly common way of life, political disagreements can be surprisingly
divisive. Sometimes, the family unit is the most heated battleground! Perhaps this is
due to the paradox of it all—a unit of people that have so much shared environment are
expected to have a common politics. When they do not, it is puzzling.
Why do human beings have so many central disagreements over how a society
should be structured? No doubt the incredible variety of human experience would yield
an incredible variety of political opinions. However, interestingly, for all the diversity of
human experience and political attitudes, political disagreements tend to actualize as a
general debate between only two opposing camps. One side largely values traditions,
existing institutions, communities and families over government, and promotes safety,

economic freedoms, and economic inequality. This perspective has been labeled the
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"right-wing" perspective. The other side—the left-wing—largely values government as a
corrective tool to balance unequal starts and protect disadvantaged groups, while
promoting privacy at home and in religion.
In the United States and other places, the right-wing approach is called
conservative and the left-wing approach liberal, and these perspectives emphatically
disagree over the core values, policies, and politics that a society should embrace. There
are some political issues that have no disagreement between liberals and conservatives;
these valence issues can be important to partisan politics (Stokes 1963, Green 2007).
But while we all agree that decreased crime and increased economic growth are good, it
is puzzling and intriguing that we find ourselves mostly divided into two opposing
camps, who frequently have orthogonal opinions on a variety of public policies.
Partisanship, elite opinion leadership, and media all contribute to the polarization of our
politics. But there is an important role for the individual self, which is our central
concern here. Explaining why people have political disagreements requires an
understanding of political ideologies, the term political scientists use to refer to belief
structures of political attitudes.
Approaches to Studying Political Ideology in Political Science
Political scientists have a number of approaches they have used to examine the
nature and origins of political ideology. Traditional researchers have focused on
environmental factors as the chief agents for explaining political behavior. They have

made tremendously important contributions. Political behaviorists have sought the
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origins of political attitudes in socioeconomic classes, racial groups, ethnic groups,
religious affiliations, social groups, work socialization, family socialization, cultural
environment, elite influences, and particularized historical contexts. This work on
political attitudes has been dominant in the contemporary study of political behavior.
More recently, political science has had an explosion of research into the
psychological, physiological, and biological factors in the formation of political attitudes.
These researchers have looked at correlations between political values and genes,
physiology, and the brain. “Over the last three decades, we have witnessed the
emergence of neurological, biological, endocrinological, and physiological paradigms for
the study of human behavioral differences” (Hatemi and McDermott 2011, 1).
Political science has taken enormous strides in the past decades towards a better
understanding of political behavior. From the sociological studies of Lazarsfeld and
colleagues (1944), to the social psychological school of Campbell and colleagues (1960),
to Downsian economic voting and rational choice (1957), and even to newer theories of
political attitude formation such as Zaller (1990), political science has a long and
distinguished literature for explaining how people act politically. Interdisciplinary
insights have fueled each of these forward movements, and it is no accident. Political
scientists have often benefited from borrowing heavily from the methodological
techniques of other disciplines, and the four seminal works above are perfect examples
of this trend. Lazarsfeld was writing from a sociologist’s point of view and used a

sociological framework to analyze political behavior; Campbell and his colleagues
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borrowed survey methodology and attitude theories from social psychology; Downs was
a young economist applying market principles to voting behavior; and Zaller borrowed
theories and understandings from cognitive and social psychology in attitude formation
and applied it to questions about survey answers.
Outside of these trailblazing political behavior researchers, the discipline as a
whole has frequently reached out and incorporated other fields of study. Political
scientists reach out to philosophy, ethics, and history as quickly as it reaches out to
economics, psychology, and—increasingly—biology. In the next section, we explore in
detail how political ideology has been studied in political science in the past.
Origins and Definitions of Ideology
Political ideology has long been a topic of interest to political scientists, and it
holds a unique position in political science scholarship. Political science has been
generally characterized as a "borrower" discipline (Rigney and Barnes 1980; Miller 1997;
Amadae and Bueno de Mesquita 1999; Pieters and Baumgartner 2002; Bartels and
Brady 2003; Knight 2006; Sigelman and Goldfarb 2008, 2012). However, ideology is one
of the few constructs widely studied in contemporary political science to originate
directly within political science itself (Knight 2006, 619). In her study of the history of
ideology in political science literature, Knight (2006) reports that the term "ideology"
has grown substantially over time, and it now occupies a central role in research. During
the first decade of the American Political Science Review, only 2.6 percent of articles

included "ideology" or a variant (620). By 1976, 50 percent of articles published in the

18

APSR included the term ideology, and the percentage remained high into the 2000s
(620).
Specific definitions of political ideology vary widely, but political science has
worked with a few core definitions over the years. The original usage of ideology in
politics was as slander against intellectual and political opponents in the 19th Century,
used by figures such as Napoleon and Marx against opponents whom they saw as being
dogmatically unreasonable and biased against their own views about government and
political economy (620). Ideology at this time was synonymous with bias and falseconsciousness. This "blinding worldview" usage of ideology is characterized by the idea
that an ideological person has a worldview permeating their ideas and that worldview
insidiously causes them to be unable to see alternative or contrasting viewpoints. Early
political scientists also used ideology in the “blinding worldview” sense in our journals
(albeit with much less fiery rhetoric than a political speech by Napoleon or Marx). It is
important to note, though, that prior to 1930, the use of "ideology" in political science
literature is overall quite scarce (620). It is unsurprising that a term used by political
revolutionaries to score political points and brand opponents was not used frequently
by more restrained political scientists, but it also demonstrates that political scientists
had not yet come to understand how ideology could be a tool for understanding belief
structures in the mass public.

World War II increased attention to the study of ideologies, as communism,
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fascism, socialism, and Marxism became hotly studied topics in political science
literature (Knight 2006, 621). Ideology during this period continued to be defined as a
collection of interrelated beliefs or a worldview. As before, the "blinding worldview"
was employed against opposing viewpoints in a slanderous way, boldly painting
opponents as biased or close-minded. It is during this period, however, that ideology as
"blinding worldview" began to give way to a new usage of "worldview system,"
dropping the insulting or accusatory tone. By "worldview system," I mean that political
scientists began to recognize that structures of interconnected values and attitudes
existed in states and individuals, and these worldview structures did not automatically
suggest a bias. For example, our literature began to understand that the much-praised
liberal democracy was itself an ideology. A political scientist writing in 1942, for
example, approvingly called the Monroe Doctrine an "ideological fence against fascism"
(Wilcox 1942). So, we have two different usages of ideology being used side-by-side in
the World War 2 period: the "blinding worldview" and the "worldview system." I want
to note in passing that both usages are still wreathed in the idea of conflict between
world-views. Also, again, it is worth mentioning that "ideology" was still a relatively
uncommon subject in political science literature through the 1930s and into the 1940s
(Knight 2006, 619-620).
Ideology continued to evolve through the 1940s and beyond, gaining new
relevance in the midst of all the "-isms" of the post-war era. The rise of “-isms” as a

powerful force in the global political environment gave rise to the use of ideology in
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political science literature. Knight notes that 70 percent of articles mentioning ideology
between 1947-1956 also mentioned communism or Marxism (2006, 621). Ideology
continued to be connected to "-isms" into the McCarthyism Cold War era and beyond,
but we can notice that political science's positivist turn seemed to have contributed to
the abandonment of the "blinding worldview" usage in favor of the "worldview system"
usage (the negative connotation of "ideology" remained, however, and remains to this
day—but instead of a blatant accusation, it had been reduced to a connotation at
worst). For one example of the "worldview system" usage gaining prominence, we can
observe that Samuel Huntington, writing in 1957, defined ideology as "a system of ideas
concerned with the distribution of political and social values and acquiesced in by a
significant social group"—a clean, clinical definition of what was once used in
uproarious, accusatory political speeches a hundred years prior. Knight notes this
transition: "although the coherent and relatively stable set of beliefs or values has
remained constant in political science over time, the connotations associated with the
concept have undergone transformation" (625).
Even in this later era, however, the new and more neutral usage of ideology as
"worldview system" still had a broad, complex, and sometimes contradictory usage
within the discipline (Gerring 1997). There was confusion as to the proper level of study
for ideology; it could be variably applied to states, governments, institutions, groups, or
the individual (Minar 1961). Minar, writing in 1961, summarized the then-current usage

of ideology as "particularly vulnerable to vagueness and overgeneralization," but
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nonetheless noted with admiration that "the complete study of ideology is perhaps
necessarily eclectic as to level and technique, as the best in the traditions of the
discipline of political science has tended to be" (331). Interestingly, Minar's review of
ideology appears to have predicted Converse's later work on ideology: Minar illustrates
the importance of using psychological methodology to study ideology (329) and
suggests that the difficulty of understanding ideology "perhaps be avoided when
hypotheses are developed at a 'finer' level, i.e. when analysis proceeds on an individual
psychological basis" (329). Minar directly influences Converse's groundbreaking study
(and, highlights once again the "borrower" nature of political science).
It was in the 1960s that political science began to more narrowly and
consistently define ideology as a value-neutral theoretical construct. The discipline's
contemporary use and conception of political ideology begins with Phillip Converse
(2006[1964]). Converse himself initially avoided using the term "ideology" because it
was "thoroughly muddled," preferring the term "belief structures" in order to narrow
down one particular facet of ideology he believed especially worthwhile for study (3). In
essence, he was trying to separate out two terminological uses of ideology in order to
focus on a third use, ideology as a belief structure. In other words, he was culling the
blinding worldview and worldview system usage. Knight remarks "it is important to see
Converse's contribution in the context of the times. By proposing that ideology was
reflected in the representation of preferences on a liberal-conservative continuum, the

spatial definition removed the negative implications of bias or false consciousness"
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(2006, 623). "Belief structure" continues to be used in political science to this day, but as
Converse explains, the "obvious overlap" between belief structures and ideology are
apparent and hard to separate functionally (3). In contemporary research, when political
scientists speak of ideology they are nearly always speaking of a kind of belief structure,
and consequently, terminology has converged (see Knight 2006). It converged for
Converse, too; even as he was trying to avoid the muddled usage of ideology, he still
used the term interchangeably with belief structure (2006[1964], 3). In the very same
article that Converse shies away from using the term ideology, he nonetheless finds
himself using it again. He writes that "belief systems that have relatively wide
ranges...are broadly called ideologies and we shall use the term for aesthetic relief
where it seems most appropriate" (2006[1964], 5).
Seemingly following Minar's suggestions, Converse proposed what Gerring
(1997) and Knight (2006) have called the core definition of ideology: ideology as
coherence and issue constraint. The field followed Converse on this choice. Gerring
writes, "if all the senses of the term ideology are attended to, I would argue that only
one trait meets [the criterion of universality]. The importance of coherence—aka
'consistency' or 'constraint'—is virtually unchallenged in the social science literature"
(1997, 980). Knight writes in agreement, "this consensus is reflected in the 'core
definition' of coherence, regardless of what other conceptual baggage might be
imposed on the concept, the notion of ideology remains a relatively stable set of
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interrelated ideas" (2006, 623). Knight also mentions the connection between ideology
and conflict: "beyond this, the crucial element of contrast—the notion that one set of
beliefs competes against another—is implicit in discussion of party ideologies, 'ists,' and
'isms'" (623).
For Converse, the central defining element of political ideology is the idea of
coherence, which is operationalized as issue constraint. For the collection of attitudes to
have an underlying structure (a "belief system" or an "ideology"), outsiders who are
given one attitude as a starting point should be able to predict additional attitudes held
by the ideological individual. Holding one attitude should constrain what other attitudes
that person may hold, if they have an ideological structure to their political attitudes.
The collection of attitudes that a person could hold would be interrelated along
ideological lines. In contrast, holding a random collection of attitudes without any
consistency or restraint between them is non-ideological—there is no structure to the
belief system. Knight (2006) identifies this as the core definition of ideology (despite
widely varying usage from the 1800s until today) and she also offers that this definition
is the most popularly used conception in political science since the 1960s due to
Converse's influence on the issue. Converse's work on defining ideology has been
tremendously influential in political science, but also in other social sciences (Kinder
2006, Bennet 2006, Jost 2006).
From Converse, political scientists inherited a definition of ideology that they
(and other social scientists) could use to help understand belief structures in the mass

public. As noted above, over 50 percent of articles in the flagship journal of political
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science make a mention of the word ideology from the 1970s into the 2000s (Knight
2006, 620), demonstrating the importance and utility of the Conversian understanding
of ideology for political scientists both past and present, with no signs of slowing down
in the future.
Structure of Ideology: Left and Right
Having outlined the origins of political ideology in political science, we move now
to an examination of the structure of ideology today. The divide between the political
right and the left is a surprisingly timeless paradigm for politics. From the Spartans and
Athenians in ancient Greece to the French Revolution and beyond, politically interested
human beings in the past and present have found themselves divided on questions of
tradition versus change, security versus freedom, and hierarchy versus individualism.
Human beings will continue to have these conflicts of vision no matter which planet we
find ourselves inhabiting.
One part of what makes the left-right division in politics so striking is its ubiquity.
The left-right construct is not only useful to social scientists for describing political
behavior—it is also a heuristic that is popularly used by the public. Political scientists have
often thought of ideology as a continuum, and we have used spatial ideological modeling
to great effect in describing political agents like legislatures (Poole and Rosenthal 2001,
Poole 2005), presidents (Treier 2010) and courts (Martin and Quinn 2002). And, even in
popular media, one can hear frequent use of spatial concepts for organizing political
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groups. Presidential candidates appeal to the “wings” of their party (the more radical
party members figuratively spread out from the center) during the primary election. Once
selected by their party, they appeal to “the middle” towards moderate voters. In the
2012 presidential election, Republican Rick Santorum was tied to the “Far-Right” for his
political beliefs on abortion, while Democrat Barack Obama was labeled by political
opponents as a member of the “Far-Left” because of his universal health care plan.
Republican Mitt Romney’s primary campaign in 2012 was described as a way to “move to
the right” to appeal to more radical conservatives who were skeptical of Romney’s
politically moderate tenure as governor of Massachusetts.

Democratic-leaning

independent Bernie Sanders was originally a “far-left” protest candidate of Democratic
centrist Hillary Clinton’s 2016 presidential campaign. Politically sophisticated American
citizens and media use these terms in everyday discussions. As Jost (2006) writes, “even
casual observers of today’s headlines, newscasts, and late night talk shows cannot escape
the feeling that ideology is everywhere” (Jost 2006, 652). A Google web search in May
2016 reveals over 185 million results for “liberal,” 137 million results for “conservative,”
and 49.3 million results for “ideology.”
What does it mean to be left or right in the United States? Ellis and Stimson
provide excellent summaries of the popular conception of the two political ideologies in
Ideology in America (2011). In the United States and in some other places, liberal is
associated with leftist politics, while conservative is associated with rightist politics. To
be liberal in the United States means you embrace the idea of equality of opportunity

for all, and you see government as the primary tool for balancing out unequal starts
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(Ellis and Stimson 2011, 3). Liberals believe that a market economy provides benefits to
society, but that it has dangerous outcomes to disadvantaged groups, thus requiring
government to be a firm regulator (4). The role of government is also to establish
standards for the social order, in markets and for public goods (4). Liberals embrace
freedom for private, non-economic choices in lifestyle and religion, with religion
considered to be outside the proper scope of government. To be conservative in the
United States means that you believe that families and communities are the driving
forces of society, not government (5). Government often lacks the moral imperative
and practical feasibility to correct market failures and address other economic
considerations (5). The free market may have issues, but government is ill-equipped to
make adjustments, often making problems worse instead of correcting them (6).
Conservatives support economic freedoms and income inequality, believing that both of
these tend to lead towards a greater economic prosperity for society over time (5).
Government should be limited, but they do have responsibility for providing safe and
effective market transactions, as well as help enforce property rights and private
contracts (5). In terms of private social behavior, conservatives tend to split into two
camps. One group favors a strong government for promoting traditional values,
enforcing order in society, and preserving the role of religion in public life (6). A
different group is more libertarian in outlook, and they instead desire freedom in social
affairs in parallel with freedoms in economic life (6).

Psychologist John Jost has studied political ideology from a social psychologist
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perspective, focusing on the psychological factors that may motivate conservative
beliefs. Jost and colleagues have determined two primary factors divide liberals and
conservatives most fundamentally: (a) advocating versus resisting social change (as
opposed to tradition) and (b) rejecting versus accepting inequality (Jost et al. 2003, Jost
2006, Jost and Amodio 2012).
While other systems have made interesting contributions to the study of political
belief structures and ideology (for example, the Moral Foundations Theory of Haidt and
Graham 2007, Graham et al. 2009, Haidt et al. 2009 and the Cultural Cognition Theory of
Gastil et al. 2011), none of them outright reject the basic liberal versus conservative
pattern. Generally speaking, the liberal versus conservative dichotomy is preserved
quite well in new systems, although most conceptualize liberal and conservative
differences in a multidimensional framework instead of one-dimensional. For example,
a common multidimensional model of political ideology divides social issues from
economic issues. Even with two dimensions, one can see the liberal versus conservative
conflict. Social liberals conflict with social conservatives alongside economic liberals and
economic conservatives. We can increase specificity of ideology with new systems, but
the left-right divide remains surprisingly intact. Overall, I believe the ubiquitous leftright divide occupies a central place in the study of political behavior for political
scientists, and it serves as good common-ground for political scientists and psychologists

to meet. However, we do need to take seriously the consequences of multiple
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dimensions of political ideology. We take up this conversation in the next section.
Dimensions of Political Ideology
Typically, political scientists and researchers in related fields have argued for a
simple one-dimensional scale of general liberalism versus conservatism. Researchers
have articulated ideology as a one-dimensional construct (Knight 1999, 2006; Jost et al.
2009). This scale has served the research literature generally well over time, and it holds
much predictive power (Knight 1999; 2006; Jost et al. 2009). The most popular scale of
measuring political ideology is self-identification on a seven point Likert scale (see, for
example, the time-honored American National Election Studies). In this scale, individuals
are asked to place themselves on a seven point, fully labeled scale from “Very liberal” to
“Very conservative,” with the midpoint of four labeled “moderate.” However, political
scientists focused on the measurement of ideology in the mass public have often found
ideology to be more complex than this simple scale, requiring two new understandings.
First, ideological appears multidimensional, and the dimensions are most likely
economic policy and social policy. Second, there appear to be differences in how
ideology manifests in elites versus the mass public.
Political elites fit the one-dimensional scale well, given their strong attitudes and
their well-sorted party identification (Kritzer 1978; Jennings 1992; Fiorina et al. 2005;
Abramowitz and Saunders 2008; Lewis-Beck et al. 2008). Additionally, the Conversian
definition of ideology as attitudinal constraint seems to work well for political elites
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(Kritzer 1978, Jennings 1992, Lewis-Beck et al. 2008). However, even for political elites,
we have some cause to question what the scale is actually measuring (see, for example,
Conover and Feldman 1981). It is plausible that the one-dimensional scale is descriptive
of whatever current, ongoing elite ideological conflict is happening, rather than a stable
grouping of values. If true, conservatism on the scale may not be defined by underlying
or abstract conservative values, but instead by whatever self-described conservative
elites have packaged together. The debate over same-sex marriage in 2013 within the
Republican party is an example of elites trying to redefine what conservatism is, rather
than trying to define their position against a static benchmark for what conservatism
means (see Socarides 2013).
The validity of measuring the ideology of the mass public on a one-dimensional
scale has generated a lengthy discussion in the political science literature, as numerous
researchers both past and present have argued that the one-dimensional model is
underspecified, simplistic, or simply empirically absent from the mass public (Stimson
1975, Conover and Feldman 1981; Kerlinger 1984; Peffley and Hurwitz 1985; Page and
Shapiro 1992; Jacoby 1995; Kinder 1998; Stimson 2004; Jacoby 2009; Haidt et al. 2009;
Treier and Hillygus 2009; Ellis and Stimson 2009, 2012; Popp and Rudolph 2011;
Carmines et al. 2012, Hussey 2012). Measuring ideology in the mass public has been of
tremendous interest in the political science literature. The first argument about the
nature of belief systems in the mass public claims that the public is mostly non-

ideological (Converse 2006 [1964]); consequently, both one-dimensional and
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multidimensional conceptions are equally ill-suited to describing the public.
A secondary argument, however, posits that the mass public is multidimensional
in its belief structures (Treier and Hillygus 2009; Hussey 2012; Carmines et al. 2012), and
the mismatch between elites (who are one-dimensional) and the mass public (who are
multidimensional) creates problems for measuring belief structures in the mass public.
These studies note the special challenges of being a cross-pressured voter in a political
environment where elites are one-dimensional. A voter who is liberal on one dimension
(e.g. social issues) and conservative on the other dimension (e.g. economic issues)
becomes underrepresented by elites, leading to lower political participation (Hussey
2012; Carmines et al. 2012) as well as confusion about their place on a one-dimensional
ideology scale (Treier and Hillygus 2009; Hussey 2012).
Here is an example of that potential confusion. Libertarian voters (socially liberal
but economically conservative) have trouble answering our ideological placement
questions. When asked by the American National Election Studies to place themselves
on a one-dimensional scale of liberalism-conservatism, libertarians are conflicted. Do
they circle the middle reflecting the sum of their diverse attitudes? This is problematic
for researcher interpretation because self-placement in the middle could also imply they
are apathetic, moderate, or that they do not understand what the labels mean. But in
this case, none of those possible explanations are true. These libertarian voters are
both politically interested and fairly radical in their beliefs; they did not know how to
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place themselves because the scale simple does not fit their belief structure. There are
other problems, too. Libertarians who routinely vote Republican may self-place
themselves on the conservative side of the spectrum, misinterpreting that the surveyor
is asking them about partisanship or perhaps identifying as conservative because the
label is politically charged at the moment (think of the Tea Party movement).
The conclusion from this line of research suggests that a multidimensional scale
will reduce measurement error. If the mass public is ideological at all, that is. We pick
up this topic in the next section.
Why does the dimensionality of political ideology matter for the current research
project? First, virtually all of the political psychology literature on the connection
between ideology and various psychological factors measure ideology on a onedimensional scale. Political science literature suggests, however, that using a onedimensional scale may not fit the public very well, presenting the possibility that most
work on this subject could be improved by introducing multidimensionality to their
measures. Second, having difficulty capturing the mass public on a one-dimensional
scale has traditionally been interpreted as evidence that the public is non-ideological, as
most scholars conclude based on the Conversian tradition. This could be incorrect,
however. If the public were actually multidimensional in their political ideology, trying
to fit them on a single dimension would similarly fail. Moving forward, to study ideology
properly requires social scientists to include multidimensionality.

Political Ideology in the Mass Public
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Does the mass public even think about politics in ideological terms or understand
what political ideology is? If political ideology is having a relatively stable and logically
coherent belief system, few people meet that standard, according to Converse (2006
[1964]). Using American National Election Study data from 1956 to evaluate the public’s
view, Converse estimates that only about 12 percent of the electorate uses ideological
thinking to organize their political beliefs, based on the attitudinal constraint definition
of ideology.
Converse finds that only a small fraction of the mass public organizes their
political beliefs according to broad and abstract principles. So, then, how do they
organize their beliefs, if at all? Converse grouped survey responses into five categories
of attitude structures: ideologue, near-ideologue, group interests, nature of the times,
and no issue content. Ideologues are people who exhibit some evidence of ideological
thinking, by articulating abstract principles and using conceptual dimensions to evaluate
political actors. Near ideologues are those who used ideological thinking in a brief or
incomplete way, yet did make at least a minimal appeal to abstract principles. Group
interests were people who did not use ideological precepts and instead made
evaluations based on the favorable or unfavorable treatment of groups in society
(working against “the common man,” favoring “big business”). Nature of the times
describes people who praised or blamed political actors based on the actors’ association
with either good times or bad times in the recent past. Finally, there is a residual
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category for respondents who had virtually no structure to their political attitudes and
were unable to articulate an organization for their beliefs at all.
This data is from one study in the 1960s and no matter how incredibly influential
this piece is, we ought to look at more data. Lewis-Beck et al. (2008) closely followed
Converse’s methodology on attitude structures and updated observations about the
mass public using 2000 and 2004 American National Election Studies data. The number
of people who are ideologues and near-ideologues had increased from 11.5 percent to
19.8 percent of the population since Converse published his research in 1964. 20
percent of the population is twice what Converse found, although it still remains a
minority of the mass public.
Political scientists disagree over these claims, however. Political scientists have
tended to agree that political elites are polarized around ideology and partisanship.
Political elites are broadly defined as people with high levels of political knowledge,
political interest, and political participation (sometimes this group is also called political
sophisticates or the political class). High levels of political engagement and political
sophistication characterize them, and they also have strong, durable political beliefs
(Abramowitz 2010; Claassen and Highton 2009; Levendusky 2009). Political elites can
include elected government officials, but it can also refer to private citizens with an
intense interest in political affairs. Political scientists are in agreement that political
elites are polarized along the Left-Right continuum, and they have grown more
ideologically polarized over time. The theme of elite polarization on a liberal-

conservative continuum is a major one in current political behavior studies
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(Hetherington 2001; Fiorina et al. 2005; Lewis-Beck et al. 2008; Abramowitz and
Saunders 2008; Fiorina and Abrams 2008).
While political scientists agree about elites, they have an ongoing (and
passionate) debate about political polarization in the mass public. A popular and
influential book by Morris Fiorina (Culture War?, 2005) argues that while elite
polarization is dangerously increasing over time, everyday citizens themselves have
virtually no ideological polarization. In Fiorina’s analysis, he demonstrates relatively
small differences in opinion between red states and blue states (49), as well as only mild
differences in opinion between self-placed Republicans and Democrats on
contemporary political issues (65). Claassen and Highton (2009) find support for Fiorina,
and they suggest that party elite polarization has been increasing and that the public
still continues to be unmotivated to become politically aware. RePass joins in this
debate on the side of Fiorina, demonstrating in his analysis that only 7.4 percent of
potential voters in the United States were found to be both strongly conservative and
strongly Republican, while only 3.2 percent were both strongly liberal and strongly
Democratic (2008). RePass also reports that 62.4 percent of the American public is
functionally non-ideological, meaning they do not adhere to abstract ideological
principles on either the left or the right (2008). This line of argument tends to lead
towards Conversian conclusions about the mass public—regular people simply are not
animated by ideological principles. Fiorina’s work describes a mass public that is

distinctly moderate and characterized by rather strong agreement about the issues
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(instead of being locked in ideological conflict).
Abramowitz and Saunders (2008) disagree intensely with Fiorina, arguing that a
substantially large segment of the mass public is ideological and growing more
ideological over time. Abramowitz and Saunders find little evidence of polarization in
the least politically engaged third of the public (agreeing with Fiorina here) but they find
that most engaged third is significantly polarized (2008, 546). Moreover, they also argue
that polarization actually has some benefits for increasing political interest and
participation, by energizing voters and increasing political participation. This debate
between the Fiorina camp and the Abramowitz camp continues to this day to be fairly
spirited, inspiring new research (Fiorina et al. 2008; Abramowitz 2010). These scholars
all agree that political elites are sharply polarized, and have grown more polarized over
time. They disagree over the ideological polarization of the mass public.
Arguments over the polarization the public may give us suggestions about
whether the public’s attitude structures are ideological in nature, but it does not fully
satisfy the basic Conversian project of exploring whether the mass public adheres to
ideological belief systems because political polarization does not require political
ideology but could be dependent mostly on partisan identity (or even, as recently
suggested by Iyengar and colleagues, by emotional affect (Iyengar et al. 2012); see also
Huddy et al. 2015). The most direct evidence we have, therefore, is from the studies of
Converse and followers (Lewis-Beck et al. 2008; see also McGuire 1986; Tedin, 1987). In

his original work, Converse demonstrated that few in the mass public thought about
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politics in terms of ideology, but there has been a strong growth of ideological thinkers
in more recent time, according to Lewis-Beck and colleagues (who have deliberately
replicated Converse’s methodology as closely as possible). Overall, it seems that
political scientists mostly agree that the number of people in the mass public who fully
structure their political attitudes according to ideological principles is small but perhaps
growing. Political science is not the only social science to look at political ideology,
however, and we will see that political psychologists and social psychologists have
interesting insights that political scientists have overlooked.
In a 2006 retrospective on his work, Converse eagerly commented on the view
born from his work that citizens mostly have nonattitudes and/or are non-ideological
(Converse 2006). Converse quickly addresses the issue as a strawman argument of the
worst kind. He states, “to my eye, the worst common misinterpretation of the essay
attributes to me the claim that most citizens have only "nonattitudes" on questions of
public policy. It is my contention, I am told, that "real" policy opinions are in very short
supply” (300). In his own words, he states a viewpoint that the public has many
ideological beliefs, with only 22 percent of his original sample have completely nonpolitical viewpoints (301). He says, “In short, I have found it very hard to understand
this misreading about few in the electorate holding any "real" policy attitudes. It is
almost as though the misreader believes our argument to be that citizens must be either
full ideologues or near to it (12 percent of the electorate) or else that they have no

"real" policy attitudes. This is quite unimaginable to me” (303). Converse himself
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believes that “full ideologue” is perhaps a very tall bar to leap for the mass public, and a
failure to hit that threshold does not indicate that people are completely nonideological.
Indeed, is it possible that these scholars have simply “defined away” ideology by
making its requirements too steep? (Jost 2006, 653). Converse had a tremendous
impact on psychologists studying political ideology, effectively closing down the study of
political ideology (651). “The deadening impact of these conclusions on the study of
ideology in social, personality, and political psychology can scarcely be exaggerated”
(Jost 2006, 651-652). Jost criticizes the entire group of ideology scholars for having a
standard for ideological thinking that was too strict, with too many prerequisites (650652).
Following Tedin 1987, Jost proposes the definition of political ideology is better
thought of as an interrelated set of moral and political attitudes possessing cognitive,
affective, and motivational components (Jost 2006, 653). This standard, more flexible
and broader than Converse’s, “gives ordinary citizens a reasonable chance of empirically
satisfying the criteria of being ideological” (654) and allows Jost to issue a call for
psychologists and political scientists to reopen the study of political ideology. Jost
points us to Kerlinger (1984) who writes as if to summarize this point:
Whether conservatism and liberalism are typically conceptual tools for
the man-in-the-street is not the central point. For the scientist, too,
liberalism and conservatism are abstractions like any other abstract
concepts he works with: introversion, intelligence, radicalism,
achievement, political development and the like. To be sure, most
people don’t recognize their abstract nature and certainly don’t use them

as social scientists do. Nevertheless, they are quite familiar with their
behavioral and environmental manifestations. (217)
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Political scientists have been primarily concerned with the question of whether
elites and the public organize their politics around ideological principles and how
consistent they are in the expression of those principles—thus emphasizing defining and
measuring ideology instead of explaining why individuals, groups, or societies gravitate
towards ideological persuasions (Jost 2006, 654). The insight of Jost and Kerlinger is
that human beings do not have to intellectually understand ideological thinking in order
to be found using it. When looking at the most influential work from political scientists
on this question, Jost’s charge seems fair—Converse and his followers have frequently
defined ideological thinking in terms of whether citizens can explain what ideology is,
whether they can accurately frame their opinions in ideological terms, and whether they
can accurately place political actors on a political ideology continuum. These are
important questions worthy of continued analysis. However, just because people do
not understand political ideology does not mean they are not ideological. Moreover, as
Sullivan and colleagues taught us about the mass public and ideology, people are highly
sensitive to the method of measurement employed (Sullivan et al. 1978). Ask questions
as Converse did, and the public largely looks non-ideological. However, change the
questions as Nie and colleagues did (Nie and Anderson, 1974; Nie et al. 1976), and
ideology in the mass public swells to much higher rates. In this respect, ideology is
similar to religious belief—it is difficult to parse out, but there is little doubt that

religiosity varies widely among the population and can be a driving force in some
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people’s lives.
Jost (2006) marshals some empirical support for the claim that the mass public is
more ideological today than in the quieter 1950s-60s when Converse was collecting his
data. First, note that Stimson (1975) argued that more than a majority of the actual
electorate had evidence of an ideological belief structure according to Conversian
definition (414). Second, Judd and Milburn (1980) analyzed data from the 1970s and
found it to “pose a substantial threat to Converse’s original hypothesis that the attitude
responses of the public at large are unstable, nearly random responses” (82). In an
analysis of ANES data conducted by Jost, he finds that over two-thirds of respondents
since 1972, and over three-fourths since 1996 were willing to place themselves on a
scale of liberalism-conservatism, even when provided explicit “don’t know” answer
item options. Overall, self-placement on the scales are reasonably accurate (Conover &
Feldman, 1981; Evans, Heath, & Lalljee, 1996; Feldman, 2003; Knight, 1999).
Additionally, the scale has tremendously strong predictive usefulness, explaining 85% of
the variance in presidential vote choice (Jost 2006, 658).
Some political scientists have joined this chorus as well. In their book
Predisposed, authors Hibbing, Smith, and Alford write: “Ideology is not, as Converse and
his many followers claimed, merely the ability to describe currently popular labels or to
endorse collections of positions that meet with the approval of political scientists”
(2014, 56). Like Jost, they argue that ideological thinking is a core part of human nature:

40
“Ideology is us” (56). Ideological thinking is due to bedrock social and political problems
that draw roots from our evolutionary heritage. “The [political] division is real and
unavoidable, and it centers on distinct orientations to mass-scale social life…ideology…is
not, as the ‘end of ideology’ school asserted, a concept that just popped out fresh and
new from Renaissance thought, only to fade from sight with the end of the Cold War”
(55-56).
Ellis and Stimson (2012) similarly reject Conversian claims about ideology,
writing that “whatever the well-documented weaknesses and randomness of individuallevel political opinions (see Converse 1964 for the still authoritative treatment), we
expect to find power and simplicity when we look at the summary preferences of the
whole electorate over time” (37). In their analysis, Ellis and Stimson find that large
segments of the population that can be categorized into four ideological groups
(operationally vs. symbolically, liberal vs. conservative). Ellis and Stimson easily concede
that the voters may not be capable of articulating their own underlying belief structure,
but the big picture of the data tells a clear story. For example, in their most recent year
of data (2006) they find that 25% of the public is operationally liberal but symbolically
conservative (Figure 5.5, 98). This “mismatched” ideological specification would have
failed Converse’s test, effectively labeling a quarter of the population non-ideological
under his terms. But, in reality, this group has a consistent set of professed values
(typically conservative) and also a consistent design for how they want government to
function (typically liberal). It is not a contradiction or a confusion. They are church-

going, gun-owning patriots who support minimum wage and believe it is the role of
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government to provide housing for the poor (Table 5.5, 105). They may be conflicted
conservatives (Ellis and Stimson 2012, 111) but they are consistently so in their attitudes
about social life and government prerogatives.
Jost, Hibbing, and other political psychologists propose that ideological thinking
plays a critical role in social cognition—the way human beings encode, store, process,
and retrieve social information. Studies from these researchers reveal meaningful
political and psychological differences between liberals and conservatives that co-vary
with dispositional and situational variables. Political ideology is tied more deeply into
the human experience than we may have realized, and this area deserves more
attention from political scientists.
Next, we turn to new research in political science and political psychology that
explores the psychological and physiological correlations to political ideology. Two large
theories have emerged to describe the underlying mechanical structures of a host of
various studies on the psychological and physiological traits of political adherents. We
outline these two theories and point to an area of the literature that needs better
specification in order for us to understand how liberals and conservatives differ from
each other in their traits and dispositions.
New Approaches to the Study of Political Attitudes
The study of biological origins of politics could be considered to have started
shortly after the discipline itself was founded (Aristotle's famous "man is a political

animal"). In the modern state of the discipline, E.O. Wilson's writings on sociobiology

42

(Wilson 1979) kickstarted an intense debate over biological determinism that appears to
have resulted in a cooling of the entire research program. More recently, renewed
interest from political scientists and psychologists have reinvigorated the field of study.
They have faced less criticism from other academics compared to the earlier generation,
perhaps partially because of increased scientific literacy across fields, or perhaps due to
increasing tolerance for other methodologies, or perhaps partially because of a
concerted effort by these new wave biopolitical scientists to express the unification of
nature and nurture, instead of being ambivalent or depicting them as opposing forces.
Very recently, scholars have begun to connect some of the dots between political
science and biology by calling for a new look at the evolutionary origins of politics
(Hatemi and McDermott 2011).
What is “biopolitics” as a subfield of political behavior? Somit and Peterson
define biopolitics as a “short-hand term used to describe the approach of those in the
profession who believe that biological concepts—especially evolutionary theory, which
treats behaviour as the product of both nature and nurture—and biological research
techniques can help us study and understand political behaviour better” (1999, 559).
Alford and Hibbing write “a biological approach to political science is hardly new… in
fact, biopolitics stretches back nearly as far as behavioral politics; both approaches
found their first enthusiastic practitioners in the behavioral revolution of the 1960s”
(2008, 184). The first review of the biopolitics literature was published in 1972,

summarizing the findings and theoretical underpinnings of forty articles (Somit 1972).
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Biopolitics received formal disciplinary recognition in 1973 when the IPSA Research
Committee on Biology and Politics was formed (560). The Association for Politics and
Life Sciences was formed in 1981 and launched a dedicated journal, Politics and the Life
Sciences, in 1983 (560). By 1998, Somit and Peterson note that the biopolitics literature
had increased to over 1200 articles (1998, 560).
However, the state of biopolitics research in political science proper has always
been questionable even as it was growing. Somit and Peterson note the vast majority of
this literature was featured in journals outside of political science, and the top tier
journals were largely abandoning the publishing of biopolitics work (1998, 561). Somit
and Peterson (1999) express disappointment in the lack of biopolitics research in
political science of that time, and they attribute this dearth of research to (a) losing
shared theoretical space with rational choice, (b) residual distaste for ill-founded social
Darwinism accusations and implications of racist associations with earlier biopolitics
work, and (c) hesitation of new scholars to engage the work because of negative career
implications. Alford and Hibbing note the departure in methodology between early
behaviorists and early biopolitics researchers: behaviorists took an empirical approach
where instead “biopolitics [had] remained largely theoretical, descriptive, and
speculative” (Alford and Hibbing 2008, 184). Even the negative associations with social
Darwinism aside, biopolitics appears to have stagnated because political science grew

44
increasingly interested in empirical study, and early biopolitics researchers did not share
this interest, or had methodological difficulty.
This changed in the 2000s. A groundbreaking study by Alford et al. (2005) used
twin data to reveal the surprising inheritability of political attitudes and party
identification. Fowler and colleagues followed swiftly afterward with two studies
demonstrating the heritability and genetics of political participation (Fowler et al. 2008;
Fowler and Dawes 2008). These studies were published in top tier journals and were
empirical in methodology. They opened a floodgate of empirical biopolitics work within
the pages of political science’s top journals (including, also, high-profile criticism; see
Charney 2008; Charney and English 2012).
Why Biological Models?
Political behavior researchers have traditionally used two approaches for
explaining human action in politics—situational and individual (Hatemi and McDermott,
2011, 13). Socialization models exemplify the situational approach, positing that the
environment creates, shapes, and reinforces the political behavior of the individual that
ascends from that environment. The individual approach, in contrast, is exemplified by
rational-choice modeling, which asserts that individual behavior responds to changing
incentive payoff schedules. As Hatemi and McDermott note, "in their most reduced
form, behavioral models argue that all behavior results from social conditioning
(Campbell et al. 1960), while rational-choice models assume preferences are exogenous,
fixed, and given, and remain agnostic, if not unconcerned, about their source (Bueno de

Mesquita 1983)" (Hatemi and McDermott, 2011, 13). Both of these perspectives are
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environmental in the sense that environmental changes drive all of the important
effects in the models. Changing socioeconomic status or changing the payoffs for
defecting is proposed to substantially change the behavior of subjects.
Models from both approaches have had a huge impact on the discipline of
political science as a whole, and they continue to be productive lines of research that
increase understanding and knowledge of political behavior. Over time, however, many
other scientific disciplines challenged the assumptions of both socialization/behavioral
models and rational-choice models (Green and Shapiro 1994; Robson and Kaplan 2003).
Hatemi and McDermott note that "numerous challenges from economics, psychology,
neuroscience, and other fields have found that not all people are socialized to act the
same way; rational-choice models also hold limited explanatory capacity by remaining
almost exclusively focused on choices motivated by unrealistically narrow conceptions
of self-interest (Dawes and Thaler 1988; Tversky and Thaler 1990; Fehr and Gächter
2000; Gintis 2000; Henrich et al. 2001, Fehr and Fischbacher 2004).”
These environmental models necessarily are silent on the human being prior to
interaction with the environment. This is not a fundamental flaw to the research
program, but we no longer need to treat the pre-environment psychological/biological
being as a black box to be ignored. We already intuitively understand that humans do
not enter into the environment as blank slates. People within a common environment
(say, a small community) can have rather divergent opinions on politics, or could have

very different preferences for monetary inducements. Race, gender, social class, and
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culture have powerful effects on political behavior, but within these subgroups is
disagreement about political candidates and political issues. Even within families there
is a surprising diversity of opinion—two siblings raised in the same household have an
environment in common and yet regularly hold different political beliefs. The point here
is that the environmental effects are not universal—every human reacts differently to
every environmental effect. We are beginning to fashion the tools we need to start
understanding why and how people are different prior to the important environmental
effects.
Given our evolutionary history, purely economic models of human behavior
seem dubious as explanations for the sum of human political behavior. "The process of
natural selection is based upon adaptive traits beginning at a much earlier period in
human development, where pure economic power-seeking and self-interest were not
the only potential adaptive traits, if such traits were adaptive at all. Certainly many
important human social and political traits, including detecting kin, selecting mates,
foraging for food, avoiding predators, and detecting cheaters, evolved in a context prior
to modern market conditions" (Hatemi and McDermott 2011, 13). We should not be
surprised that it takes an exceptionally large monetary incentive to get human beings to
defect from those who share close kinship, given how central such an impulse seems to
be to our evolutionary psychology (Trivers 1971; Kruger 2003; Axelrod and Hamilton
2006). Economic models also seem to be unable to explain our tendency to want to

punish defectors even when it costs us personally to do so, and we expect to not
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recover the costs of punishment (Gintis 2003).
Biological models have the potential to contribute to the existing sociological
and economic behavioral models in political science by offering a theoretical
explanation for these behavioral effects that the other models consider paradoxes
(Hatemi and McDermott 2011). But even more centrally, evolutionary political science
offers to investigate a large paradox in the study of political behavior: "simply put, our
current theories and examinations largely assume that all people are biologically the
same when it comes to politics, which is a radical notion considering how remarkably
diverse humans are in virtually every other domain” (Hatemi and McDermott 2011, 18).
With these insights in mind, calls for an ambitious program of political
neuroscience began in the 2000s from a number of researchers connected closely to
biopolitics in political science (Marcus et al. 1998, McDermott 2004, Schreiber 2006,
Fowler and Schreiber 2008, McDermott 2009; Hatemi and McDermott 2011; Schreiber
2011) as well as in political psychology (Lieberman and Schreiber 2003, Cacioppo and
Visser 2003, Amodio and Jost 2007, Jost and Amodio 2012). As we shall see in the next
section, political neuroscience offers new methodological tools to study our core
questions about political ideology. For the present study of political ideology, biological
investigations promise to be revealing—political ideology is likely an evolutionary
adaptation that human beings evolved in response to the social nature of human groups
(Thornhill and Fincher, 2007; Hatemi and McDermott, 2011; Fincher et al. 2008).

Two Psychological Theories Emerge
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The recent reawakening of the biopolitics and political attitudes research
program in political science has been coupled with a similar revival of interest in political
ideology in social psychology. While there is a myriad of studies in the literature tying
various psychological, physiological, neurological, and endocrinological factors to
political attitudes, two overarching theories have emerged for explaining why these
differences are there. First, the Motivated Social Cognition theory posits that
differences in psychological factors (traits, dispositions, cognitive styles) suggest
conservatives (compared to liberals) are more motivated by needs to reduce
uncertainty, ambiguity, threat, and disgust (Jost et al. 2003). Second, the Negativity Bias
Theory argues that conservatives have more sensitivity to negativity than liberals,
causing them to register greater physiological responses to such stimuli and devote
more psychological resources to them. Considerable cross-citation exists between the
two theories and much common ground. Below, I outline the two theories and their
findings. We are on the precipice of additional theoretical development (see, for
example, unpublished work by Tritt et al. on the arousal model of political
conservatism). However, the two major theories represent the most well-developed and
empirically supported literature that we have today.
Having established a history of research on political ideology, the next chapter
outlines a research program designed to improve our understanding of the two major
theories of political ideology from a political psychology perspective. It also introduces
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the work and ideas of Jeffrey Allen Gray, an influential psychologist who can help specify
and clarify the psychological processes studied by the teams from Hibbing and Jost.

CHAPTER THREE
THEORY
This chapter builds the theoretical foundations for the empirical investigation in
the remainder of the dissertation. The motivating question for this dissertation is as
follows: do conservatives and liberals have differing sensitivities to avoidance,
inhibition, and negative emotion? Do psychological factors beneath our conscious
awareness underlie the political ideologies we embrace?
As reviewed in the last chapter, there are two major theories concerning the
psychological differences between political liberals and conservatives. Psychologist John
Jost and his colleagues formulated the Motivated Social Cognition Theory. This theory
posits that conservatives are motivated by behavioral avoidance. In Jost’s terminology,
conservatives are more motivated by needs to reduce uncertainty, ambiguity, threat,
and disgust (Jost et al. 2003), which is due to differences in dispositional traits
(compared to liberals). The second theory, from John Hibbing and colleagues, posits that
conservatives have more sensitivity to negative emotion. I term this the Negativity Bias
Theory.
This chapter provides theoretical and literature justification for my
characterization of these two theories. It is important to recognize that these two
theories are not competing theories—I argue they are interested in different
50

psychological processes. Jost’s work has an affinity with a psychological disposition
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called avoidance sensitivity, while Hibbing’s work focuses instead on negative emotion.
By the end of this chapter, we will see that Jeffrey Allen Gray’s theories on behavioral
motivation have a direct connection to both avoidance sensitivity and negativity bias.
His theories, and the neuroscience related to them, can considerably aid the research
program of understanding political ideology from a psychological perspective. Thus, the
goal of this chapter is to articulate these two theories, integrate Gray’s theoretical
insights to this project, and explain why neuroscience methodology is essential to
sorting all of this out.
The Negativity Bias Theory
Hibbing, Smith, and Alford (2014) present the Negativity Bias Theory as a
summation of a decade of research into the physiology of political ideology. These
scholars have been the primary progenitors of the modern “rediscovery” of the biology
and politics research program, a revival that begins in the mid 2000s. In summarizing
the entire empirical biopolitics literature in political science, as well as drawing deeply
from the political psychology literature, Hibbing and colleagues hypothesize that
conservatives have a stronger negativity bias than liberals. Negativity bias means that
“negative events are more salient, potent, dominant in combinations, and generally
efficacious than positive events” (Rozin & Royzman 2001, 297).
Human beings, on average, tend to have negativity bias. People in general are
more sensitive to negative faces, words, and social information, and biological systems

52
tend to have measurably higher levels of activation in response to negative than positive
stimuli (Rozin & Royzman 2001). However, Hibbing and colleagues note that this
sensitivity is measurably stronger in conservatives than liberals and this theory explains
nearly all of the hundreds of political psychological studies of correlates to political
attitudes.
Consequently, not only do political positions favoring defense spending,
roadblocks to immigration, and harsh treatment of criminals seem naturally to mesh
with heightened response to threatening stimuli but those fostering conforming unity
(school children reciting the pledge of allegiance), traditional lifestyles (opposition to
gay marriage), enforced personal responsibility (opposition to welfare programs and
government provided healthcare), longstanding sources of authority (Biblical inerrancy;
literal, unchanging interpretations of the Constitution), and clarity and closure
(abstinence-only sex education; signed pledges to never raise taxes; aversion to
compromise) do as well. Heightened response to the general category of negative
stimuli fits comfortably with a great many of the typical tenets of political conservatism
(23-24).
The evidence for increased negativity bias in political conservatives is readily
available through a group of studies focused on physiological correlates of political
ideology. Oxley et al. (2008) present evidence that conservatism is correlated with
physiological reactions to non-political stimuli. In a group of non-student participants
with strong political beliefs, individuals less tolerant of sudden noises and
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fearful/disgusting visual images, tended to support increased defense spending, capital
punishment, patriotism, and the Iraq War. Helzer and Pizarro (2011) find that asking
research participants to wash their hands increased their stated preferences for
conservative positions. Several studies have found that threatening stimuli are
consistently more distracting for conservatives (Carraro, Castelli & Macchiella 2011,
McLean et al. 2013). Negative stimuli such as angry faces attract the attention of
conservatives more than they do liberals. Dodd et al. (2012) found conservatives spent
significantly more time looking at negative images and were significantly quicker to
“fixate” on those images (as measured by eye-track software) as well.
The Motivated Social Cognition Theory
Political science has a consensus definition of political ideology as attitudinal
constraint, and the discipline makes use of this definition to explore and explain political
behavior. As mentioned earlier, however, some political psychologists have used a
different definition and conceptualization of ideology. The major departure in theory is
that political scientists have put abstract principles as the foundations of political
ideology while these political psychologists believe root psychological needs are the
foundation for the abstract principles. So, political scientists would believe a person is a
liberal ideologue because they endorse certain abstract principles about fairness and
equality. Endorsement of abstract principles leads to endorsement of political attitudes
in an ideological way. Psychologists working on political ideology have typically taken a
different perspective. In contrast, they would believe a person is a liberal ideologue
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because they have psychological needs or sensitivities that make the abstract principles
of fairness and equality appealing to the individual. Psychological needs lead to
endorsement of abstract principles, which lead to endorsement of political attitudes in
an ideological way.
The psychological theory has the potential to contribute much to political
science’s understanding of political ideology. In my view, the constraint theory may
describe a defensible way to measure the presence of ideology, but it simply does not
speak to why. Human beings seem strangely compelled by ideological beliefs and
powerfully animated by ideas. Some have been willing to kill or die for abstract
principles, committing great acts of atrocity or heroism (Jost and Amodio 2012, 55). The
strength of these endorsements suggest that ideology is tied deeply to the self. Even
the more everyday forms of ideological thinking can fundamentally bend the way that
we are exposed to information and bias our information processing.
Ideology can motivate cognitive processes and behavior in several theoretical
ways (Jost et al. 2009). First, ideology reduces uncertainty by suggesting preferences
and providing a framework for analyzing new and old contexts and situations. Second,
ideologies offer existential security, a way to cope with anxiety about death (see Becker
1985, also Greenberg et al. 1986 on terror management theory). Third, people are
drawn to ideologies for reasons of affiliation, for belongingness and social strength as
part of a group. People take an ideological perspective in politics that they find
appealing—political scientists will not find that controversial—but they do so in part
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because the ideology itself appeals to psychological dispositions and cognitive processes
within the individual. Ideology offers “certainty, security, and solidarity” (Jost and
Amodio 2012). Political scientists may find this controversial, or they may not, but it is
certainly the case that this angle is understudied in mainstream political science
literature.
One of Jost’s central arguments, however, is that not all ideologies are the same,
and not all ideologies will satisfy the same needs. There are likely important
psychological differences between varying ideologies, although researchers have not yet
ventured outside of studying conservatism contrasted with liberalism (but see Iyer et al.
2012 for a look at libertarianism). Jost and his colleagues have focused on the left-right
divide between political liberals and political conservatives (in contrast to, say, religious
ideologies or social ideologies such as Social Dominance Orientation (Sidanius and
Pratto 1999), but there are, no doubt, other ideological belief structures. In terms of
political ideology, political psychologists have mostly followed political scientists and
accepted the unidimensionality of political ideology.
The Motivated Social Cognition theory comes directly from Jost and colleagues
(Jost et al. 2003). In an extensive meta-analytic review of 88 studies in 12 countries, Jost
et al. (2003) found evidence that political conservatives exhibit more death anxiety, are
less tolerant of ambiguity, have less openness to new experiences, have less tolerance
for uncertainty, have more need for order, structure, and closure, and have more fear of
threat and loss when compared to political liberals.

Jost and colleagues are not alone in their study of the psychological
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underpinnings of political ideology. Other researchers have suggested that
conservatives have an increased wariness of out-groups that may be related to
heightened feelings of threat in certain contexts (see Skitka & Mullen 2002, 119; de St.
Aubin 1996; Stone & Schaffner 1988). Right-wing authoritarianism has a long history of
being correlated with and being activated by threat (Lavine et al. 2002; Lavine et al.
2005). Nail and McGregor (2009) observed a movement towards conservative political
stances in eight of eight items in two independent surveys of adults, one taken before
9/11 and one taken afterwards. Survey respondents reported increased support for
conservatives, George W. Bush, and increasing military spending, and less support for
socialization of medicine. Weber and Federico (2007) found that anxious attachment
styles were associated with right-wing authoritarianism and mediated by belief that the
world was a dangerous place. They also found that avoidant attachment styles were
associated with social dominance orientation. The perception of a dangerous world is
correlated with right-wing ideologies (Jost et al. 2003), and it is especially strong among
political sophisticates (Federico et al. 2009). Hatemi et al. (2013) find that fear
dispositions have a modest but significant relationship with conservatism out-group
attitudes. Shook and Clay (2011) found that conservatives were more susceptible to
conditioning with negative stimuli than liberals, and conservatives were less susceptible
to conditioning with positive stimuli compared to liberals.

These correlations suggest conservatives have an aversive cognitive style,
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behaviorally motivated to avoidance, and in particular, avoidance of threat and the
unknown (see also Dodd et al. 2012). This evidence highlights the distinct possibility
that political conservatives have a more avoidant cognitive style.
Two Theories Measuring Two Different Psychological Constructs
The two theories discussed above have much common ground. Both sets of
authors tend to cite each other in support of their respective findings. In my view,
however, it is clear that each theory is focusing on a specific psychological process
distinct from the rest. We would benefit from sorting these mechanisms that underlie
the two theories, which would allow us to gain much more specificity for our claims.
It is valuable to understand how sensitivity to avoidance (Motivated Social
Cognition theory findings) impacts political attitudes. It is also valuable to understand
how sensitivity to emotional negativity is correlated to political attitudes (Negativity Bias
theory findings). These findings, however, have different underlying mechanisms.
Affect is not the same as personality traits, and neither are the same as cognitive style.
Yet, research in this field tends to lump all the findings together as if it is one portrait of
conservatives.
The Motivated Social Cognition theory posits that conservative belief structures
are motivated by psychological needs to reduce uncertainty, ambiguity, threat, and
disgust (Jost et al. 2003). The Negativity Bias Theory argues that conservative belief
structures are correlated with sensitivity to negative affect (Hibbing et al. 2013). Both

theories have consistent empirical support. While the two theories frequently cross-
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reference each other, there is little explanation for why both theories could or should
co-exist. Or, put another way, regardless of the surface similarities, these theories are
ultimately describing different mechanisms as the roots for these correlations. But what
are those mechanisms? Is a disposition towards avoidance the same as a dispositional
sensitivity to negative affect? How does cognition and emotion intersect to create
behavioral outcomes? What we could use is a better specified theoretical link between
these two profiles of political conservatism.
Gray’s Theory of Behavioral Motivations
Jeffrey Allen Gray offers a theory of behavioral motivation, which he envisioned
as two complementary systems that underlie cognition, emotion, and behavior. The
behavioral activation system (BAS) facilitates behavior towards the completion of a
direct objective or goal. All of the small behaviors we take during a day are for some
purpose, some goal. The goal may be short-term, fleeting, poorly considered, or it may
be long-term and strategic. Regardless of what the goal is, and how much we have
considered it, we act because we desire some outcome. BAS facilitates action. In
contrast, the behavioral inhibition system (BIS) halts ongoing behavior in response to
new information. This is our monitoring system, designed to help us react to
unexpected changes in our environment. The behavioral inhibition and activation
systems blend our cognition with our emotion in order to generate behavior.

Here is an illustration of how the dual systems operate. Sitting down with our
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laptop for work, we decide to have a sip of coffee. The BAS operationalizes the goal
with our cognitive processes. We reach for the cup of coffee and bring it to our lips. We
experience a mild sense of satisfaction, mild positive affect, which helps to motivate the
action. Our goal is nearly achieved, something that we planned in our mind that was
aided by emotion. As we look into the mug near our lips, however, we notice that a
dead fly is floating on top of the coffee. Seeing the fly cues a disgust reaction, an
arousing negative emotion, and we immediately halt our planned action to drink a sip of
coffee. This is the BIS facilitating a rapid change of plans by interrupting our ongoing
behavior in response to newly detected information. Again, the BIS integrates both
cognition and emotion to trigger behavior.
BAS is about going while BIS is about stopping. BAS is connected to feelings of
positive emotion, while BIS is associated with feelings of negative emotion. This theory
has the potential to articulate the mechanisms underneath both theories as well as link
them together directly. Below, we examine Gray’s theories in more depth and outline
several ways to study dispositional differences of political ideologues.
Researchers in psychology have a number of tools to investigate avoidance
motivations and negativity bias, methods that can be used to help illuminate the
psychological differences between liberals and conservatives. Below, I describe the most
commonly used framework for studying emotion and behavioral motivation in
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psychology, and then outline methodological tools from cognitive neuroscience that can
be used to explore the question of emotional sensitivity in political ideology.
Gray’s dual behavioral motivation systems—the Behavioral Inhibition System
(BIS) and the Behavioral Approach System (BAS)—are a pair of heuristic devices
developed to help explain animal and human behavior (Gray 1972, 1978, 1981, 1988).
BIS can be thought of as a process for stopping when a potential threat or reward is
detected, while BAS is a process for going forward to enact a plan of action (Demaree et
al. 2005). Worded another way, BIS is an aversive system, while BAS is an appetitive
system (Carver and White 1994).
BIS is thought to facilitate attention or sensitivity to cues of punishment, danger,
avoidance, and novelty. Gray suggests that BIS functioning is responsible for feelings
such as fear, anxiety, frustration, and sadness in response to cues (Carver and White
1994; Gray 1972, 1978, 1981, 1988). BIS functions to interrupt current behavior in order
to process these cues in preparation for a response. High BIS activation is associated
with enhanced attention, arousal, vigilance, and anxiety, and very strong BIS
corresponds to anxiety-related disorders (Fowles, 1988; Quay, 1988).
The complementary system to the BIS is the BAS, which represents a
motivational system sensitive to signals of reward, nonpunishment, and escape from
punishment. BAS facilitates approach towards a reward (going toward), but also
facilitates active avoidance away from a punishment (going away) (Amodio et al. 2008).
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BAS has been associated with feelings of optimism, joy, aggression, and anger (Gable et
al. 2000; Gray and McNaughton, 2000; Wingrove and Bond, 1998; Harmon-Jones 2003).
The BIS and BAS scales developed by Carver and White (1994) have been used
extensively by psychologists to measure dispositions for behavioral approach and
behavioral inhibition, as well as emotion. BIS, in particular, is associated with selfregulation (Amodio, et al. 2008) but has not been examined in the context of political
ideology. Marcus et al. (2000) use Gray’s BIS and BAS systems in their theory of
Affective Intelligence, which demonstrates that anxiety increases political learning and
enthusiasm increases political participation. They do not connect it to political ideology,
however, which presents a clear opportunity to look at BIS and BAS in a survey
questionnaire as a way to test for the psychological dispositions that Hibbing and Jost
utilize in their respective theories.
Hemispheric Asymmetry and Psychological Dispositions
Neuroscience has contributed in a significant way to the study of emotional
affect and behavioral motivation, and we will need these insights in order to explore the
psychological dispositions of avoidance sensitivity and negativity bias. By borrowing
some of these methodologies, many grounded directly in Gray’s work, we can find new
tools to study how political ideology may be related to emotion and behavioral
motivations.
One such tool is the measure of hemispheric asymmetry. Tomarken et al. (1990),
found that participants in an electroencephalography (EEG) experiment who had greater
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resting right frontal activity responded with more intense negative affect to negativelyvalenced film clips, particularly those involving fear or threat (see also Wheeler et al.
1993). Davidson and colleagues (1993, 1998a, and 1998b) suggest relatively greater left
frontal activity corresponds with trait tendencies toward a general withdrawal or
avoidance system, a hallmark of Gray’s behavioral activation system (BAS). This finding
has been empirically verified by a number of different research groups (e.g., Carver and
White 1994; Coan and Allen 2003, 2004; Harmon-Jones and Allen 1997, 1998; Sutton
and Davidson 1997). Based on these findings, researchers now believe that the pattern
of frontal hemispheric asymmetry is a biomarker for avoidance motivations and
negativity bias. Yet, they were not able to distinguish between the two at the moment.
As demonstrated, there are detectable left/right hemispheric differences in the strength
of EEG signals in frontal electrodes, and this asymmetry may be a moderator and/or
mediator of emotions, such as fear and anxiety (Coan and Allen 2004).
Coan and Allen, writing in 2004, report than the relationship between cortical
asymmetries and emotion had been established by over 70 studies (2004, 7). In their
review, they establish that resting levels of neural activity, as well as state-based
activation, in the prefrontal cortex are correlated with trait predispositions and changes
in emotional state. These findings suggest that brain systems tapped by frontal EEG
asymmetries may moderate (in the case of activity) and mediate (in the case of
activation) emotional responding. The consensus in this literature is that relatively
greater right hemispheric frontal activity is associated with tendencies toward a general
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avoidance or withdrawal system, which is then often correlated to negative affect (Coan
and Allen 2003a; Coan and Allen 2003b; Davidson 1993; Harmon-Jones and Allen 1997,
Sutton and Davidson, Davidson 1998a,b). Davidson's influential approach/withdrawal
motivational model of emotion proposes that left frontal activity (either as state or as
trait) indicates a propensity to approach or engage a stimulus, while relatively greater
right frontal activity indicates a propensity to withdraw or disengage from a stimulus.
Other researchers have confirmed this relationship. For example, Field et al.
(1995) and Fox et al. (1996) found evidence that children with greater right frontal
activity at rest were more inhibited socially, and scored lower on social competency.
Schmidt and Fox (1994) found a relationship between frontal EEG asymmetry and
measures of sociability in adults. Those scoring low on measures of sociability had
relatively greater left frontal activity. Schmidt et al.1999 found shyness had greater
right frontal activation. All of these studies from developmental psychology researchers
suggest a relationship between avoidance and right frontal activity. EEG asymmetry
promises to be a useful tool for studying avoidance sensitivity in political liberals and
conservatives. Below, I briefly discuss political ideology as studied from a political
neuroscience perspective, noting that no research has yet connected EEG asymmetry
and emotional sensitivity with political ideology.
The Go/No-Go Task and Psychological Dispositions of Conservatives
To date, three studies have explored the connection between dispositional styles
in the brain and political ideology. None, yet, directly measure avoidance sensitivity or
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negativity bias for liberals and conservatives, which is the project that this dissertation
picks up. Amodio et al. 2007 hypothesized that differences in the cognitive styles of
liberals and conservatives might reﬂect basic differences in information processing
mechanisms, such as those involved in conﬂict monitoring—a neurocognitive process
for detecting discrepancies between response tendencies and one’s higher-level
intentions. To test this prediction, Amodio and colleagues compared participants’ selfreported political orientation with behavior and neural activity on a Go/No-Go task
(explored in detail in Chapter Six). Consistent with the model of political ideology as
motivated social cognition, liberalism was associated with greater behavioral accuracy
on No-Go trials of the task. Furthermore, liberals’ EEG signal exhibited significantly
larger event-related potentials (ERP), indicative of greater anterior cingulate cortex
(ACC) response on No-Go trials than did conservatives, supporting the hypothesis that
political orientation may be linked to basic neurocognitive processes for dealing with
new and unexpected information.
Weissﬂog et al. (2010) also assessed ERP responses and political ideology, this
time in a sample of Canadian university students who completed the Go/No-Go task. As
in the Amodio et al. 2007 study, a stronger liberal orientation was associated with larger
No-Go N2 amplitudes, indicating greater conflict-related ACC response, and thus
replicating the results of Amodio et al. 2007. In addition, larger No-Go N2 and EventRelated Negativity (ERN) amplitudes in these college students were correlated with

greater endorsement of egalitarian values and lesser endorsement of right-wing
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authoritarianism.
Although they did not look at political attitudes or ideology directly, Inzlicht et al.
(2009) indicated that higher religiosity was correlated with smaller ERNs in response to
errors on a color-naming Stroop task (1937). As Jost and Amodio (2012) note, there is a
strong association between conservatism and increased religiosity, and so this study
may also be considered broadly consistent with the results of Amodio et al. 2007.
The intent of the above discussion is to open the subject matter, but more
discussion and clarification of these studies is explored in more detail in Chapter Six,
which explains the Go/No-Go task conducted for this dissertation, and presents a
comprehensive look at what these findings mean for political ideology. In sum, this
chapter outlined the two major theories of the political psychology of ideology as being
fundamentally about (a) sensitivity to avoidance and (b) negativity bias. Then, it
introduced Gray’s theory of behavioral motivation. By using tools for studying Gray’s
Behavioral Inhibition System and Behavioral Activation System, such as survey
questionnaires, hemispheric asymmetry studies, and the Go/No-Go behavioral task, we
will be able to focus on these two important psychological processes and improve
political science’s understanding of the political psychology of ideology. The next three
chapters present empirical studies of these psychological processes in a sample of
liberals and conservatives, through a survey questionnaire and two laboratory
experiments.

CHAPTER FOUR
SURVEY DATA AND DISPOSITION ANALYSIS
One of the central objectives of this dissertation is to expand research in the
area of root physiological differences in avoidance sensitivity and negativity bias
between liberals and conservatives through an investigation of Gray’s theories of
behavioral motivation systems. This chapter furthers this goal by (a) characterizing my
participant pool for experiments in later chapters and (b) exploring correlational analysis
between political ideology and self-reported dispositions towards behavioral inhibition
and behavioral activation. Later chapters go beyond questionnaire self-reports to bring
these questions into the lab.
This chapter describes and characterizes a large sample (n = 466) of non-student
employees drawn from Loyola University Chicago who completed a detailed survey
about their personality traits and social-political viewpoints. From this larger sample, I
drew a subsample (n = 51) who participated in two behavioral neuroscience
experiments that become the focus of this dissertation in later chapters. Therefore, this
sample becomes an important starting place for characterizing the group of participants
who go on to complete the lab experiments. Overall, we find that this sample is not
nationally representative and skewed towards liberals, although a meaningful minority
of participants do hold deeply conservative beliefs. This sample is considerably more
66

representative than a typical sample of college undergraduates. Additionally, as
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introduced in the last chapter, Carver and White (1994) have developed a questionnaire
that allows researchers to estimate dispositional sensitivity to behavioral inhibition and
behavioral activation, which will help us investigate avoidance sensitivity differences
between liberals and conservatives in a large sample size.
Behavioral motivation is an interesting, important psychological and
physiological process that could be of importance for political ideology. Borrowing
heavily from the theories of Gray (1990; Gray and McNaughton 2000), psychologists
Carver and White (1994) devised a questionnaire to tap into behavioral motivations with
a survey instrument. This measure has become a seminal contribution, with over 4,000
citations and continuing to grow in influence. While behavioral motivations will always
be best measured through experimental manipulation and observation of actual
behavior, there are numerous situations where a survey can provide important
information in a cost effective way. Experimental costs for a large sample may be
prohibitive, and/or time available for experiments may be scarce. A survey instrument
can be issued quickly, at lower cost of time and effort. Finally, observational data from a
survey can serve as an effective way to assess personality dispositions towards
behavioral inhibition and approach in a large sample. Observational data about selfdescribed personality traits can be useful to investigators.
The rest of this chapter follows from these goals. Primarily, this chapter details
the social, political, and demographic characteristics of the large sample, which itself will

serve as the participant pool for two behavioral experiments in subsequent chapters.
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Additionally, this survey collected observational data on sensitivity towards Gray’s dual
systems of inhibition and activation, which is hypothesized to be related to political
ideology. By combining the observational data in this chapter with the experimental
data in later chapters, we use a multiple method approach to answering the central
question of the relationship of Gray’s BIS/BAS systems to political ideology.
Behavioral Inhibition and Activation
J.A. Gray hypothesized that two general motivational systems for behavior
underlie our emotional and cognitive processing (1990; Gray and McNaughton 2000).
The behavioral activation system (BAS) facilitates action in pursuit of a desired outcome.
The behavioral inhibition system (BIS) is a surveillance system, intended to monitor the
environment for unexpected changes that may threaten or change our goal-directed
behavior.
As described in the past chapters, BAS is about going while BIS is about stopping.
Additionally, research has demonstrated that increased BAS has been connected to
feelings of positive affect, and increased BIS is associated with feelings of negative
affect. BAS is a process for going forward to enact a plan of action while BIS interrupts
when a potential threat or reward is detected. For these reasons, Carver and White
(1994) describe the BAS as an appetitive system, while BIS is an aversive system. BIS
draws attention to cues of punishment, danger, and novelty, and is theorized by Gray to
be responsible for negative emotions of fear, anxiety, frustration, and sadness. BAS

motivates behavior towards a reward or a desired interaction and is associated with

69

feelings of optimism, joy, aggression, and anger. Recall from earlier discussions that
approach can be positively valenced (optimism, joy) or negatively valenced (aggression,
anger) as long as the emotions motivate engagement with a stimulus instead of
avoidance.
I have argued in past chapters that Gray’s dual systems underlie two of the most
prominent theories about the political psychology of political ideology. First, the
Motivated Social Cognition Theory (of John Jost and colleagues) is built upon the theory
that conservatives are motivated by a constellation of psychological factors related to
fear, threat, and reducing uncertainty. These core psychophysiological functions,
especially of fear and threat, are a kind of behavioral avoidance clearly rooted in Gray’s
behavioral inhibition system. While it is true that uncertainty avoidance is not purely the
same psychological construct as behavioral inhibition, the overlap is substantial. As Jost
and colleagues write, uncertainty avoidance in conservatives is part of a general
predisposition towards caution and general avoidance (Jost et al., 2003; Jost et al.,
2009). Jost and colleagues also frequently mention a study of children that describes
“inhibited” preschoolers as growing up to become political conservatives (Block and
Block 2006; as cited in Jost et al., 2009; Jost, 2009). Given that motivational avoidance
and inhibition have substantial overlap, and Jost’s theories find great empirical support
for the claim that conservatives are more avoidant, we can also predict that
conservatives would be more inhibitory as well.
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According to the Negativity Bias Theory, conservatives exhibit stronger reactions
to negativity, and focus more visual attention to negative stimuli (Hibbing et al 2014).
Negative affect includes many different emotions, such as fear, threat, sadness, and
anger. (The connection between discrete emotions and political ideology is picked up
with force in Chapter Five of this dissertation.) Negativity bias is also connected to
feelings of fear and threat, and they motivated behavioral avoidance of the stimulus
that triggers the negative emotion.
Hypotheses
In sum, the key hypothesis for how Gray’s dual systems may be related to
political ideology is that conservatives should have greater behavioral inhibition. Jost’s
work on conservatives and avoidance and Hibbing’s work on negative emotions each
point to this conclusion.
Behavioral activation predictions are less clear, and will be approached as
exploratory in this work. Behavioral activation is related to sensitivity to approach, as
well as positive emotion. Because being sensitive to negative emotion cannot speak to
whether someone is also sensitive to positive emotion, we do not have direct
hypotheses from current work. There is nothing in the Jost or Hibbing theories that
suggest conservatives or liberals have a relationship to behavioral approach or positive
emotion. Behavioral inhibition and behavioral approach are conceptually separate from
each other, not two ends to the same phenomena. Positive and negative emotion, too,
are not inverses of each other, but separate constructs.

Method
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Participants
Participants were recruited from the campus staff of Loyola University Chicago
from February 2012 until November 2012. This recruitment method was inspired by
Kam et al. 2007 as a good convenience sample to utilize when an undergraduate sample
poses research problems. As Sears 1986 noted, college aged students are likely to have
more weakly held social and political attitudes (522) and may exert more cognitive
effort than the typical person due to the emphasis on accuracy in a school setting (525).
Of particular importance is their young age and their (understandable) lack of broad life
experiences compared to national populations.
I sent 1144 emails to non-student adults employed by Loyola University Chicago,
inviting them to take our online survey on political attitudes and personality. The survey
was created and administered on Opinio software
(http://www.objectplanet.com/opinio) with access provided by Loyola University
Chicago. My outreach included all employees at the Lake Shore Campus or the Water
Tower campus, except those who were academic faculty or higher-level administrators
(above the title of “director”). Three follow-up attempts were made. First, a reminder
email was sent after 30 days. Second, I also mailed physical copies of the survey
through interdepartmental mail approximately three months after my initial email
contact. Third, I sent a final email reminder. Overall, I received a total of 466 completed
surveys (40.3% response rate). I did not offer compensation for completing the survey;
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however, the materials mentioned that successful completion of the survey may make
one eligible for a follow-up neuroscience study which would pay more than $40/session.
280 of those who completed the survey (60%) also volunteered to be considered for the
follow-up study in the lab. Eventually, a selection of 51 of these volunteers became
subjects of the behavioral and neuroscience studies in later chapters of this dissertation.
Participant demographic background. This sample was disproportionally female
(286 females, 176 males, and 4 refused). The median age of the sample was 38 years
old, and age ranged from 20 to 93 years old (mean = 41.33, sd = 13). Ninety-three is not
an error: a small number of participants of advanced age live and work at Loyola
University Chicago in various departments, but are especially found in numerous Jesuit
groups and organizations housed on campus. 72 percent of respondents identified as
white, 11.6 percent as black, 6.3 percent as Asian, and 10.1 percent as other/multiracial.
The sample was disproportionally educated compared to the national population, which
is to be expected given these are workers employed by a university. 38 percent hold a
bachelor’s degree and 36 percent hold a master’s degree. 8 percent of the sample had a
professional degree or Ph.D. Only 16.8 percent of the sample did not have at least a
bachelor’s degree.
Party identification. Party identification fit expectations (Kam et al. 2007) that
the campus staff would largely resemble the Democratic politics of the surrounding
region generally. 79 percent of the respondents identified as Democrats, 9 percent as
independents, and 11 percent as Republicans. These numbers include those who said

they leaned toward a party. Only 11 participants in the entire sample considered
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themselves “strong Republicans” (2.4 percent), an exceptionally low amount compared
to the national population. This sample skewed heavily Democratic, an expected result
for a university located in Chicago.
Measurement
Broadly, this survey questionnaire addressed two categories of attitudes:
political ideology and behavioral motivations. Full question wording is provided in
Appendix A.
Political ideology. Three different question sets were used to assess political
ideology, with each designed to tap into a different conceptual element of political
ideology. Much previous research has relied on the 7-point self-identification Likert
scale. Following the standard set by the American National Election Studies,
participants are asked to place themselves on a 7-point scale between “very liberal” and
“very” conservative, with the middle labeled “centrist.” Self-placement on this scale is
strongly predictive of party identification as well as vote choice in national elections.
The self-placement scale also allows a measure of how the individual sees their own
political ideology, providing a summary judgment of how the individual would selfclassify their own belief structure. However, there are some potential weaknesses.
First, the respondent must have a sense of what the terms conservative, liberal, and
centrist mean, which requires a certain amount of political knowledge. Second, like all
self-reports, there are a number of opportunities for purposeful and inadvertent
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misrepresentation. Third, this scale presumes a one-dimensional ideological spectrum,
which, as discussed in prior chapters, may be problematic.
To compensate for weaknesses with the self-report, I also used a variation of the
Wilson-Patterson Conservatism scale of political ideology (1968), which asks
respondents for their opinion on a variety of contemporary public policy topics and then
aggregates the results into an overall ideology score. Political ideology has often been
conceptualized as the summary of your various political attitudes—after all, if you take
the liberal view on most political arguments, you are probably liberal. One way to
measure political orientation, thus, may be to ask your opinion on a variety of political
topics and then see what the aggregate picture is. The Wilson-Patterson scale has been
a popular measure of political orientation by using the summation of various political
attitudes on political issues of the day. These question items need to be updated to the
contemporary political setting, and so I adopted the modified Wilson-Patterson battery
utilized by Smith et al. (2011). Twenty questions are included in the Smith et al. variant.
Additionally, although the theoretical conception of political ideology should be
universal to human beings, there is little question that answers to contemporary
political ideology question batteries are going to be bounded by cultural and national
contexts. This sample is drawn from the United States, and the question sets listed
above have been primarily used on subjects in the United States. To broaden our reach,
I use four questions adopted from the World Values Survey that offer attitudes on
competition, income inequality, public ownership, and private responsibility. These
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questions have been used reliably across the globe to look at attitudes toward political
economy issues, especially concerning economic justice. These questions are useful as a
way to measure collectivism versus individualism in economic policy, and they offer a
more diverse measuring stick with applications outside of the United States. This scale is
referred to as the World Values Survey Economic Justice scale.
Multidimensional ideology. The Wilson-Patterson items collected here are
usually utilized as a measure of unidimensional ideology, running from liberal to
conservative. However, the underlying items of the scale could be analyzed along
additional dimensions. Commonly, ideology is broken into two dimensions: economic
and social (Treier and Hillygus 2009; Ellis and Stimson 2012). Economic (or, fiscal)
conservatism suggests a strong preference for free markets and opposition to
government regulation and taxation. In contrast, social conservatism is a skepticism
towards social changes and preference for more traditional social mores, such as the
traditional family structure. Splitting ideology in two dimensions allows for a better
measurement of libertarian (economically conservative, socially liberal) and
authoritarian (economically liberal, socially conservative) ideological archetypes.
I account for, and anticipate, multidimensional ideology in two ways in this
chapter. First, I utilize factor analysis below to determine how well multidimensional
ideological values fit this sample. Second, however, as this sample is not nationally
representative, it would not have been appropriate to use the factor analysis to derive
dimensions. There is no guarantee that employees of Loyola University Chicago would
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represent the normal dimensions of political ideology (social and economic factors). So,
I created two subscales designed to tap into economic and social dimensions based on
the well-known and reliable Wilson-Patterson scale and prior researchers (Treier and
Hillygus 2009). The economic conservatism subscale includes these items: welfare
spending, tax cuts, small government, and foreign aid. The social conservatism subscale
items chosen were: prayer in school, legal pornography, illegal immigration, death
penalty, the Patriot Act, biblical truth, gay marriage, and legal abortion. These two
subscales are theoretically derived, based on researchers work on the
multidimensionality of political ideology (Treier and Hillygus 2009; Ellis and Stimson
2012).
Behavioral Inhibition and Behavioral Activation Scales. BIS and BAS were
assessed in the conventional manner described in Carver and White (1994). All BIS/BAS
questions ask the respondent to say whether they strongly agree, somewhat agree,
somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree with the statement. These question batteries
assess an individual disposition towards each motivational system (aversive and
appetitive.) BIS has a seven items and BAS has thirteen. Specific items are listed in
Appendix A with the rest of the survey.
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Results
Descriptive Statistics
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics of Survey Measures.

Table 1 displays the descriptive statistics for the major variables of interest. The
varying sample sizes of the statistics reflect the existence of missing data from the
survey instrument.

Figure 1: Survey Data Compared to National Sample

78

The self-report ideology scale (mean = 3.04, median = 3) skews leftward,
reflecting greater self-described liberalism in the sample. While the seven point scale
has representation at each score, extreme conservatives are scarce. Figure 1 illustrates
how the distribution of ideology differs from a nationally representative survey. The
American National Election Study of 2012 includes the same survey question that I
utilize to generate a self-report of political ideology on a seven point scale.
The Wilson-Patterson Conservatism scale has a similar left-ward skew (mean =
6.7, median = 6.25). The theoretical range goes from 0 to 20, but the most conservative
members of this sample cap at 16.5. (Participants that answered neither “support” nor

79
“oppose” are scored as a 0.5, as per Smith et al. 2011.) As with the self-report measure,
moderate liberals and strong liberals are overrepresented while conservatives are
underrepresented. Both of the Wilson-Patterson subscales follow similar patterns as
the full scale, except the sample is far more socially liberal than economically liberal.
The World Values Survey Economic Justice Scale is considerably more moderate
than the other measures, reflecting two insights. First, the WVS is written for a global
audience, and Americans are more economically conservative than most countries.
Second, this scale has no social conservative elements in it, and thus, the very liberal
viewpoints on social issues does not weigh the measure toward the left in this scale as
much as others. This scale features of mean of 19.51 and median of 19, on a 0 to 36
point scale, and participants in the survey had values at both poles of the scale. While
there is a left-ward skew to the data, attitudes about economic justice are not as
strongly left as the other ideological measures, suggesting that the sample may be more
socially liberal than it is economically liberal (which is consistent with the story told by
the Wilson-Patterson Social conservatism scale, which has a median value of 2, with a
scale maximum of 8).

Figure 2. Distribution of Political Ideology.
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Figure 2 visually represents the distribution of ideology in the survey sample
across the three ideological measures of self-placement, Wilson-Patterson Conservatism
scale, and the World Values Survey Economic Justice scale. Note that the range of all xaxes are drawn from the scale minimum to the scale maximum, not the observed range
of the data from this sample. For example, although no subject scored a maximum of

20 (100 percent conservative) on the Wilson-Patterson scale, the x-axis includes that
maximum value of 20. Drawing x-axes to the scale dimensions facilitates better visual
interpretation of the ideological preferences of the sample within each plot, as well as
comparison between each plot.
Figure 3. Distribution of BIS/BAS Scales.
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Figure 3 demonstrates the distribution of Carver & White’s BIS/BAS scales of
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behavioral motivation in the sample. Both shapes are essentially normally distributed
around the middle of each respective scale, with few outliers and zero extreme values
to the far left or right.
Correlation Matrix
Table 2. Correlation Matrix of Important Variables.

Table 2 displays the correlation matrix for the variables of interest in this study,
with Pearson’s correlation tests. Below is a visualization of these relationships.

Figure 4. Correlation Matrix Visualization
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These relationships can also be clearly seen in Figure 4. The darkness of the
shading and the size of circle both indicate the strength of the correlation, with blue
coloration representing a positive correlation and red being negative. Any relationship
that is not statistically significant to the p = 0.05 standard is represented with a blank (all
white) space on the matrix. As can be observed, all relationships between the variables

do reach statistical significance, except for those between the BAS measure and any
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political ideology measure.
The table and visualization demonstrate that all five ideological measures are
tightly correlated, forming a strong cluster of related measures. Additionally, all
measures of ideology are negatively correlated with the behavioral inhibition scale
measure, with mild strength. In contrast, BAS has no relationship with any ideological
measure, and only a mild positive relationship with BIS.
Scale Reliability
Often, social science research relies on a bundle of questions that are used to
approximate some kind of underlying construct. For example, some researchers believe
that political ideology cannot be accurately assessed by the simple question, “what is
your political ideology?” Participants may not be consciously aware of their political
ideology, they may not know what political ideology means, they may be overly
influenced by a negative association with a political label, or for various other reasons
may misrepresent or miscalculate their own political ideology. Researchers facing this
challenge may wish to employ a battery of questions such as the Wilson-Patterson scale,
which attempts to assess political ideology by asking twenty questions about
contemporary political issues. By looking at the big picture of these twenty issues, it
may be possible to triangulate the political ideology of a person without needing to rely
on the subject’s self-assessment. In these cases, it would be useful for researchers to

know (and, also, to demonstrate to reviewers) that the bundled items were
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appropriately chosen to estimate the latent construct.
In situations like this, social scientists have come to rely on Cronbach’s alpha to
measure the internal consistency of a scale. Cronbach’s alpha is a coefficient that
examines to what degree the items are related as a group. A higher alpha coefficient
signifies more internal consistency, meaning that the items are more closely measuring
the same thing. In practice, researchers frequently employ Cronbach’s alpha to justify
their scale as assessing a single unidimensional latent construct, a practice that has
been widely criticized in the psychometric literature. Psychometric researchers have
established that Cronbach’s alpha cannot determine the dimensionality of the
underlying construct, but instead merely the degree to which the items are consistently
related to the construct (Green et al. 1977; Schmitt 1996). The underlying construct may
be unidimensional or multidimensional and still yield a high alpha score.
Interpreting alpha scores is based on consensus and rules of thumb, much like
assessing p-values. The general practice is that an alpha score greater than 0.70 is
“acceptable,” with 0.80 considered “good,” and greater than 0.90 to be “excellent”
(George and Mallery 2003). These are guidelines and not hard rules, however. Alpha
scores of 0.60 are sometimes used with caution, particularly if the scale has been
validated elsewhere in a more nationally representative sample. It is not unusual for
studies with non-representative samples to have a weaker Cronbach’s alpha coefficient.

Such studies can still justify the use of a scale if it has empirical support from more
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definitive articles with more complete samples.
Table 3. Cronbach Alpha Scores of Scale Measures.

Table 3 lists the Cronbach’s alpha scores for the scales employed in this study.
The Wilson-Patterson Full Scale, and the twin behavioral motivation scales of Carver and
White (1994) all maintain healthy alpha scores of around 0.80, signifying “good” internal
reliability. All three scales are widely used in academic research, and so it is not a
surprise that they replicate well with this sample. The two Wilson-Patterson subscales
derived from theoretical perspectives have more questionable alpha scores, with 0.611
and 0.764. Prior literature has not attempted to derive an economic conservatism and a
social conservatism factor structure from the Wilson-Patterson battery, and these alpha
scores suggest caution when interpreting findings. As this sample is not nationally
representative, we might not be surprised to discover that the theoretical factor
structure of economic and social conservatism does not fit well the liberal denizens of
the workforce of Loyola University Chicago. (We will see shortly that economic
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conservatism is not so clear cut in this sample according to factor analysis.) Because of
the clear utility in investigating ideology with these two factors, this work will proceed in
utilizing the two scales, but interpretation will be exploratory and cautious. Finally, the
World Values Survey Economic Justice scale is also novel to this work. With an alpha
score of 0.700, it hovers in the “acceptable” range of internal consistency.

Figure 5. Distribution of Individual Wilson-Patterson Items.
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Earlier, we have already viewed the distribution of aggregate Wilson-Patterson
scores in this sample. Figure 5 explores the ideological polarization of the sample on a
per-item basis within the Wilson-Patterson scale. Each item was labeled simply with the
labels on the y-axis (e.g. “Prayer in Schools” and “Gay Marriage”) and participants are
directed to either “support” or “oppose” the topic by choosing the answer that is closest
to their belief. These answers are coded as liberal (or conservative) if they support a
liberal (or conservative) belief. For example, welfare spending is traditionally a liberal
belief—if a participant chose “support”, that would be coded as a liberal answer.
Items in Figure 5 are arranged from the item which received the greatest
proportion of conservative responses (patriotism) through the item that received the
greatest proportion of liberal responses (women’s equality). Overall, there is
considerable political diversity across the span of issues, although there is a noticeable
left-ward skew to the attitudes reported. Only three items had more conservative
support than liberal support (patriotism, free trade, and small government). On the 17
other items, the liberal viewpoints is endorsed by a majority of respondents. Although
failing to capture the majority on most issues, a healthy conservative minority is readily
apparent in most of the remaining items.
There are three exceptions, however—three issues that have very little support
for the traditional conservative position in this sample. Gay marriage, pollution control,
and equality for women each feature 95% of the sample taking the liberal side of the
issue. While women’s equality and pollution control could be explained by changing
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societal attitudes towards women as well as the largely bipartisan support of pollution
control in a major American city, the lack of political diversity for the issue of gay
marriage is somewhat puzzling. Gay marriage is one of the most polarizing issues
throughout the 1990s and 2000s, defining one of the sharpest cleavages between
liberals and conservatives. It is possible that the conservative, educated denizens of
Chicago had already shifted the gay marriage argument out of the culture wars, in
acknowledgement that times have changed or will change (this survey was administered
in 2012, and shortly afterward in 2015, the Supreme Court in Obergefell v. Hodges ruled
that gay marriage was a constitutional right, effectively winning that pitched battle for
the liberals.) More likely, though, the lack of conservative opinion about gay marriage
reflects the dearth of social and religious conservatives in my sample.
Overall, the distribution of Wilson-Patterson items helps illustrate the left-ward
skew of the subjects, but also note that conservative viewpoints are still represented.
Below, we turn to a factor analysis in order to sort out the dimensionality of the WilsonPatterson data.
Wilson-Patterson Factor Analysis
As discussed in earlier chapters, political scientists increasingly view political
ideology as multidimensional, and yet, the self-report measure and the political issue
attitude battery employed here are unidimensional, assuming participants to be either
liberal or conservative, or somewhere in-between. Yet, in the public, we know this
simple picture to be false. There are some in the public who are socially liberal, yet

economically conservative. They may or may not identify as political libertarians, or
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even understand what that term means; and yet, they fit a profile that cannot be easily
placed on a bidirectional scale.
This sample is not nationally representative, so an exploration of the underlying
factor structure of ideology in this sample cannot easily serve to teach us about the
multidimensionality of attitudes in the general public. Based on prior research that does
use representative samples, we have expectations that there ought to be an economic
factor and a social factor. Earlier, this chapter describes how I developed two subscales
of the Wilson-Patterson battery that attempts to capture those two elements.
There are least two reasons to explore the underlying factor structure of this
sample, even if it is not nationally representative. First, we ought to see how well the
theorized social and economic factor structure fit this sample. Does an economic factor
emerge? Is a social factor observable? And, second, to what degree are there any latent
ideological factors at all within the sample? If issue attitudes did not cluster whatsoever
in this sample, it would suggest that Conversian political ideology (where issue attitudes
are constrained around some kind of latent underlying value structure) is not a relevant
issue.
Confirmatory factor analysis requires the researcher to stipulate a theory for
how many factors should be present. I hypothesize that there will be two factors, a
social and an economic kind of conservatism, based on contemporary research on this
subject. My confirmatory factor analysis was conducted on the twenty Wilson-
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Patterson items, utilizing a method of oblique rotation called promax, and with a model
specification of maximum likelihood. The factor analysis was performed in R Statistics,
using both the base package native to R as well as the supplemental R package “psych”
written by William Revelle of Northwestern University (Revelle 2016). This factor
analysis procedure will yield two sets of loadings (one for each proposed factor) for each
item of the Wilson-Patterson scale.

Figure 6. Factor Analysis Scatterplot.
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I will present two visualizations that help illustrate the factor structure apparent
in this sample. First, Figure 6 represents the factor analysis as a scatter plot. Each axis
represents one of the factors, and the W-P item is plotted on the Cartesian plane. In this
figure, you can observe two clear clusters of attitudes have emerged (I have colored

them black and gray). The gray circles are centered at the factors’ mean loadings, and
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are sized to help visually connect the clusters.
The black items load very strongly on Factor Two (y-axis), while being fairly weak
on Factor One (x-axis). This factor includes many socially and religiously conservative
issues: legal pornography, legal abortion, gay marriage, biblical truth, and prayer in
school. I interpret this factor as a good representation of the “social” conservatism
factor we expected to find. Note that equality for women, punishing illegal immigration,
and death penalty are also socially conservative viewpoints, but they did not load
strongly on Factor Two as would have been expected. Equality for women simply had
no variability in this sample, and so the factor analysis could not adequately sort this
item. On the death penalty, Illinois has had extreme problems with the death penalty
for decades, with a Republican governor in 2000 declaring a moratorium on death
penalty cases after thirteen people were found wrongfully convicted. So, while the
death penalty ought to be in this factor, the context of living in Illinois probably altered
the normally expected factor structure.
The gray items, in contrast, do not have so clear a theme. These issues span
from international affairs and national defense, to free market economics, to
immigration and the size of government. Factor One does not appear to be an
economic factor, as expected, but instead it is a kind of general conservatism. For
example, gun control, patriotism, the Patriot Act, and the death penalty are not
primarily economic issues.

Figure 7. Factor Analysis Barplot.
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In Figure 7, the loading information is presented in a different form which will
aid in demonstrating how cleanly the factor analysis divides the items. The length of the
bar represents the strength of the loading. Generally, the items cleanly position in one
factor and not the other (the exception being free trade and equality for women, which
had almost zero variability within the sample anyway).
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Overall, we find support for the idea of a two-factor system of political ideology
in this sample, although the factors are not cleanly a social factor and an economic
factor.
Ideology and Behavioral Motivations
Lastly, we turn to Gray’s behavioral motivation systems, the behavioral inhibition
system and the behavioral activation system. This is an active test of my hypotheses in
this chapter, where I expect conservatives to have more self-reported inhibition
compared to liberals. Utilizing Carver and White’s (1994) scale, we compare how much
behavioral inhibition and activation is self-reported by liberals and conservatives in the
sample.
Figure 8. Behavioral Inhibition and Two Measures of Ideology.
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We observe a modest negative correlation between behavioral inhibition and
political ideology, with conservative participants reporting less behavioral inhibition.
This is precisely the inverse of what we would hypothesize, given the theories of Hibbing
and Jost. Contrary to expectations, it is the liberals in this sample who self-report having
a disposition towards behavioral inhibition.

Figure 9. Behavioral Activation and two Measures of Ideology
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For exploratory purposes, we also investigated how self-reported disposition
towards behavioral activation may be related to political ideology. As observed in
Figure 8, there is a robust null finding for this relationship.
Discussion
This chapter contributed to the larger dissertation project in two ways. First, this
chapter detailed the politics and traits of the larger sample from which experiments in
the next two chapters will draw their participants. Second, this chapter explores the
correlation between various measures of political ideology and Gray’s behavioral
inhibition system and behavioral activation systems by way of the Carver and White
(1994) questionnaire. Future chapters, which investigate experimental findings from lab
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work, have a smaller sample size than what was presented here. Thus, this survey work
allows a test of the hypotheses about avoidance motivations and negative affect in a
large sample before moving to smaller ones.
The hypothesis for the behavioral inhibition system did not go as expected.
Contrary to expectations gleaned from Hibbing and Jost, behavioral inhibition (at least,
the self-report) appears to be associated with political liberals in this sample. Also,
behavioral approach appears unrelated to political ideology. Future chapters will
continue exploring these hypotheses by going beyond the survey questionnaire and into
the laboratory.

CHAPTER FIVE
HEMISPHERIC ASYMMETRY ANALYSIS
This chapter focuses on dispositional differences between liberals and
conservatives in terms of their trait avoidance and trait emotional sensitivity. A trait is a
relatively stable disposition that gives the individual a propensity to act in a certain way.
Our personality is comprised of thousands of traits. We can readily think of examples of
personality traits such as careful, trusting, or pessimistic. A more trusting individual has
a propensity to trust, independent of context. Traits often lead to behavior, but they
are not determinative. They only prejudice behavior, not dominate it. There are many
situations where even a trusting person will choose not to trust. All other things being
equal, however, a person with the trusting trait would be more likely to trust. Thus,
traits are conceptually independent from circumstances. Interactions like context,
environment, mood, and stimuli are temporary and fleeting (experiencing a “state”),
while the trait is an enduring characteristic of the individual. A state is a temporary
experience, while a trait is a core disposition to the individual.
My overarching argument is that approach-avoidance processes and emotional
processes need to be better separated in order to distinguish and judge the two
mainstream theories of psychological political ideology. As described in an earlier
chapter, although both the Motivated Social Cognition Theory and the Negativity Bias
101
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Theory often rely on the same evidence and have common ground, they actually make
two separate claims about conservatives. The psychological processes of interest in this
chapter are trait differences between liberals and conservatives, specifically trait
avoidance and trait negative affectivity. These individual dispositions are related to
everyday behavior, and both theories make predictions for how these traits ought to be
related to political attitudes. Below I describe the predictions each theory would make
for these traits.
Recall that the Motivated Social Cognition theory argues that conservatives are
more motivated by needs to reduce uncertainty, ambiguity, threat, and disgust (Jost et
al. 2003). Conservatives are sensitive to avoidance signals, and this sensitivity biases
how they view the world, turning them towards a politically conservative belief
structure. One way to explore conservative sensitivity to avoidance is by using
electroencephalography, measuring electrical signals from the scalp. Cognitive
neuroscientists believe that frontal hemispheric asymmetry, a pattern of neural activity
in the brain, is correlated with avoidance sensitivity. Thus, trait avoidance may be a
biomarker of being politically conservative.
The Negativity Bias Theory, on the other hand, actually makes a different
argument about trait differences between liberals and conservatives. These scholars
argue conservatives are more sensitive to negative emotions than liberals, which causes
stronger physiological reactions and focuses greater attention on such stimuli (Hibbing
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et al. 2014). Thus, the Negativity Bias Theory posits that negative affectivity may be a
biomarker of being politically conservative.
This distinction between trait avoidance and trait negative affectivity seems
subtle, but it has deep ramifications for what we believe is the psychological origins of
political ideology. Trait avoidance is a disposition that moderates tendencies to avoid
and withdraw from novel stimuli. Trait avoidance is behavioral, not specifically
emotional. A person with strong trait avoidance will have a relatively greater propensity
to avoid. This propensity may manifest in myriad ways, such as faster response times to
disengage or more awareness or alertness to dangers in the environment. Trait
avoidance is a low-level behavioral process, a reaction that insects or small mammals
could have. Reacting to smelling a predator or inhibiting the consumption of a piece of
bread about to go into your mouth because you see mold are both examples.
This behavior is different than higher order level reasoning. Anticipating the foul
mood of a work colleague and deciding to avoid interrupting them for a coffee break
may appear to be “behavioral avoidance.” In fact, it may indeed be a kind of behavioral
avoidance, in some sense, but it is a far more sophisticated kind of cognitive processing
than the prior examples. It is less automatic and less instinctual. Only humans have
relationships with work colleagues, and only humans are capable of the higher cognition
to anticipate and avoid their foul moods. Behavioral avoidance, as I mean it, is a kind of
fundamental reaction that all multi-cell organisms possess and utilize hundreds to
thousands of times a day.

While trait avoidance is a motivational proclivity, encouraging behavior, trait

104

negative affectivity is an emotional sensitivity, encouraging a feeling. Emotions serve
the purpose of facilitating behavior, but they are not behavior themselves. Trait
negative affectivity is a disposition that enhances tendencies to feel negative affect,
giving a tendency to experience a broad range of negative emotions in response to
environmental stimuli. A person with greater trait negative affectivity will experience
emotions like anger, disgust, and anxiety more regularly than others, and will have
relatively more negative affect in response to negative stimuli. Low trait negativity
means a person is relatively less affected by negative mood states and negative stimuli.
Individuals may have clinical levels of trait negative affectivity, resulting in anxiety,
depression, and/or poor self-concept that can interfere with life. Non-clinical
populations also have individual variability in negativity sensitivity. For example, two
individuals who watch the same sad movie may feel differing degrees of sadness. If one
of the individuals felt greater sadness across several sad movies, they may have stronger
trait negative affectivity than in the companion. Neither individual is necessarily
abnormal in this example. In this case, negative affectivity is simply a characteristic of
the person, one of thousands of personality traits.
Trait avoidance and trait negative affectivity overlap in psychological political
ideology studies, but they ought to be considered conceptually distinct. Tritt and
colleagues argue, for example, “political psychology research may have similarly
confounded valence and arousal, leading to the false conclusion that negative valence
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per se is associated with conservative political beliefs. The confounded nature of arousal
and valence is reflected in Hibbing et al.’s interpretation of experimental,
psychophysiological, neurobiological, and personality research” (Tritt et al. 2014, 330).
Many negative emotions motivate behavioral avoidance. However, some emotions that
are negative are not avoidant. Valence (the feeling of positive or negative) and arousal
(the feeling, or lack thereof, of energy and attention) have often been confused in
emotional studies (see Harmon-Jones et al. 2010; Tritt et al. 2013). Harmon-Jones and
colleagues stress the importance of differentiating valence from arousal: “By exploring
the cortical regions underlying emotion processes, the research has suggested the
importance of delineating emotional experience from emotional expression and
emotional valence from motivational intensity and direction” (Harmon-Jones et al. 2010,
459, my emphasis added).
One important case study might illustrate this point. Consider the emotion of
anger, an important discrete emotion that both theories fail to consider fully. If
considered more fully, in fact, the two literatures would have opposing hypotheses
about political conservatives. Anger is a negative emotional state that motivates
approach behavior like yelling, hostility, confrontation, and even violence (Ekman &
Friesen 1975; Plutchik 1980; Berkowitz 1993; Blanchard & Blanchard 1984; Lagerspetz
1969). Harmon-Jones and colleagues believe “the valence of the emotion may be
separable from the motivational direction of the emotion, so that negatively valenced
emotions such as anger can be approach motivating” (Harmon-Jones et al. 2010, 459).

The Motivated Social Cognition theory predicts conservatives to be avoidant,
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and therefore would predict conservatives to have less trait anger than liberals because
anger is related to approach. In contrast, the Negativity Bias Theory posits that
conservatives are sensitive to trait negative affectivity. As anger is a negative emotion,
the theory predicts that conservatives have more trait anger than liberals. The theories
are at crossroads on anger, and this example illuminates the motivation of this study to
examine trait avoidance and trait negativity affectivity individually.
Interestingly, both theories mostly avoid discussions of anger, not integrating it
directly with their respective theories, nor discussing anger as a division point between
Motivated Social Cognition Theory and Negativity Bias Theory. In fairness, of course,
studying psychological anger as a discrete emotion is very new to political science (but
see Ryan 2012). In fact, the study of discrete emotions in political science is itself fairly
new (but see Hatemi et al. 2013; and Clifford and Wendell 2015). Hibbing and colleagues
(2014) include only a glancing mention of anger, in passing, and without data or
consequence to their argument. They write, “when ‘emotionally ambiguous’ faces are
shown to research participants, individuals on the political right are more likely to report
that the face is expressing a threatening or dominant emotion, such as anger.” The word
anger is otherwise absent from the rest of the article. Consequently, anger is not given
full consideration in the theory, or distinguished from other negative emotions. Jost et
al. 2003 give a similar treatment to anger. Anger is mentioned in a subheading (361),
but merely lumped alongside fear and threat. Grouping anger with fear and threat is
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problematic because while all are negative emotions, fear triggers behavioral avoidance
while anger triggers behavioral approach. These discrete emotions have the same
negative valence, but they motivate completely different behavior. Furthermore, the
evidence marshaled by Jost and colleagues is exclusively about reacting to fear and
threat (361). There is no direct reference to anger as anything other than a synonym of
feeling threat, and no data exploring the relationship of anger to ideology whatsoever.
Also, arguably, the link between anger and ideology that they explore is in the specific
context to Right Wing Authoritarianism and parenting styles (and, so, not emotional
anger, nor broad political conservatism) (Jost et. al 2003, 347; see also Jost et al. 2009).
The discussion above on anger risks being taken as simply a cheap shot against
two big targets—is it not unfair to take criticism to these seminal works simply because
they have left work to be done? Let me be especially clear about why this discussion of
anger matters to the present work. Anger specifically illustrates the potential problems
with conflating emotional valence for behavioral motivations in psychological work.
Anger has a negative valence, and yet, also encourages behavioral approach, unlike
most other negative emotions. But, more importantly, the discussion of anger is also
serving as an illustration of the broad consequences of being too vague about the
underlying psychological factors that contribute to political ideology.
Right now, as paradigmatic and ground-breaking as they are, the theories rely on
much of the same literature but Motivated Social Cognition interprets conservatives as
avoidant, while the Negativity Bias Theory interprets conservatives as sensitive to

negativity. Neither theory has taken up the challenge of sorting out whether these
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conservatism effects are (a) behavioral avoidance, (b) negative affectivity, (c) both, or
(d) neither. It is time to dig in deeper into these parallel claims. I argue that trait
avoidance and trait negative affectivity are two different psychological dispositions, and
this chapter is an opportunity to evaluate both theories on their own appropriate
claims.
Thus, it is clear that investigating the theories based on their claims of
conservative dispositions requires two different (but related) investigations. I argue that
testing baseline dispositional differences is an important way to draw contrasts between
the two theories, in an attempt to understand better these psychological differences
between liberals and conservatives. Motivated Social Cognition needs to test trait
avoidance, as it posits that conservatives have more trait avoidance. Negativity Bias
Theory needs to test trait negative affectivity, as it posits that conservatives have more
sensitivity to negative affect. This chapter tests these theories in two ways: first, we
examine a dispositional difference in resting brain activity that has been linked to trait
avoidance, and second, we compare dispositional differences in trait-based negative
affectivity.
Frontal Asymmetry and Trait Avoidance
Cognitive neuroscientists have used trait frontal hemispheric asymmetry for
more than 25 years to investigate approach and avoidance sensitivities in human beings.
Today, some of the seminal papers on trait frontal hemispheric asymmetry from
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Davidson and colleagues have over 900 citations (Sutton and Davidson 1997, Davidson
1992). Coan and Allen, writing in 2004, report than the relationship between cortical
asymmetries and emotion had already been established by over 70 studies (2004, 7). In
their metareview, they establish that resting levels of neural activity in the prefrontal
cortex appear to be correlated with trait predispositions towards emotions and
behavioral motivations. “Findings from numerous studies reflect an emerging consensus
that relatively greater trait left frontal activity is associated with trait tendencies toward
a general appetitive, approach, or behavioral activation motivational system, and that
relatively greater trait right frontal activity is associated with trait tendencies toward a
general avoidance or withdrawal system” (Coan and Allen 2004, 11). Below I describe
these findings, and then turn towards how it may be useful in evaluating the Motivated
Social Cognition Theory and the Negativity Bias Theory.
Very early in the study of hemispheric asymmetry—indeed, of all neuroscience—
researchers connected hemispheric activity patterns with emotions. Over 70 years ago,
World War I soldiers with damaged right or left anterior cortices were discovered to
have differing experiences with positive and negative affect (Goldstein 1939). Subjects
with lesions to the left frontal region (leaving the left side malfunctioning and the right
side intact) were more likely to exhibit depression symptoms (Black 1975, Gainotti 1972;
Robinson and Price 1982).
These earlier efforts with clinical populations eventually led to research on
normal populations, too. Measuring electroencephalography, Tomarken et al. (1990),

found that subjects with greater resting right frontal activity responded with more
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intense negative affect to negatively valenced film clips, particularly those involving fear
or threat. Tomarken and colleagues later proposed that trait positive affect is
associated with greater left than right frontal cortical activity, whereas trait negative
affect is associated with greater right than left frontal activity (Tomarken et al., 1992).
Another study using film clips similarly revealed that having more right frontal activity
led to more intense reports of negative affect, and having more left frontal activity led
to more intense reports of positive affect (Wheeler et al. 1993).
The relationship between hemispheric asymmetry and emotional sensitivity had
early support, but is now challenged by contemporary research. Indeed, these early
findings were real, but new research clarified that emotional affect may have been a
confound. Davidson and colleagues (1993, 1998a, and 1998b) pushed the study of
hemispheric asymmetry away from positive and negative affect, instead suggesting that
hemispheric asymmetry corresponded with an approach-avoidance system, a hallmark
of Gray’s theories of BIS/BAS behavioral motivation. Several follow-up studies by
Davidson and colleagues confirmed the relationship (e.g. Reuter-Lorenz and Davidson,
1981; Sutton and Davidson 1997; Davidson 2004). Harmon-Jones and colleagues also
found support for the approach-avoidance theory, noting that “past research had
essentially confounded emotional valence with motivational direction, and researchers
were claiming that relatively greater left than right frontal cortical activity reflected
greater approach motivation and positive affect, whereas relatively greater right than
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left frontal cortical activity reflected greater withdrawal motivation and negative affect”
(Harmon-Jones et al. 2010, 454-455). Davidson’s findings have been empirically verified
by a number of different research groups (e.g., Carver and White 1994; Coan and Allen
2003, 2004; Harmon-Jones and Allen 1997, 1998; Amodio et al. 2008).
The consensus in this literature is that relatively greater right frontal activity is
associated with tendencies toward behavioral avoidance, instead of emotional affect
(Coan and Allen 2003a; Coan and Allen 2003b; Davidson 1993; Harmon-Jones and Allen
1997, Sutton and Davidson 1997, Davidson 1998a,b; Harmon-Jones et al. 2010). Other
researchers have confirmed this relationship. For example, Field et al. (1995) and Fox et
al. (1996) found evidence that children with greater right frontal activity at rest were
more inhibited socially, and scored lower on social competency. Schmidt and Fox (1994)
found a relationship between low adult sociability and relatively greater right frontal
activity. Schmidt et al. 1999 found shyness had greater right frontal activation.
All of these studies from developmental psychology researchers suggest a
relationship between avoidance and right frontal activity. Davidson's
approach/withdrawal motivational model of emotion also proposes that left frontal
activity (either as state or as trait) indicates a propensity to approach or engage a
stimulus, while relatively greater right frontal activity indicates a propensity to withdraw
or disengage from a stimulus. Yet, as described above, testing the avoidance
motivations of conservatives would appear to be a significant part of the larger project
of the Motivated Social Cognition Theory. (Also, it is worth mentioning that the
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Negativity Bias Theory may also be interested in these results, given that while emotion
is technically a confound in these hemispheric studies, it can still be instructive because
most avoidance motivations are, in fact, triggered by negative emotions.) Consequently,
frontal EEG asymmetry promises to be a useful tool for studying avoidance sensitivity in
political liberals and conservatives. To date, no study has looked at resting hemispheric
data to evaluate whether liberals and conservatives have more approach or avoidance
sensitivities. This chapter thus fills a lacuna in the psychological study of political
ideology.
PANAS-X and Sensitivity to Negative Emotion
To examine trait differences in how liberals and conservatives experience
emotion, we will need to use a tool designed specifically to evaluate trait (not state)
emotions. Recall that this chapter focuses on trait dispositions, or the characteristic
propensity to feel an emotion independent of context. We are interested in trait
negative affectivity, not the effect of putting subjects in a negative state condition. One
method of operationalizing trait negative affectivity is by having participants self-report
how often they experience these emotions in their last few weeks. The Positive and
Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS) is a scale developed by Watson and colleagues
(Watson et al. 1988; updated to PANAS-X in Watson and Clark 1994) to measure positive
and negative affect in contextual (state) and characteristic (trait) ways. The scale is
extremely popular in psychology and has more than 17,000 citations. As a trait measure,
PANAS-X has been shown to be significantly correlated with corresponding judgments
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made by well-acquainted peers (Watson and Clark 1994, 19). Self-reporting a negativity
bias, for example, was correlated with peers claiming that you were sensitive to
negativity. Additionally, test-retest scores were strongly consistent, and PANAS-X scores
were significantly correlated to weekly mood ratings in a sample of 239 undergrads
studied for a minimum of seven weeks (Watson and Clark 1994, 19-20).
Before continuing, what exactly is positive and negative affect? Positive affect
represents the extent to which an individual feels enthusiastic, active, and alert (Watson
et al. 1988). Higher positive affect is a state of full energy, concentration, and pleasing
engagement, whereas low positive affect is characterized by lack of energy and sadness
(Watson et al. 1988). Negative affect is the extent to which a person feels general
distress and unpleasant engagement. It includes mood states such as anger, contempt,
disgust, guilt, fear, and nervousness, while low negative affect is a state of benign
calmness (Watson et al. 1988). It is worthwhile to note here that positive affect and
negative affect are theoretically (with empirical justification) thought of as separate
emotional factors or dimensions (Watson and Clark 1994). An individual could have a
strong trait of positive affect and a strong trait of negative affect, together. This
individual would be a (relative) roller-coaster of emotion—higher highs and lower
lows—compared to someone with low affect in both dimensions. For example, the
Negativity Bias Theory states that conservatives are more trait negative. This does not
axiomatically mean the theory would also posit that conservatives are less trait positive.

The dimensions are largely independent from each other (Watson et al. 1988, 1064;
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Watson and Clark 1994, 1-3)
As the Negativity Bias Theory posits that conservatives are more sensitive to
negative affect, it can to be tested via the PANAS-X scales. Although the Motivated
Social Cognition Theory ultimately makes a different claim than conservatives have
more negative affect, the results of this study would still prove useful to that study.
Affect and behavioral motivations have much in common, even though they are
commonly conflated.
Hypotheses
Thus, the two major theories of psychological political ideology have predictions
for trait dispositions related to avoidance and negativity bias (see Table 4, below).
Concerning frontal hemispheric asymmetry and trait avoidance, the Motivated Social
Cognition Theory posits that conservatives should have greater right-side asymmetry,
reflecting a greater sensitivity to avoidance compared with liberals (H1). The Negativity
Bias Theory agrees that conservatives should have more avoidance sensitivity, but as I
have argued, this is technically confounding avoidance sensitivity for negativity bias.
Consequently, a better test of the negativity bias would be measuring trait negative
affectivity. The Negativity Bias Theory predicts that conservatives should have more
trait negative affectivity than liberals (H2). Additionally, in terms of the discrete
emotion subscales, the Negativity Bias Theory predicts that conservatives should have
more trait fear (H3) and trait sadness (H4) than liberals. Again, the Motivated Social

Cognition Theory does not necessarily dispute H2, H3, or H4. After all, there is
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substantial overlap between trait avoidance and trait negative affectivity. However,
interestingly, we can use trait hostility (anger) as a differentiator between the theories.
Anger is both affectively negative but motivationally approaching, where the other
emotions are affectively negative and motivationally avoiding. Motivated Social
Cognition Theory predicts conservatives should have less trait hostility (anger) than
liberals, while Negativity Bias Theory predicts conservatives should have more trait
hostility (anger) (H5).
Both theories remain agnostic about positive emotion scales. As mentioned
above, positive and negative affect sensitivity are independent from each other (positive
affect is not simply the absence of negative affect, but instead is its own emotional
dimension). Although Hibbing and colleagues (Dodd et al. 2012) find that liberals have
increased sensitivity to positivity compared to conservatives, this finding is not
emphasized or explored in Hibbing et al. 2014, the foundational paper of the Negativity
Bias Theory of political ideology, and so is not emphasized here, either.
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Table 4. Disposition Hypotheses.

Method
Participants
466 adults employed by a large university in the Midwest completed a screening
survey of their political attitudes and personality dispositions. Details about this survey
are in Chapter Four of the dissertation. Four months later, a subsample of 51 was
selected to perform laboratory behavioral experiments. As the original pool was
substantially skewed towards liberals, this sample was screened for political attitudes in
order to promote political diversity in the sample. The screening was simply a random
selection of 20 liberals, 15 moderates, and 20 conservatives, determined by a
combination of their self-reported ideology, and the aggregation of their political
attitudes on various issues (the Wilson-Patterson scale, detailed in full in Chapter Four).
If an invitation was declined or ignored, a new random participant of their group would
receive an invitation. Over the next six months, 20 liberals, 14 moderates, and 17

conservatives agreed to the additional testing session and came into the laboratory.
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(More detailed political characteristics of this sample are of direct interest to this
chapter, and will be described in additional detail below.)
Fifty-one adults (age 24-52 years, mean = 30.7, sd = 5.8) served as participants
(32 female, 19 male). Participants self-described as right-handed (49 selected
“somewhat” or “strongly” right-handed). Although it is speculated that handedness
may be related to hemispheric asymmetry patterns, and most research consequently
selects right-handed participants only, differences in handedness have no impact on the
findings of this chapter. The testing session averaged less than two hours and 30
minutes, including breaks and capping preparation (described below). Participants
completed four tasks during the session, and had short breaks of 5 minutes between
tasks. Participants were permitted to stand up and/or leave the testing room, but were
encouraged to avoid doing so because of the tedious capping process. As it happens, no
participants left or required to be recapped during their testing session. Participants
were compensated at a rate of $20/hour, with a minimum payment of $40 and a
maximum of $50 for the session.
Procedure
After arriving at the laboratory, participants were briefed on the tasks, and asked
to sign consent forms. Electroencephalography requires wearing a tight fitting cap that
includes a set of sensor nodes for reading electrical signals from the scalp. The capping
process requires between 20-40 minutes of preparation time, as electrode nodes are
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first gelled with a saline solution to increase conductivity, then snapped into the cap one
at a time, and then finally the readings system is tested. The electrodes do not break the
skin or provide any discomfort to the participants. While being capped, but before the
experiments began, participants completed a brief questionnaire about personality as
well as the PANAS-X trait and state emotional batteries (Watson and Clark 1994).
Participants first completed three tasks and had several breaks for approximately 110
minutes. Then, they began the resting electroencephalography task that is the subject
of this chapter. Resting electroencephalography, a reading of electrical signals from the
scalp while the participant was at rest, was recorded while participants sat quietly in a
sound-attenuated room for an 8-minute resting period (alternating one minute blocks of
eyes-open and eyes-closed in a counterbalanced pattern, as is the convention). The
activity lasted about 10 minutes in total, and it was the final activity completed by
participants before they were dismissed from the session.
Measuring Alpha Asymmetry
Resting alpha waves were collected in a 64 channel system designed by Biosemi.
Alpha waves are one variety of brain waves that can be detected by
electroencephalography. Alpha waves appear to originate from the occipital lobe
during an awake, but resting, state. According to Coan and Allen, “evidence suggests
that activity within the alpha range (typically 8–13 Hz) may be inversely related to
underlying cortical processing, since decreases in alpha tend to be observed when
underlying cortical systems engage in active processing” (Coan and Allen 2004, 9). The

detection of more alpha waves, thus, represents less cortical processing. Measuring
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alpha is therefore an indirect way to measure cortical processing. As our goal is to
assess the degree to which one hemisphere may be more active while at rest, like all
other frontal asymmetry researchers, we need to measure alpha waves in order to infer
cortical activity.
Alpha was collected in the frequency range between 8-13 Hz, in 0.5 Hz bands.
The raw data was collected by the Biosemi system (compiled in a BDF file format for
each participant) and manually checked for eye movement artifacts using BESA
Research, Windows-based software designed to analyze digitally recorded EEG.
Electroencephalography is hyper sensitive to muscle movements, and the slightest
twitch of the eye can result in a noticeable data artifact which needs to be removed
from analysis (as individuals have different propensities to blink). In order to reduce
volume conduction contributions to EEG, data were transformed to a current source
density (CSD) Laplacian 27- channel virtual montage (Allen & Reznick, 2015; Stewart et
al., 2014). The application of a CSD montage has been recommended to yield a stable,
localized estimate of frontal alpha (Stewart et al., 2014).
One challenge for comparing results between labs is keeping consistent
electrode placement, and only careful work in the lab with measuring tape can minimize
these differences between subjects. Another complication is that different EEG systems
today use varying electrode node schemes over time, with most systems today having
32, 64, or 128 channels. Consequently, researchers use virtual channels to allow
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comparison of results between labs. Whether EEG signals are measured with a 32, 64,
or 128 channel system, software can be used to convert these measurements to a
common cranial mapping system called the 10-20 system. Thus, our 64 channels of
recorded data were converted to virtual channels corresponding to the traditional 10-20
system, thus allowing comparison to other asymmetry literature. 10-20 refers to the
fact that the actual distances between adjacent electrodes on the scalp are either 10%
or 20% of the surface area, creating a spreading pattern where electrodes are
equidistant from each other.

Figure 10. The 10-20 System and Hemispheric Asymmetry.

121

As observed in Figure 10, each site has a letter to identify the lobe (Frontal,
Temporal, Parietal, or Occipital) or to signify that it is Centrally located. Numbers are
used with the letters to designate the hemisphere location, with even numbers on the
right and odd numbers on the left. A "z" (zero) is used for an electrode on the midline.

The codes “A”, “Pg” and “Fp” identify the earlobes, nasopharyngeal and frontal polar
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sites respectively.
The first step of capping correctly is to note two anatomical landmarks: first, the
nasion which is the distinctly depressed area between the eyes, just above the bridge of
the nose; and second, the inion, which is the lowest point of the skull from the back of
the head and is normally indicated by a bump. From these landmarks, researchers can
determine the sizing of the cap, and the placement of the cap on the head, to ensure
that electrical nodes are consistently arranged from subject to subject.
Electroencephalography data needs to be referenced (all signals recorded are
necessarily relative, and so there is need for a base reference). In this system, all sites
were referenced to the mastoids. To filter electrical interference from the signal, a band
filters of 0.01 Hz and 60 Hz was applied, as is standard convention. Cortical hemispheric
asymmetry is measured with frontal electrodes (placement of these electrodes are
noted with color). Following conversion to the virtual channels, amplitudes were natural
logged by site, and then asymmetry scores were calculated the conventional way (see
Coan and Allen 2004), by subtracting the left score from the right score at each frontal
node pairing (FP2 – FP1, F4 – F3, F10 – F9, and F8 – F7). The original idea for creating a
difference score comes from the theory that the two hemispheres inhibit each other, so
a greater difference in resting state scores suggests one hemisphere is more dominant
(and there are approach-avoidance consequences for this dominance). The subtraction
also takes into account individual differences in skull mass or other physical factors,
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creating a metric that accounts for the relative asymmetry of that individual. After the
creation of the node subtractions, all four were averaged into an aggregate frontal
asymmetry subtraction score.
Table 5. Frontal Asymmetry Score Interpretation.

For the remainder of the chapter, we will use the frontal asymmetry score to
measure and discuss the findings of this experiment. Table 5 summarizes
interpretation. The frontal asymmetry score represents the relative activity of the right
and left hemispheres, with a score of zero meaning symmetrical activity. In interpreting
this scale, a positive frontal asymmetry score means more alpha waves on the rightside, more left frontal activity, and increased approach sensitivity. A negative frontal
asymmetry score means relatively more alpha waves on the left-side, more right frontal
activity, and increased avoidance sensitivity.
Measuring Trait Emotions
The PANAS-X revised scale was administered to all participants in order to assess
the degree to which they are sensitive to emotions. PANAS-X questions allow emotional
sensitivity to be assessed dimensionally—positive affect and negative affect. Each
participant uses a five point scale to self-report how much they have felt a discrete
emotion over the past couple of weeks (trait), or how much they feel it now, in the
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moment (state). A total of 30 discrete emotion items are included (see appendix for full
list).
Positive affect and negative affect are themselves comprised of a factor
structure of discrete emotions. In their creation and analysis of the PANAS-X scale,
Watson and Clark (1994) identify a number of subscales for each affective dimension.
Positive Affect is comprised of Joviality, Self-Assurance, and Attentiveness. Negative
affect includes Fear, Hostility, and Sadness. A summary of the two dimension scales, the
six discrete emotion subscales, and the individual emotion items that comprise each
scale is included in Table 6.
Table 6. PANAS-X Scale Compositions

As can be observed in Table 6, discrete emotions are aggregated into two
general dimensional scales, negative affect and positive affect. For example, fear,
hostility, and sadness are all negatively valenced discrete emotions, while joviality, selfassurance, and attentiveness are all positively valenced discrete emotions. An individual

with greater trait negative affectivity would be expected to react more strongly to
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negative emotions, and would do so independently from state-based contextual factors,
such that would trigger an emotional response. If two people both had an emotional
response triggered by the environment, the one with greater trait negative affectivity
would be expected to react more strongly to that trigger, all else being equal. PANAS-X
also allows the creation of several subscales of interest, as well. As noted above,
discrete emotions like fear, hostility (anger), and sadness are commonly invoked by the
Negativity Bias Theory and other emotion researchers working in political psychology.
Measuring Ideology
Political ideology questions were asked to all participants several weeks prior to
the laboratory experiment. Below are the five ways ideology was measured in this
sample, and the samples distributions on those scales. Cronbach’s alphas reported in
subsequent paragraphs are from the full survey sample of 466 participants, as alphas
from the smaller sample of 51 include more random variability and are not as
conceptually useful. That said, alphas from the smaller sample did not differ in a
meaningful way from the numbers reported below. Other details about the scale
construction and measure validity are described in Chapter Four.

Table 7. Descriptive Statistics of Lab Participants.
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Self-reported ideology is the conventional seven-point scale used by the
American National Election Studies, spanning “Very liberal” (1) to “Very conservative”
(7) with “Moderate” (4) being the middle anchor. Liberals range from 1 to 3, moderates
are 4s, and conservatives range from 5 to 7. Although some literature has pointed to
interesting alternatives for self-reports (Wood and Oliver 2012), this is still the dominant
way of measuring ideology in a survey. Also, this scale (and a 10 point variant of it) is
used almost exclusively by psychologists doing work in the Motivated Social Cognition
Theory area (e.g. Jost et al. 2003, Jost and Amodio 2012).
The Wilson-Patterson scale of political attitudes (Wilson 1968; updated by Smith
et al. 2011) is a battery of twenty issue attitude items, which are additively combined
into a general conservatism scale (α = .80). As ideology is sometimes conceptualized as
multidimensional, I also created social conservatism (α = .76) and economic
conservatism (α = .61) subscales based off of the Wilson-Patterson scale detailed above.
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A full description of how these subscales were constructed is available in Chapter Four.
In short, however, these two subscales are based on theoretical grouping, and based on
general multidimensional work (e.g. Treier and Hillygus 2009). Social conservatism
includes school prayer, legal pornography, illegal immigration, death penalty, the Patriot
Act, biblical truth, gay marriage, and abortion. Economic conservatism includes welfare
spending, tax cuts, small government, and foreign aid. More research needs to be done
on the psychological underpinnings of multidimensional ideology (Hibbing et al. 2014),
and some evidence points to the idea that ideology is not a singular concept (see
Chapter Two for more details). It will be useful here to see how social and economic
conservatism might differ, and this is an important way that political scientists can
improve on the work of psychologists in the study of the psychology of political
ideology.
Finally, I used the World Values Survey asks four Likert-style questions about
economic justice. (Exact question wording is available in the appendix.) These items
have been combined into the World Values Survey Economic Justice battery, which
measure attitudes about income redistribution and economic inequality (α = .70).

128

Results
Table 8. Correlation Matrix of Emotional Measures.

The Motivated Social Cognition Theory predicted that conservatives would have
more trait avoidance compared to liberals (H1), which is operationalized in this study as
a lower frontal asymmetry score. However, I find no significant relationship between
frontal asymmetry and self-identified political ideology, and it trends in the opposite
direction than predicted (r = 0.23, p = 0.11). I also find that the Wilson-Patterson
conservatism scale is correlated positively with the frontal asymmetry score (r = 0.36, p
= 0.01), exactly the opposite of the expectations. This finding also holds for the W-P
social conservatism scale (r = 0.35 , p = 0.01), and it trends in the same pattern for the
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economic issue subscale (r = 0.24, p = 0.10). The economic justice subscale of the World
Values Survey, which focuses on liberal-conservative beliefs about economic inequality,
is not correlated with frontal asymmetry (p = 0.49). Whether ideology is self-reported
or survey-determined, there is no evidence that conservatives have more trait
avoidance based on frontal asymmetry measures. If anything, these results suggest
liberals have the neural correlates for having more trait avoidance.
What about trait sensitivities to negative emotions? No statistically significant
relationship was found between self-identified conservatism and trait negative
affectivity (H2) (p = 0.59). No statistically significant relationship was found between
the Wilson-Patterson ideology scale (p = 0.27), the W-P social conservatism subscale (p =
0.58), or the W-P economic conservatism subscale (p = 0.3). The World Values Survey
Economic Justice scale does have a surprise negative correlation to trait negative
affectivity (r = -0.36, p = 0.01), which suggests that more trait negative affectivity is
correlated with political liberalism (not with conservatism, as was expected).
Trait fear appears mostly unrelated to political ideology, with a trending finding
on economic conservatism, and a statistically significant relationship on the World
Values Scale, where once again the relationship directions are contrary to theoretical
expectations (H3). Self-reported ideology (p = 0.20), W-P scale (p = 0.26), or W-P social
conservatism (p = 0.84) yield no relationship. Again, the Wilson-Patterson subscale for
economic conservatism trends towards having a relationship to trait fear, but in
precisely the opposite direction than expected (r = -0.24, p = 0.09), with it being

associated with political liberalism. Economic conservatives in this sample may have
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moderately less trait fear sensitivity.
Trait sadness (H4) and trait hostility (H5) have essentially no relationship to any
measurement of political ideology in this sample (p values range from 0.27 to 0.95 for
both trait sadness and trait hostility, see Table 8). Early in this chapter, I mentioned that
trait hostility (anger) may prove to be an interesting dividing point between the
Motivated Social Cognition Theory and the Negativity Bias Theory, but as it turns out,
both theories fail their hypotheses here.
Although both theories are agnostic about the relationship of political ideology
to positive affect, we have the data to explore. First, recall that Watson and Clark 1994
posited trait negative and positive affectivities ought to be considered separate
dimensions (and not two sides of the same construct). In this data, I find that the two
characteristics are only weakly negatively correlated (r = -0.26, p = 0.06), confirming
their research. Second, in terms of the relationship of trait positive affectivity to
political ideology, I find rather strong evidence of no relationship whatsoever (see Table
8). One correlation manages to catch, as economic conservatives have more trait selfassurance (r = 0.30, p = 0.03). We should be careful about extrapolating too much on
that finding, given that it was precisely one significant result of twenty tests (exactly 5%
of the tests) of trait positive affect. Self-assurance has two trending relationships, both
in the opposite direction to expectations.

Discussion
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This chapter focuses on ideological differences in trait avoidance and trait
negative affectivity. These individual dispositions are related to everyday behavior,
used by human beings from dozens to hundreds of times a day. We investigate the
claims of the Motivated Social Cognition Theory and the Negativity Bias Theory, being
especially sensitive to the idea that the theories subtly posit different psychological
undercurrents for political ideology (albeit, processes that are quite related).
Recall the Motivated Social Cognition theory argues that conservatives are more
motivated by needs to reduce uncertainty, ambiguity, threat, and disgust (Jost et al.
2003). Conservatives are thought to be sensitive to avoidance signals, biasing their
beliefs towards political conservatism. I use frontal hemispheric asymmetry to test the
idea that trait avoidance may be a biomarker of being politically conservative.
The Negativity Bias Theory, on the other hand, argues conservatives are more
sensitive to negative emotions, causing stronger physiological reactions to negativity
(Hibbing et al. 2014). I used a battery of survey questions that tap into emotions to test
the idea that trait negative affectivity may be a biomarker of being politically
conservative.
The results are surprising in every possible way. The data show there is virtually
no evidence that liberals and conservatives hold trait differences in trait avoidance or
sensitivity to negative emotion. In fact, if anything, liberals in this sample appear to be
more sensitive to avoidance, which stands out from the vast majority of political
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psychology work on this subject. Where I had hoped to contribute by parsing out two
different psychological processes (behavioral motivations like avoidance from negative
affect) in order to clarify our two main theories, instead I fail to find evidence that
supports either theory.
Overall, ideology was measured in five ways, and in no form of measurement is
there a relationship between trait emotional sensitivity and ideology. These results urge
caution moving forward for both psychological theories of political ideology, and begs
further work to establish where the psychological differences noted by Jost, Hibbing,
and colleagues are emerging. Those results have strong support over dozens of papers,
yet, my work here does not support their claims. The next chapter continues the
investigation of how avoidance sensitivity and negativity bias may be different between
liberals and conservatives.

CHAPTER SIX
GO/NO-GO BEHAVIORAL INHIBITION ANALYSIS
This chapter expands our investigation of dispositional differences between
liberals and conservatives by looking at conflict monitoring in the brain. Conflict
monitoring is the cognitive process that helps resolve issues between goal directed
behavior and our ever changing environment, allowing us to detect potential conflicts
and facilitate behavior to resolve detected conflicts. Conflict monitoring is part of a
behavioral surveillance system, with the central purpose of resolving a conflict between
desired outcomes and a habituated response.
Conflicts between goals and ongoing behavior occur regularly in human
experience. For one silly—but instructive—example, consider the children’s game, RedLight-Green-Light. In the game, one child plays as the Stop-light and the rest are at a
starting line some distance away. The game begins when the Stop-light yells, “Green
light!” At this cue, the children at the starting line race towards the Stop-light at high
speed. However, at any time, the Stop-may call out, “Red light!” which forces the
children to immediately halt moving. Children who cannot successfully stop are
removed from that round of the game. As the game continues, the Stop-light alternates
between calling for green light and red light in an attempt to get the dashing kids to
make errors and drop out of the game. The first child to tag the Stop-light without
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violating the red light signal is the winner. The Stop-light wins if they can successfully
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force errors in all the runners, leaving no runners remaining on the field.
What makes Red-Light-Green-Light difficult for children (and their 32 year old
uncle) is that the players have a common goal that is difficult to achieve. They want to
be the first to touch the Stop-light, which is accomplished by running more quickly than
the other players. However, the runners must simultaneously monitor changing signals
in the environment to stay “safe” in the game. Failure to stop immediately after the red
light signal results in disqualification. A runner in this game needs to be goal-directed,
but also needs to remain constantly aware of changing signals in the environment. And,
if your niece really wanted to see her uncle out of the game, she could yell out, “Green
lightning!” which falsely impersonates a green light signal to begin running again. (Do
not underestimate the strategic shrewdness of your nieces.) To succeed in this game,
you need constant surveillance paired with fast footwork. The challenge of the game is
in successfully reaching your goal rapidly while being alert to unexpected signals that
threaten immediate failure.
Red-Light-Green-Light is a metaphor for conflict monitoring in animal behavior.
We are constantly engaged in small goal-oriented behavior, while also simultaneously
being constantly vigilant for new signals in the environment. Conflict monitoring is a
cognitive process that allows humans to detect potential conflicts between behavior
and goals as well as instigate new behavior to resolve the conflict. Our conflict
monitoring processes are constantly vigilant, and may trigger dozens of times per day, at
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many different scales. You reach down for an apple at the grocery store, and place it in
your basket. You repeat this twice more. However, when you reach down for the
fourth apple, your eyes catch the sheen of dusty green-brown mold. Your goal to place
this apple in your basket was interrupted by a new signal in the environment. Conflict
monitoring is the process that halts your habituated behavior in response to this new
information. Other day-to-day examples are numerous. While briskly walking through a
cafeteria towards a vender, you suddenly need to halt because another person walks
into your path without seeing you. You might be taking notes during a phone call and
realize that the pen you are using has run out of ink, requiring you to shift attention
from the phone call to the drawer under your desk for the backup pen. Your conflict
monitoring processing is what helps you identify when a shift in attention and behavior
may be required, especially in circumstances when the ongoing behavior is prepotent,
habitual, or intuitive. We need our conflict monitoring process the most when we are
not concentrating or focusing on what we are doing, and the behavior is routine.
Conflict monitoring is broadly categorized by researchers as part of the
behavioral inhibition system, which has been a theme of this dissertation. As a reminder
from earlier chapters, behavioral inhibition is the system that triggers motivation to halt
ongoing behavior in response to the environment, especially concerning negative stimuli
and events that cause punishment, frustration, and anxiety (Gray 1982; Gray &
McNaughton 2000). The behavioral inhibition system is a broad psychological construct
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that involves numerous other cognitive processes, of which conflict monitoring is one
example.
This chapter follows recent cognitive psychology work by looking at conflict
monitoring in the brain, examining behavioral and neural data responses on a Go/No-Go
task. I record electroencephalography to measure how the brain reacts when it detects
a conflict between goal and behavior. Our key question for this chapter is: are there
individual differences between liberals and conservatives in conflict monitoring
processing?
As we will see, only limited attention has been given to the question of whether
liberals and conservatives would be expected to have differences in conflict monitoring
processes. Much like personality differences, we might expect some individuals to have
a stronger conflict monitoring response than others, allowing them to make fewer
response errors to simple behavioral tasks. This chapter is a direct replication of a study
by David Amodio, John Jost, Sarah Master, and Cindy Yee (2007), which hypothesizes
that because liberals are more cognitively flexible, they ought to have stronger conflict
monitoring systems. This study, cited more than 350 times, is a seminal contribution to
the area of inquiry sometimes called political neuroscience (Jost and Amodio 2012), and
seeks to bolster and extend Jost’s extremely popular theory of conservatism as
motivated social cognition. Replication of this study is important because the paper
itself is important to the project of biology and politics. When political scientists and
political psychologists defend the utility of neuroscience for studying political attitudes,
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the Amodio et al. 2007 paper is always cited, and it is sometimes the only such paper
cited in a review paper.
Prior chapters in this dissertation have raised more questions about the
psychological roots of political ideology than answers—indeed, results so far from this
sample have largely failed to support the idea of significant differences between liberals
and conservatives in psychological factors of root-level emotional sensitivity and
approach and avoidance motivations. Chapter Four dealt with self-reported behavioral
inhibition and behavioral activation in survey data, finding a few unexpected
relationships but mostly a host of null results. Chapter Five moved beyond self-report
into an investigation of trait level differences in approach-avoidance and emotional
sensitivity by the reading of electrical signals off the scalp in search of brain patterns
connected to negative and positive emotions. These results suggested very few
differences in emotional sensitivity between liberals and conservatives, which goes
against expectations from virtually any researcher working on the political psychology of
political ideology. In this chapter, we move past self-reported traits and trait-level
neurophysiological patterns, towards actual behavioral data on a behavioral task.
When this chapter closes, we will continue to find a counter-intuitive (but
robust) story of no significant psychophysiological differences between liberals and
conservatives, this time in the context of conflict monitoring processes during a Go/NoGo task. I also address the replication efforts of two additional studies—one which
intended to directly replicate Amodio et al. 2007 as I have done, and one which
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collected similar data to Amodio et al. 2007 but did not discuss the implications of their
data. Thus, this chapter ultimately looks at all available conflict monitoring in the brain
of liberals and conservatives across four sets of researchers. Amodio et al. 2007 are
cited frequently, but no review paper has yet looked at the aggregate findings across all
four of these research teams.
At the close of this chapter, having reviewed new and old evidence of conflict
monitoring and political ideology, I believe the Amodio et al. 2007 findings need more
attention from scholars. The original data presented in this chapter, on a sample of 51
non-student adults, do not replicate any part of Amodio et al. 2007 at all. One study
(Weissflog et al. 2013) has mixed results for replication, and a second related study
(Inzlicht et al. 2009) fails to replicate. Implications of this struggle to replicate this
important work are discussed at the conclusion of this chapter.
Conflict Monitoring and Executive Functioning
To think and act, the human brain must engage in several attentional and
monitoring behaviors. Cognitive scientists broadly refer to these processes as executive
functioning. Executive functioning is a set of cognitive processes that are necessary for
the cognitive control of behavior. Executive functioning allows people to identify,
pursue, retool, and resolve goal-directed behavior. Some of these executive functions
include control of attention, inhibition control, and memory processes. Our capacity to
plan, problem solve, and logically reason are all due to our executive functioning. The
broad array of executive functions in the brain are tremendously influential on behavior,
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and impairment in executive functioning is linked to a suite of cognitive and personality
disorders.
Executive functioning is about the control of action, where “deliberate,
conscious control of activity is desired rather than those that are automatic” (Norman &
Shallice, 1986, 1). Norman and Shallice (1986, 2) posit five types of situations that
require deliberate attentional resources:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

They involve planning or decision making.
They involve components of troubleshooting.
They are ill-learned or contain novel sequences of actions.
They are judged to be dangerous or technically difficult.
They require the overcoming of a strong; habitual response or resisting
temptation.

In common between these situations is the need to control the response in order to
avoid error.
Researchers have classified the cognitive process designed to identify potential
response conflict and motivate effective performance to overcome the conflict as
conflict monitoring (Amodio et al. 2008; Kerns, 2004). Response conflict is the
occurrence of incompatible response tendencies, or an instance where reflexive or
habitual response appears to conflict with the individual’s immediate goals. Conflict
monitoring, therefore, helps control our control (Kerns, 2004). Conflict monitoring in
this dissertation is synonymous with error detection and behavioral conflict detection.
One of many behavioral tasks in psychology labs known to tap into conflict
monitoring is the Stroop color-naming task, one of the most famous and important
experimental tasks ever devised. In the generic variant of the Stroop, participants view

140
a printed word that represents a color (e.g. “RED,” or “BLUE”), and they are tasked with
speaking the written word aloud. This task is relatively simple during the congruent
trials, where the word “RED” is written in red ink. However, incongruent trials are
mixed in, where the word “RED” is written in blue link. Incongruent trials require the
participant to suppress the reflexive impulse to say the color of the ink in order to
correctly say the written word aloud. Participants take longer and makes more errors on
incongruent trials because of the increased difficulty.
The Stroop task requires individuals to engage in conflict monitoring. It requires
subjects to override a strong, prepotent response in order to accurately complete the
trial. Subjects in the Stroop task are habituated to quickly viewing a word and quickly
responding by naming a color. Once the prepotent response is established, it requires
executive control to step in and inhibit the response. Conflict monitoring is about
detecting a potential conflict between goal and behavior, and cuing the brain to attempt
to resolve the conflict.
The Go/No-Go task is another behavioral task for measuring individual
differences in conflict monitoring. Like the Stroop color-naming task, the Go/No-Go task
creates a habitual prepotent response of pressing the “Go” button, which must be
unexpectedly inhibited when the rare “No-Go” signal flashes on the screen in place of
the “Go” signal. This chapter utilizes the Go/No-Go behavioral task, and more details
about the experiment are below.

Although accuracy on the tasks is one reasonable measure of conflict
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monitoring, researchers have also expanded the scope of their investigation into the
neurocognitive mechanisms responsible for conflict monitoring. Cognitive scientists
studying the brain have learned that conflict monitoring largely involves the anterior
cingulate cortex and the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (Botvinick et al. 2001; Botvinick
et al. 2004; Kerns 2004). Neuropsychological studies of lesion patients have helped
demonstrate the importance of ACC related executive function for everyday cognitive
and social behavior (Bush et al., 2000; Holroyd & Yeung, 2012). Below, we outline the
role of the anterior cingulate cortex as it relates to conflict monitoring in more detail.
Anterior Cingulate Cortex and Psychological Processes
Conflict monitoring involves functions of attention, cognitive control, and
memory. Processes like this are virtually never fully isolated to a single brain region. It is
important to understand that many regions of the brain are related to emotion and
cognition, complexly interweaving many different brain regions. Strict topographical
understandings of brain function tend to underestimate the interplay that occurs
between many regions in response to a single stimuli. And, of course, region-of-interest
studies (necessarily) tend to downplay the role of the whole-brain in favor of the
particular region being highlighted and investigated in a particular study.

Figure 11. The Anterior Cingulate Cortex.

142

Those warnings understood, research has nonetheless demonstrated a
consistent special role for the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) in conflict monitoring and
conflict detection. The anterior cingulate cortex is the frontal area of the cingulate
cortex, a centrally located region immediately above the corpus callosum (see yellow
region in figure). Over the past few decades, researchers have broadly understood that
the ACC is related to cognition and emotion in the human brain, with particular
specialization in attention and self-regulation (Botvinick et al., 2001; Botvinick et al.,
2004; Bush et al., 2000; Kerns, 2004; Van Veen & Carter, 2002). Research also suggests
that emotions can moderate and mediate executive action and attention, as well
(Kanske & Kotz, 2011).
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As research on the anterior cingulate cortex has continued, a picture has been
sketched of its particular specialization in emotional and cognitive behavior.
Researchers have found the ACC is particularly active compared to other regions when
the cognitive processes involve attention, detecting errors, and self-regulation (Amodio
& Frith, 2006; Botvinick et al., 2001; Kanske & Kotz, 2011). Additionally, distinctive ACC
activity spikes when individuals engage in top-down control to resolve detected conflicts
during information processing (Botvinick et a. 2001; van Veen & Carter 2002).
Researchers also believe that the anterior cingulate cortex has a broad role in
directing attention during behavioral tasks in the laboratory. During a computerized
behavioral task with an accuracy component, a powerful response in the ACC can be
observed when the subject realizes that they have made an error when attempting to
be accurate. This error-detection processing appears to originate from the ACC (Gehring
et al. 1993), and researchers have also found general conflict-monitoring processing also
tied to the ACC (Luu et al. 2003). In theory, the ACC serves an adaptive purpose, helping
us recognize errors between our passive behavior and our active goals, particularly if
our current habitual behavior needs to be rapidly interrupted in response to new
information or a new threat.
Additionally, the ACC has also been connected to modulation of autonomic
activity (Devinsky et al. 1995), suggesting a role in subconscious or unconscious behavior
direction. Lavin et al. 2013 note that neuro activity generated in the ACC is produced
when subjects process conflicting social information, as well as detecting pain. Singer et
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al. (2004) and Jackson et al. (2005) linked ACC activity with empathy when viewing pain
in others.
The anterior cingulate cortex has also been connected to many related
psychological processes, including self-regulation and anxiety. Gray and McNaughton
(2000) looked at animal models of mice, lesion studies of human beings, and the known
effects of anxiolytic drugs (like Xanax) to formulate their theory of anxiety as an alarm
system, with the ACC as a “cortical alarm bell” (pg. 137). The ACC alerts the mind in
response to states of uncertainty, simultaneous activation of conflicting goals, and
erroneous responding.
Gray and McNaughton 2000 specifically note that abstract conceptual goals are
likely to be regulated in much the same way as simple, concrete goals. It should be
expected, according to them, that more advanced cognitive processing will follow the
same general rules. Anxiety about completing a dissertation follows the same broad
neurocognitive rules of anxiety as walking into an ominous cave where predators may
be present.
Research continues to confirm the Gray and McNaughton model of anxiety, and
the role that the ACC plays in the detection of states that trigger anxiety. The ACC is
important for the types of inhibited responding that is characteristic of anxiety (Hajcak
& Foti 2008; Hajcak et al. 2003) and for the minimization of prediction errors
(Ridderinkhof et al. 2004). A prediction error is when you expected an outcome but you
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turned out to be wrong. This concept is highly compatible with the idea of conflict and
error detection noted above.
The ACC, thus, is part of the general system for regulating and modifying
behavior by signaling when control is needed, usually as a result of some anxietyproducing event such as the commission of an error (Holroyd & Coles 2002), the
detection of conflict (Yeung et al. 2004) or the experience of uncertainty (Critchley et al.
2001; Hirsh & Inzlicht 2008).
You can see that researchers are still triangulating the detailed functions of the
anterior cingulate cortex, but work so far has demonstrated a number of pathways for
how the ACC affects, facilitates, or mediates a particular kind of attentional information
processing concerned with making mistakes and correcting behavior. In other words,
the anterior cingulate cortex seems to play an especially important role in conflict
monitoring.
Below, we turn to the Go/No-Go behavioral task and Gray’s dual-systems of
behavioral motivation, to try to understand how conflict monitoring is related to Gray’s
system of behavior inhibition and what this could mean for political ideology.
Go/No-Go and Gray’s Behavioral Motivation Systems
The Go/No-Go behavioral task has been used by researchers as a measure of
individual differences in behavioral inhibition. In past chapters, I argued that Gray’s dual
theory of behavioral motivations is potentially important to understanding
psychophysiological differences between liberals and conservatives. Below, I sketch an
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outline for why Gray’s work is relevant to conflict monitoring in the anterior cingulate
cortex.
To review quickly, Gray (1982; 1990; Gray & McNaughton 2000) proposed that
animals have a behavioral activation system (BAS) that motivates behavior towards
goals and a behavioral inhibition system (BIS) that halts ongoing behavior in response to
novel or unexpected stimuli. The behavioral activation system is conceptualized as the
go system, motivating behavior towards the pursuit of goals. Goals, in this context,
refer to the hundreds of directed impulses and small plans we have on a daily basis.
Colloquially, we often tend to think of goals as big picture ideas—you have a goal
to complete this research paper, or a goal to leave work early enough to walk the dog
before dinner. But Gray’s definition of goal-directed behavior goes to a much smaller
level (we might colloquially think of them as micro-goals). Under this framework, it is
considered goal-directed behavior to wheel your rolling office chair over to the phone,
so that you can place a call. It is also a goal to pull a tissue from the box to blow your
nose. These goals require behavior, and Gray’s theory conceptualizes the behavioral
activation system as the mechanism for initiating goal-directed behavior.
The problem for us living things is that we cannot pursue these little goals with
reckless abandon. Our environmental situation or context can change rapidly without
notice, requiring us to change our immediate plans and halt ongoing behavior. For
example, your plan to roll the chair over to the telephone needs to quickly be changed
when you hear the sharp, distressed bark of the dog underfoot. When you hear the

noise of the bark, or feel the bump of his tail under the chair wheels, you will
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immediately halt your executing plan in reaction to the new information. To inhibit our
current intended behavior requires the behavioral inhibition system. You should think
of the behavioral inhibition system as being the stop mechanism. It halts ongoing
behavior, attempts to disengage us from danger, and allows us to create a new
behavioral plan in response to the new information.
Simultaneously in our minds, we are engaged in goal-oriented behavior while
also keeping persistent surveillance over our changing environment. This is the heart of
Gray’s dual process system—humans and animals alike have a behavioral activation
system that is engaged in current goal-directed behavior while also an active behavioral
inhibition system that is quietly surveying the environment for emergent new
information.
Now, a critical question has emerged about what behavioral inhibition means in
psychological research. Amodio et al. 2008 note, “the primary source of ambiguity
concerns whether BIS is associated with the tendency to halt ongoing behavior or to
engage in active avoidance behavior in response to a potential threat. On one hand,
much research has operationalized BIS in terms of behavioral inhibition, as originally
suggested by Gray… on the other hand, many researchers have described BIS in terms of
behavioral avoidance” (12). These two conceptualizations of the Gray system—
inhibition versus motivational avoidance—are rather different. Behavioral inhibition is
the halting of ongoing behavior based on new information—it is the interruption of
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action. In contrast, behavioral avoidance is actively avoiding something based on new
information—it is the action of avoidance. Behavioral inhibition is about stopping a
plan, whereas behavioral avoidance is about starting a plan of avoidance.
Both functions could be linked to the concept of conflict monitoring as they are
related to detecting a conflict, stopping conflictual behavior, and redirecting behavior to
avoid the conflict. Still, conceptual clarity is necessary because stopping a plan and
starting a plan could be fundamentally different behavioral motivations, threatening to
confuse the underlying psychological mechanisms that we look at in this dissertation.
Especially as they intersect with approach-avoidance theories.
Amodio et al. 2008 examine this conceptual confusion directly. Based on a
review of the literature, they conceptualize BIS as specifically about inhibition. They
argue that Gray’s original conceptualization is theoretically more akin to halting ongoing
behavior rather than initiating avoidance behavior. Then, using behavioral and
electroencephalography measures, Amodio and colleagues find that the BIS self-report
(based on the questionnaire from Carver & White, 1994) is correlated with ACC related
activity on a Go/No-Go task. This means the BIS self-report is related to an attentional
system for monitoring response conflicts. (A deeper discussion of BIS, BAS, inhibition
and motivational avoidance is included in Chapter Four.) Additionally, they find that
self-reported BIS is correlated with increased error-related negativity in the anterior
cingulate cortex when subjects make errors on No-Go trials. In other words, when
subjects are supposed to inhibit their button-pressing, but fail to do so, the anterior

cingulate cortex has a sharp moment of activity to reflect the detected error. This
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further establishes the relationship between Gray’s BIS scale and ACC related activity
during the Go/No-Go task.
Thus, this chapter considers the BIS system a method of halting ongoing
behavior, suggesting that it is important or essential to the process of conflict
monitoring. Additionally, I conceptualize the Go/No-Go task as a behavioral measure
designed to test conflict monitoring in a way consistent with Gray’s theories of a
behavioral inhibition system. The experiment in this chapter is the behavioral and neural
complement to the survey data on BIS in Chapter Four. Below, we complete the
literature review by looking at how conflict monitoring in the anterior cingulate cortex, a
feature of Gray’s behavioral inhibition system, could be related to political ideology.
Go/No-Go Task and Political Ideology
The Go/No-Go task has already been applied to political ideology twice and
religious belief once. Before wading in, though, we should pause on what we might
expect to find. From the summary of literature above, we understand that conflict
monitoring is a general mechanism for detecting when one’s habitual response
tendency is mismatched with responses required by the current situation. We
understand that conflict monitoring is conceptually related to Gray’s behavioral
inhibition system, a powerful cognitive feature of how we interact with the world on a
minute-by-minute scale. We also understand that conflict monitoring is not restricted to
autonomic body systems or low-level cognition—it could just as easily be related to
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abstract thought. Given the above, how do these processes influence high level abstract
thinking, such as liberal and conservative political beliefs?
Generally speaking, the political psychology of ideology literature predicts
conservatives to be both motivationally avoidant and inhibited in cognitive style. Jost’s
Motivated Social Cognition Theory and Hibbing’s Negativity Bias Theory address this
issue only in passing, as our investigation in Chapter Two details. Recall that prior
theories in political psychology have conflated approach-avoidance tendencies with
emotional sensitivity differences. Approach and avoidance sensitivity is not the same as
emotional sensitivity. The Motivated Social Cognition theory of Jost and colleagues
posits that conservatives are psychologically motivated by needs to reduce uncertainty,
ambiguity, threat, and disgust (Jost et al., 2003). The psychological needs of
conservatives ought to be associated with increased sensitivity to avoidance and
inhibition signals. As avoiding uncertainty, ambiguity, threat, and disgust are connected
to Gray’s theory of behavioral avoidance and behavioral avoidance has a connection to
inhibition in Gray’s theories, we might expect to see conservatives being higher in
behavioral inhibition as well.
The relationship of ideology to motivational avoidance, inhibition, and negative
affect has been explored in prior chapters. This chapter makes the claim that conflict
monitoring is a part of the behavioral inhibition system. With that in mind, we can
develop hypotheses on the relationship of conflict monitoring to political ideology, by

sketching a picture of the relationship of motivational avoidance and inhibition in
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ideology.
Uncertainty avoidance in conservatives is part of a general predisposition
towards caution and general avoidance (Jost et al., 2003; Jost et al., 2009). Jost’s
theories also include the idea of conservatives being more inhibited. For example, Jost
and colleagues repeatedly cite the Block and Block (2006) study that describes that
“inhibited” preschoolers disproportionally grew up to be political conservatives (Jost et
al., 2009; Jost, 2009). This evidence is used to demonstrate that the psychological
differences between liberals and conservatives noted by their Motivated Social
Cognition Theory occur early in life, before the emergence of political awareness. While
motivational avoidance and inhibition are different psychological constructs, as Amodio
et al. 2008 details, it could certainly be the case that conservatives have more sensitivity
to both, and we have reason to believe that sensitivity to one would be positively
correlated with the other.
The Negativity Bias Theory, of John Hibbing and colleagues, on the other hand,
posits that conservatives have more sensitivity to negative emotions. This causes
conservatives to exhibit stronger physiological reactions and focus greater attention to
negative stimuli (Hibbing et al 2014). Again, emotional sensitivity is not the same
construct as motivational avoidance, inhibition, or conflict monitoring, so Hibbing and
colleagues have not explored how either would be related to their theory. In my view,
being sensitive to negative emotions, though, has clear overlap with conflict monitoring.
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Behavioral avoidance—the avoiding of unpleasant things—is typically an emotionally
negative experience. Feelings of fear, disgust, and sadness are all negatively valenced
and associated with motivated avoidance. Most negative emotions trigger motivational
avoidance, although there is one exception. Anger is emotionally negative but
behaviorally causes individuals to approach, as it directs the angry individual to engage
with the subject of the anger.
In another Hibbing paper, Dodd et al. 2012 develop the idea that individual-level
variation in physiological and attentional responses to aversive and appetitive stimuli
are correlated with political ideology. Using skin conductance measures and eyetracking
software, they find that conservatives have more sensitivity to aversive stimuli while
liberals have more sensitivity to appetitive (pleasing) stimuli. They demonstrate that
those on the right not only respond more strongly to aversive images but also devote
more attention to aversive images.
The research from Dodd, Hibbing, and colleagues does not mention conflict
monitoring specifically, but their study of attention opens the idea that conflict
monitoring differences may exist. They find that both liberals and conservatives pay
more attention to aversive images than appetitive images, but conservatives’ attention
to aversive images is relatively greater and more pronounced. Dodd et al. 2012 suggest
that attention should be studied alongside other psychological and physiological
differences of liberals and conservatives.
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Thus, the Negativity Bias Theory would seem to be supportive of there being a
relationship between conservatives and sensitivity to aversive stimuli. Hibbing, et al.,
2014 note several studies that have found that conservatives focus more on threatening
images and react more strongly to being startled (e.g. Dodd et al., 2012; Oxley et al.,
2008). These reactions should properly be categorized as of an “inhibitory” nature
rather than motivationally avoidant—the motivational drive to avoidance occurs
chronologically after the startle reflex in response that Hibbing’s team observed.
Overall, while both theories would be deeply interested in how conservatives
would differ from liberals on conflict monitoring they have thus far declined to wade
deeply into the topic. Three different papers have looked at these issues in the brains of
liberals and conservatives using the Go/No-Go task. We take them up below.
Amodio, Jost, and the Go/No-Go Behavioral Task
Amodio et al. (2007) is the first study to look at conflict monitoring in liberals and
conservatives on a Go/No-Go task (John Jost is one of the co-authors). They look at
behavioral and electroencephalography data during a conventional Go/No-Go task. This
study broke new ground in the literature by being one of the first to explore cognitive
styles of liberals and conservatives with neuroscience techniques.
In the Go/No-Go task, participants must quickly respond to a frequently
presented Go stimulus. Participants are habituated to expect the Go signal, which they
receive about 80% of the time at random intervals. Each time the participant sees the
Go signal, they must quickly (within 1000 milliseconds) press the Go button. However,
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20% of the time, at unpredictable intervals, a No-Go signal appears. Upon seeing the
unusual No-Go signal, participants must withhold the habitual pressing of the Go
button. As the Go signal has become the prepotent response, participants struggle to
accurately inhibit pressing the Go button. The difficulty of the struggle is demonstrated
by decreased accuracy during No-Go trials. Where Go trials typically have an accuracy
rate of greater than 98 percent, No-Go trials can have a significantly decreased accuracy
rate of 70 percent or less. It takes careful attention and cognitive effort to resist the
habitual Go response in response to the No-Go signal.
To assess performance on the task, researchers calculate an accuracy rate for Go
trials and a separate accuracy rate for No-Go trials. The process of conflict monitoring is
observed in how the participants handle the No-Go trials. Fewer errors on No-Go trials
represents stronger, or more successful, conflict monitoring.
Electroencephalography (EEG) data can also be collected during a Go/No-Go
task, which gives another measure of behavioral data corresponding to conflict
monitoring. As noted above, researchers have found EEG related activity during the
Go/No-Go task to be especially distinctive in the anterior cingulate cortex.

Figure 12. The Error-Related Negativity Component.
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An event-related potential (ERP) is a brain response measured with
electroencephalography in response to a stimuli. Observing ACC activity during a No-Go
error (that is, when the subject fails to inhibit pressing the Go button) reveals an
particular ERP component called error-related negativity (ERN). As observed in Figure
12, Error-related negativity is a sharp spike in negative voltage that originates in the ACC
region of the brain. This distinctive brain activity, typically occurring 50 milliseconds
after the subject has locked in their response, represents the subject’s realization that
they pressed the button when they ought not have. A stronger error-related negativity
response is associated with greater conflict monitoring.

Figure 13. Common ERP Components.
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Another event-related potential component correlated with the Go/No-Go task
is the N2. The N2 is the second negative peak observed in the ERP waveform (see Figure
13). A stronger (more negative) N2 peak is associated with increased conflict
monitoring activity in the anterior cingulate cortex.
In congruence with the literature described above, Amodio and colleagues
conceptualized the Go/No-Go task as a measure of conflict monitoring, which is part of
a self-regulation process. They also agree with current literature that conflict monitoring
is positively correlated with neurocognitive activity in the anterior cingulate cortex
(ACC), in particular the two event-related potentials known as the error-related
negativity component (ERN) and the second negative wave peak (N2).
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So, which ideological group would have relatively higher conflict monitoring as
measured in the Go/No-Go task? Following Jost’s Motivated Social Cognition Theory,
liberals are thought to be more cognitively flexible, reflecting higher tolerance for
ambiguity and complexity, and greater openness to new experiences. Conservatives, in
contrast, are cognitively rigid, tending to be more structured and persistent in their
decision making. Amodio and colleagues (2007) posit that liberals’ greater cognitive
flexibility would translate into stronger and more active conflict monitoring. Thus, they
predict in their 2007 article that liberals would make fewer accuracy errors on the
Go/No-Go behavioral task, and would have stronger ACC related activity including larger
average amplitudes for the ERN and N2 components. Their hypotheses are confirmed in
the paper.
This theory is, however, a departure from the literature on Motivated Social
Cognition Theory. Recall from the literature review that Amodio, in a different paper,
(Amodio et al. 2008) establishes that the Go/No-Go task (and related ACC activity) is
primarily a measure of behavioral inhibition. Our summary above of the political
psychology of ideology—both the Motivated Social Cognition Theory of Jost and the
Negativity Bias Theory of Hibbing—suggests that conservatives would likely be more
inhibited. It seems clear that political conservatives ought to have more conflict
monitoring or a stronger neural response to conflict monitoring processing.
The puzzle continues. In the literature review above, you can see that the
Go/No-Go task, which taps into the anterior cingulate cortex, is consistently related to a

number of attentional cognitive processes, including conflict monitoring, response
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inhibition, and error detection. Noticeably absent from this list is “cognitive flexibility.”
So where does “cognitive flexibility” come from? Amodio and his colleagues appear to
conceptualize the Go/No-Go behavioral task differently between papers. In Amodio et
al. 2008, when searching for a neural correlate of Gray’s Behavioral Inhibition System,
they report that ACC related behavior from the Go/No-Go task is correlated with selfreported BIS scores, signifying that the Go/No-Go task is a measure of behavioral
inhibition. We walk away from that paper thinking that the Go/No-Go task is about
behavioral inhibition. And, if you independently consulted with Jostian theory of
conservatism as motivation social cognition, you would assume that conservatives are
likely more inhibited and, therefore, would have a stronger performance on the Go/NoGo task and more ACC related activity during the task.
However, Amodio et al. 2007 interprets the task differently from Amodio et al.
2008. Instead of behavioral inhibition, now this disposition is called cognitive flexibility.
For this paper, Amodio and colleagues state that ACC activity from the Go/No-Go task
reflects a general mechanism for monitoring response conflict, and they theoretically
connect this general mechanism to a more flexible cognitive style for liberals. As they
believe conservatives are more cognitively rigid, they will be less sensitive to conflict
monitoring compared to liberals. Thus, liberals should have greater conflict-related ACC
activity on the task compared to conservatives.

Replicating Amodio and Jost in the Go/No-Go Task
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To sort out this potential confusion, it would be useful to see how other
researchers have looked at the Go/No-Go task and political ideology. Only one
published paper has directly replicated Amodio et al. 2007. Weissflog et al. (2013)
purportedly confirm the Amodio et al. 2007 findings that liberals made fewer errors and
produced larger ACC-generated ERPs (ERN and NoGo N2). A key contribution for their
study is that they go beyond self-identification of political ideology, employing related
scales of egalitarianism and traditionalism. This is an important extension of the
Amodio and Jost work because they (Amodio et al. 2007) are limited to a selfidentification scale.
Weissflog and colleagues find that increased attitudes favoring social equality
(egalitarianism) had the greatest contribution to ERN and N2 effects, and behavioral
accuracy on the task was more strongly associated with openness to social change
(traditionalism). In general, their findings follow the same story as the Amodio et al.
2007 paper, finding political liberalism across their scales was associated with improved
accuracy and stronger ACC related neuroactivity on the Go/No-Go task. Like Amodio et
al. 2007, Weissflog and colleagues interpret this finding as consistent with the
Motivated Social Cognition theory (Jost et al. 2003), claiming this as support for the idea
that liberals are more cognitively flexible than conservatives. Like Amodio and Jost,
there is no account for how inhibition may or may not be associated with political
liberalism.
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There are some puzzling findings within the Weissflog et al. 2013 article worth
considering. First, there are some issues with the sample employed. The initial pool was
256 Canadian undergraduates, but only 34 were chosen for the experiment. This very
small sample had only two males, raising questions about gender as a confound.
Moreover, on the self-placement scale, they lack solid representation from
conservatives and oversample of extreme liberals. 13 were somewhat to extremely
liberal, 13 neither, 8 were somewhat to moderately conservative. Zero participants
were near the high limit of conservatism. Amodio et al. 2007 have this same problem—
their article and appendices do not contain clear write-ups of the variable descriptives,
but the scatterplot of the relationship between ideology and ERN amplitudes in Amodio
et al. 2007 reveals very few moderate conservatives and zero extreme conservatives.
Additionally, the Weissflog paper finds no relationship between accuracy on
NoGo trials and a measure of egalitarianism (p > 0.41), which is inconsistent with their
stated theory and the theory of the Amodio et al. 2007 paper. With egalitarianism being
one of the major pillars of the Jost et al. 2003 theory of conservatism as motivated
social cognition, we need more information to try to understand why the theory
appears to break down on this key relationship.
Third, Weissflog and colleagues do fail to replicate one of the key relationships in
Amodio et al. 2007. Recall that Amodio and colleagues find two ERP components to be
related to political ideology, the ERN and the N2. These two components are supporting
evidence to the idea that conflict monitoring is related to political ideology. Although
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Weissflog and colleagues find consistent results with the N2 in their study, they fail to
replicate the finding on the ERN (r = 0.27, p = 0.13). The ERN is very important to the
claims in the Amodio article, and it is puzzling that the findings do not replicate. When
Jost and Amodio (2012) examine the Weissflog study in a review paper, they do not
comment on this counterintuitive finding.
Although Weissflog is the only direct replication of Amodio and Jost on the
Go/No-Go task, there is another study that will be of interest to us with regard to
political ideology. Inzlicht et al. 2009, in two small samples (n = 28 & 29), study the ACC
during a Stroop color-naming task (described above) as it relates to religious conviction.
They theorize that religious conviction should be related to reduced activity in the
anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) because the religious belief system helps to reduce
incidents of uncertainty, conflict, and error by strengthening convictions and narrowing
attention away from inconsistencies. Inzlicht and colleagues indeed find that weaker
religiosity is connected to stronger ERN. As Jost and Amodio 2012 note, “given the
strong association between conservatism and religiosity, this finding is broadly
consistent with [our] results” (60).
Unfortunately, this study also has a few puzzling interpretation issues. First,
religious belief is fundamentally different than political belief, even if the two are
typically correlated. And, in fact, Inzlicht et al. find no relationship between political
conservatism and religious belief in their sample. Jost and Amodio did not report

religiosity in their 2007 paper, so we do not know if they were able to measure or
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control for it.
Second, Inzlicht and colleagues wrap their theory around the idea of religious
belief being a kind of anxiolytic drug that protects believers from cognitive conflict,
reducing the need for conflict detection. The theory of Jost and Amodio around
cognitive flexibility does not link into the anxiolytic drug hypothesis, and we could use
more theoretical work to understand what the connection could be.
Third, another issue for connecting the Inzlicht et al. 2009 work to the Amodio
and Jost findings is that Inzlicht et al. find no relationship between cognitive rigidity and
religious belief (their table 1, pg. 388). Jost and Amodio 2012 (and, Amodio et al. 2007)
theorize that cognitive rigidity is the reason why liberals outperform conservatives in
the conflict monitoring tasks. Inzlicht demonstrates in study 1 that religion drives these
effects on the behavioral task, and not cognitive rigidity does not. This leaves a puzzle
for our interpretation, because Inzlicht and colleagues seem to test an important part of
the Amodio and Jost hypothesis, and then rejects it.
Finally, as with Weissflog et al. 2013, Inzlicht et al. 2009 actually deliver another
failed replication of a central Amodio et al. 2007 finding. As before, the ERN and
conservatism results fail to replicate (their table 3 on pg. 390), with Inzlicht and
colleagues finding no relationship between ERN activity and political conservatism.
Additionally, Inzlicht and colleagues find no correlation between accuracy on the task
and political conservatism whatsoever (their table 3, pg. 390). Remember that Inzlicht et
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al. 2009 is not using a Go/No-Go task, but is instead using a Stroop task. These two tasks
are conceptually similar in the way they are used by Inzlicht et al. and Amodio et al.
The discussion above illustrates the need for more replication of the Amodio et
al. 2007 finding. The remainder of this chapter describes my study which is intended to
directly replicate Amodio et al. 2007 using a larger sample of non-students while closely
imitating the exact parameters of the Amodio Go/No-Go task. After I describe my
findings, I will summarize how the three published studies intersect with the findings of
this chapter.
Hypotheses
This chapter focuses on a replication of Amodio et al. 2007. Although the
literature review above raises more questions than answers about what kind of effects
we ought to find for political ideology, I will lay out the same hypotheses as Amodio et
al. 2007. The Conservatism as Motivated Social Cognition theory posits that
conservatives have greater cognitive rigidity compared to liberals. This cognitive rigidity
causes conservatives to be less adaptive to new and unexpected information. In a
Go/No-Go task, Amodio and Jost expect that liberals will have a stronger (more
negative) ERN response to making errors on No-Go trials, a stronger (more negative) N2
component on successful No-Go trials, and greater behavioral accuracy on the NoGo
trials. The hypotheses are summarized in Table 9.

Table 9. Go/No-Go and ACC Hypotheses.
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Method
Participants
Participants for this study are the same as in the prior chapters, but crucial
details will be repeated here for completeness. Fifty-one non-student adults (age 24-52
years, M = 30.7, sd = 5.8) served as participants (32 female, 19 male). The testing session
averaged less than two hours and 30 minutes, including breaks and the
electroencephalography capping process. Participants completed four tasks during the
session, and they had short breaks of five minutes between tasks. Participants were
compensated at a rate of $20/hour, with a minimum payment of $40 and a maximum of
$50 for the session.

Procedure
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After arriving at the laboratory, participants were briefed on the tasks they
would perform, and asked to sign consent forms. Afterwards, they were led to a dimlylit, sound-proofed room in a comfortable chair, approximately three feet from a nearby
computer monitor. Experimenters were blind to participants’ ideology scores and other
attitudes.
After the capping process was completed, and testing was successful,
participants completed four behavioral tasks in total, with numerous breaks. The total
capping time was about 20-40 minutes, and the total testing time (including breaks) was
about 110 minutes. The Go/No-Go behavioral task, the subject of this chapter’s
investigation, was the first of the four tasks. The Go/No-Go task took approximately 25
minutes to complete.
Recording the EEG Signals
As detailed in Chapter Five, I employed software techniques to convert our 64
channels of recorded data to virtual channels that correspond to the traditional 10-20
system, which allows comparison of my work to other Go/No-Go studies. These virtual
channels in the 10-20 system allow researchers using diverse systems to be able to
compare their results via a common mapping of scalp electrodes. The virtual electrode
system in this chapter, and the general data filtering procedure follows the
specifications of Chapter Five.
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As with Chapter Five data, eyeblinks and other artifacts in the ERP signal were
manually screened. ERP signals were filtered according to typical conventions. In this
case, we used relatively strong filtering, removing frequencies below 1 Hz and above 30
Hz (96 dB, zero-phase shift). This strong filtering imitates the Amodio et al. 2007 study.
Measuring Conflict Monitoring on the Go/No-Go
Figure 14. An Individual Trial of Go/No-Go Task.

The procedure for collecting EEG data on the Go/No-Go task follows Amodio et
al. 2007 closely. Subjects learned the Go/No-Go task with 100 practice trials, and then
completed three blocks of 200 trials each, for a total of 600 trials. Figure 14 visually
represents an individual trial in the Go/No-Go task. A fixation cross is first shown for
500ms, to focus and reset attention while steading the eyes and face. Then, a letter
briefly flashes on the screen. The letter “M” was a Go signal, and the letter “W” was a
NoGo signal. Participants then had 900ms to response. During a Go trial, when the
letter “M” was displayed, participants are supposed to press a large black button on a
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remote controller in their hands with their pointer finger. During a NoGo trial, when the
letter “W” was displayed, participants are supposed to do nothing and avoid pressing
any buttons on their controller. After the response window ends, participants are shown
a feedback screen for 1000ms, which informs them if they failed the trial. The feedback
screen is triggered either by an incorrect response or if the participant responded after
the 900ms interval (they were too slow). After the feedback screen, there is a final
blank screen for 500ms before the next trial begins. After a block of 200 trials,
participants received 30 seconds of rest before the next block began.
80 percent of signals were Go signals. When the high frequency of Go signals is
coupled with a rhythmic, fast response, it creates a habitual, prepotent response in the
subject to press the Go button in their hand. When the NoGo signal does trigger, for
20% of the trials, participants must inhibit their prepotent response and avoid pressing
the Go button.
I measure three different kinds of data during the task. First, I measure an EEG
component called error-related negativity (ERN), a strong negative wave that occurs
after subjects make an error during a NoGo trial. An error during a NoGo trial means
that the subject received the NoGo signal, but failed to correctly inhibit pressing the Go
button. The ERN is the pattern that emerges when you aggregate all of the individual
ERPs for each NoGo error trial together into a grand average, from -50ms to 150ms
around the response. ERN occurs between 50 milliseconds before the error response
through 150 milliseconds after the response. I measure the mean amplitude of the ERP
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signal over that period of 200 milliseconds for analysis below. Amodio et al. 2007 used
mean ERN amplitudes to estimate their ERP components, but Amodio et al. 2008
preferred peak ERN amplitudes. In this study, my results did not change by using peak
amplitude measures, so I employed mean amplitude to be consistent with Amodio et al.
2007.
Second, I measured an additional EEG component called the N2, which is the
second strong negative peak that occurs after subjects have a successful NoGo trial. A
successful NoGo trial means the subject correctly inhibited pressing the habitual Go
button after seeing the rarer NoGo signal. The N2 component is formed by aggregating
ERPs from each successful NoGo trial together into a grand average waveform.
Following Amodio et al. 2007, we utilize the mean negative amplitude between 200 and
400 milliseconds, during a successful NoGo trial.
Finally, I measured behavioral accuracy on NoGo trials, which is the number of
correct NoGo trials divided by the total number of NoGo trials. Higher accuracy on NoGo
trials represents greater conflict monitoring in the subject.
Measuring Ideology
Five survey measures of political ideology were utilized in this sample. These
subjects and the ideology measures employed are identical to prior chapters. Like
Amodio et al. 2007 and other replications, the sample skews left, and does not contain
any “extreme” conservatives. This sample has a deeper pool of solid conservatives than
previous research teams have been able to gather.
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As a brief reminder, first, I utilize the conventional seven point self-placement
scale from the American National Election Studies, which spans from “Very liberal” (1)
to “Very conservative” (7). Second, I use the full Wilson-Patterson issue attitude battery
(Wilson 1968; updated by Smith et al. 2011), which asks simple agree/disagree
questions on 20 different topics in contemporary politics. The full scale is the aggregate
number of conservative answers given in the 20 questions (ergo, a low score is more
liberal and a high score is more conservative). Third, I use a subscale developed
specifically for my data (see Chapter Four) that focuses on Wilson-Patterson items
related to economic conservatism. Fourth, I use a parallel subscale designed to tap into
social conservatism using Wilson-Patterson items. Finally, I employed a relatively
uncommon, but useful, scale from the World Values Survey that focuses on principles of
economic justice and fairness.
Results
Before proceeding into the hypotheses, I will note a couple of results that speak
to the general Go/No-Go task. In terms of accuracy in the task, NoGo trials were
significantly more difficult than Go trials (accuracy of Mnogo = 0.77, Mgo = 0.995; t(100) =
12.029, p < 0.01), as expected. Additionally, as expected, being more accurate on Go
trials is correlated with being more accurate on NoGo trials (r = 0.37, p < 0.01).
Individual differences in task performance are expected.
In terms of response time on the task, as expected, average response time on
correct Go trials was slower than response time on NoGo error trials (Mgo = 200.3,

MnogoError = 165.8; t(100) = 6.1343, p < 0.01). NoGo errors are a failure to inhibit the
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button pressing, so we would expect them to be made in haste. Also, as expected,
response time on correct Go trials is correlated with response time on error NoGo trials
(r = 0.695, p < 0.01). Again, individual differences in task performance are expected, so
differences in response time should be correlated.
In terms of the ERP components being examined, a couple of important
observations of this data. First, as expected, the mean ERN and peak ERN are very
strongly correlated (r = 0.91, p < 0.01). Second, as expected, the mean N2 and peak N2
are also extremely highly correlated (r = 0.93, p < 0.01). These associations reveal why
my results would not change substantially by using one variation of component
measurement versus another.
Table 10. Correlation Matrix of Go/No-Go and ERP Component Results.
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Table 10 presents correlations between the major variables of interest for the
Amodio and Jost hypotheses.
Hypothesis 1: Conservatives have weaker ERN
The first hypothesis is that political conservatism should be associated with a
weaker (less negative) ERN component during errors made on NoGo trials. I fail to
confirm this hypothesis. Contrary to the findings in Amodio et al. 2007, I find no
statistically significant relationship between self-identified political ideology and ERN
strength. Figures 14 and 15 visualizes data from Amodio et al. 2007 alongside with data
from this chapter.

Figure 15. Grand Average ERNs and Political Ideology
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Figure 16. Scatterplots of Ideology and ERN Data.
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Recall that each replication study of Go/No-Go and political ideology utilized the
self-identified ideology scale. Although my failed replication of the Amodio et al. 2007
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findings is surprising, my null results are consistent with findings from Weissflog et al.
2013 and Inzlicht et al. 2009. Of four research teams with this data, three cannot find
this relationship in their data.
I employed four other alternative measures of political ideology, including an
index of 20 political issues that have been aggregated together (Wilson-Patterson), an
economic conservatism subscale from the Wilson-Patterson scale, a social conservatism
subscale from the Wilson-Patterson scale, and a battery of questions concerning
economic justice from the World Values Survey. None of these measures have any
relationship to ERN measures whatsoever, consistent with my null finding on the selfidentification scale.
As Amodio et al. 2007 and Inzlicht et al. 2009 did not utilize alternative measures
of ideology at all, the only replication paper that might contribute to this mystery is
Weissflog et al. 2013. Weissflog et al. 2013 utilized Altemeyer’s (1999) Right Wing
Authoritarian Scale (1996) and Kluegel and Smith’s egalitarianism and inegalitarianism
scale (1986), which are at least distantly related to the general construct of political
ideology. Weissflog et al. 2013 found that the liberal ends of each scale were correlated
with stronger ERN responses. So, in this respect, my findings about alternative
measures of ideology are at odds with the Weissflog findings, although it is worth
considering how conceptually similar Right-Wing Authoritarianism and egalitarianism
scales are to political ideology.

Hypothesis 2: Conservatives have weaker N2 Component
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The second hypothesis is that political conservatism should be associated with a
weaker (less negative) N2 component during successful NoGo trials. Unlike both
Amodio et al. 2007 and Weissflog et al. 2013, I fail to find a statistical difference
between self-identified liberals and conservatives on the N2 component. In fact, the
correlation coefficient of self-reported ideology and the N2 component is trending
towards statistical significance p = 0.055, but this effect is reversed from Amodio and
Jost expectations—it is the self-identified conservatives who have a stronger, more
negative, N2 component on the Go/No-Go task.
Table 10 shows that none of the alternative political ideology measures
replicated the N2 results of Amodio and Jost, either. Unexpectedly, there is a
statistically significant relationship between economic conservatism and a stronger
(more negative) N2 component. This finding is unusual for a number of reasons. First, it
is contrary to the Amodio and Jost predictions, as it is liberals who ought to have
stronger N2 responses based on their 2007 paper, but my conservatives are so. Second,
Jost’s Motivated Social Cognition Theory treats social conservatism as a major part of
being conservative, and it is odd to find the N2 completely unrelated to social
conservative but instead important for economic issues, while at the same time
unrelated to the economic justice scale. Overall, we should treat this finding with
caution—it is inconsistent with the general picture of the null relationship, and it goes
against all predictions.

Hypothesis 3: Conservatives have less accuracy on NoGo trials
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The third hypothesis concerns whether conservatives have less accuracy on the
difficult NoGo trials compared to liberals. While Amodio et al. 2007 finds liberals to
have superior performance (r = 0.30, p < 0.05), I do not replicate this finding. Although
the relationship does not quite reach the 0.05 threshold, self-identified conservatives in
my sample are correlated with superior accuracy during NoGo trials (r = 0.275, p =
0.055). If anything, my self-identified conservatives are more accurate than liberals on
the trials. Conservatives also outperform liberals on Go trials (r = 0.326, p < 0.022);
Amodio et al. 2007 did not report data about Go trial accuracy and ideology.
The pattern of findings in the self-identified conservatives do not reappear in
alternative ideological measures, giving pause in how to interpret the findings above.
Discussion
In summary, this chapter described the current state of knowledge about
whether liberals and conservatives may have differences in their basic conflict
monitoring processing, in the context of a Go/No-Go task. Following a ground-breaking
study from Amodio et al. 2007, I set out to replicate their study as a way to sort out
confusion over how the Go/No-Go task should be interpreted. If the conflict monitoring
aspect of the Go/No-Go task is akin to behavioral inhibition, we would expect
conservatives to have a stronger performance and neural activity on the task. However,
Amodio et al. 2007 interpreted the Go/No-Go task as a measure of cognitive flexibility,

asserting (and finding) that liberals outperform conservatives on the task, as well as
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have stronger neural correlates during the task.
Table 11. Summary of Go/No-Go Studies.

My study fails to replicate any part of the Amodio et al. 2007 study. Additionally,
I wrote about two other studies that closely replicate Amodio et al. 2007, each which
had their own trouble replicating the findings (Weissflog et al. 2013 had several
elements successfully replicate). A summary of those findings are in Table 11. Overall,
these studies are rather mixed in their findings. It appears that liberal and conservative
differences require additional investigation and more careful study. My work
demonstrates that liberal and conservative physiological differences may exist, but not
concerning conflict monitoring in the anterior cingulate cortex.
As before, the results of this chapter urge caution moving forward for the
psychological differences noted by Jost, Hibbing, and their colleagues. Further
discussion of the big picture of the findings of this chapter are taken up in the next
chapter.

CHAPTER SEVEN
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
The political psychology of ideology holds great promise for our understanding
about the origins of political beliefs. Political psychologists working in this tradition are
beginning to understand the complex web of physiological, emotional, and cognitive
factors that make up our political minds. This new wave of research has successfully
pushed our understanding of political attitudes deep within the black box of human
cognition, and it moves us closer to understanding our political identities.
Biology and politics scholars have established a research program based on
differences in root psychological characteristics of liberals and conservatives. These
differences have been shown to be both emotional and cognitive, and they have been
linked to differences in behavioral outcomes. Additionally, and importantly, these
scholars have shown that dispositional differences between liberals and conservatives
emerge even outside of political contexts or political information. In other words, the
root psychological differences between liberals and conservatives are not restricted to
political topics alone, but can manifest in basic, everyday behavior and thought.
Two of the most important theories about the political psychology of political
ideology featured prominently in this dissertation. The Negativity Bias Theory, my term
for the research program coming from John Hibbing, Kevin Smith, and the Political
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Physiology Lab of Nebraska University, posits that political conservatives have a
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persistent bias towards negativity, which attracts their attention and triggers stronger
physiological reactions. The Motivated Social Cognition Theory, developed by social
psychologist John Jost and numerous colleagues over the past few years, argues that
psychological factors of fear, threat, and uncertainty avoidance motivate an individual
to adopt conservative political beliefs.
The three studies presented in this dissertation follow closely in the literature
that proceeded them. First, I focused on dispositional traits related to emotion and
cognition from outside of a political context. Second, following current work in
psychology, I noted that negativity and avoidance are not the same theoretical
construct, and this allowed my work to try to distinguish between the assorted
dispositional differences noted by Hibbing and Jost. Third, my studies inherited
hypotheses from these major theories. From the Negativity Bias Theory, I hypothesized
that conservatives are more sensitive to negative emotion. From the Motivated Social
Cognition Theory, I hypothesized that conservatives are more sensitive to avoidance and
inhibition. Thus, the studies described in prior chapters establishes footing on these
two theories, and in the theoretical space first outlined by research teams led by
Hibbing and Jost.
My work contributes to this research program in two ways. First, I have
integrated Gray’s theories of behavioral inhibition and approach alongside these two
prominent theories. My goal was to demonstrate how inhibition and activation are

conceptually related to the work of Hibbing and Jost, and then test a series of
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dispositional traits that ought to differentiate liberals from conservatives. I had hoped to
clarify and enrich our understanding of the research on dispositional differences.
Second, in the process of investigating inhibition and approach, I did a direct replication
of one of the most important political neuroscience studies published in the subfield of
biology and politics. This replication closely mimicked the methods of Amodio et al.
2007, while also using a larger sample of non-student adults. As of August 2016, Over
400 papers have cited Amodio et al. 2007 but there have been very few replications of
this important study.
Overall, the studies in this dissertation have presented surprising results that
urge caution for this research program. While searching for dispositional differences
between liberals and conservatives with multiple methodologies, I was surprised to
learn that very few dispositional differences could be found between liberals and
conservatives. The bigger picture of my work could largely be called a robust null
finding. This final chapter outlines my findings and integrates the bigger picture of the
work with recommendations for how future studies should proceed. In particular, I will
draw attention to the failed replication of Amodio et al. 2007, and urge caution for
future studies of political cognition.
In the remainder of this chapter, I review the need for more replication in social
science, and well as discuss the findings in this dissertation and the implications of my
work for understanding how liberals and conservatives differ in cognitive flexibility.

Replication Efforts in Social Science
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My dissertation joins the recent movement towards more replication in social
science. Social science has never been more popularly read or more influential than it is
today. Driven by increased public outreach by scientists and universities, combined with
a more empirically minded style of journalism, social science research has exploded into
the public policy scene. This increased demand for social science is a good thing for
society, informing debates and increasing the level of knowledge through rigorous, datadriven analysis. Never before has social science been so important to good governance
and society. But, also, never before has it been more important to make sure that
science is methodologically rigorous and open to analysis by outside research teams.
We already have examples of how errors in research have deeply affected the
policy world. For example, in 2013, a graduate student studying economics uncovered
an innocent spreadsheet error, and overturned an authoritative academic study that
was being utilized by heads of state and Nobel prize winners to theorize over the role of
government debt in the industrialized world (Roose 2013; Pollin and Ash 2013).
We also have examples of how the drive for fame and funding can tempt
scholars towards cheating and fraud. Broockman and Kalla’s uncovering of Michael
LaCour’s fraudulent publication in Science shocked the entire academic world (Singal
2015). The story was picked up by numerous major media organizations, including the
New York Times and FiveThirtyEight(Carey and Belluck 2015; Bialik 2015). Another case,
even more galling, is Dutch social psychologist Diederik Stapel notoriously faking data
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for years, resulting in at least 55 publications made with fraudulent data (Bhattacharjee
2013; Neuroskeptic 2015; Univers 2012).
These cases, rare and remarkable, made a huge splash in the media. But the
larger struggles of social science to foster reproducible research have also become more
public in recent years. Many commentators have discussed the issues of publication
bias, researcher degrees of freedom, and p-hacking. Co-authors Leif Nelson, Joe
Simmons, and Uri Simonsohn and their academic blog called Data Colada
(http://datacolada.org/) as well as popular academic blogger Andrew Gelman
(http://andrewgelman.com/) have coined the term “researcher degrees of freedom” as
short-hand for a number of the issues that can arise with researcher null hypothesis
testing. Publication bias, where academic publications tend towards publishing
successful experiments that confirm hypotheses while confining negative results to a file
drawer, has a sharp impact on the way modern science is practiced today. Recently,
social scientists have become more and more anxious about these problems.
Researcher Brian Nosek and the Many Labs project (over 270 scientists) created an
initiative called the Reproducibility Project, published in Science, which aimed to
sponsor and conduct replication studies of 100 recent psychology studies (Yong 2015).
Unfortunately, only 40 percent of those replications successfully replicated the originals,
and, on average, the size of the effect in the studies that did replicate were only half as
large (Yong 2015).
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These events illustrate the need for more replication of important social science
work. My dissertation is intended to contribute to that need. Below, I summarize my
results and discuss the implications for my replication of several key studies related to
the political psychology of ideology.
Summarizing Dissertation Results
In Chapter Four, I examined the survey data collected from 466 non-student
adults employed by Loyola University Chicago. The primary purpose of the chapter was
to summarize the demographic characteristics and politics of the sample from which I
drew participants to undergo behavioral experiments in the lab. However, this survey
also gave us an opportunity to test for differences self-reported dispositions towards
inhibition and activation in a large N study, which could not be done on the small
samples typically brought into laboratories. This work taps into the Motivated Social
Cognition hypothesis about conservatives and behavioral inhibition. Based on prior
research into the psychological profiles of conservatives, drawing from the empirical
work of many research teams, we expected that conservatives would report greater
behavioral inhibition compared to liberals. To my surprise, and against expectations
from prior work, it was the liberals in the sample who reported higher behavioral
inhibition. The correlation was moderate but statistically reliable.
Chapter Five combines self-reports in surveys on emotional affect with a
measurement of electroencephalography in a laboratory setting. A survey
questionnaire helped me assess trait sensitivities towards many discrete emotions, and

general negative affect. I also had the opportunity to measure frontal
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electroencephalography in these subjects, which can depict a pattern of brain activity
that is known to be connected to both negative emotion and avoidance sensitivity. My
findings, again, are surprising. Across all of the trait emotional sensitivity scales
employed, I found robust null results. No evidence was found for the idea that
conservatives are more sensitive to negativity in this sample. Additionally, the
electroencephalography measure of frontal hemispheric asymmetry revealed that
liberals and conservatives do not have different patterns of brain activity. As the
patterns are a neural correlate of sensitivity to both avoidance sensitivity as well as
negative emotion sensitivity, these findings are puzzling and challenging for both the
Negativity Bias Theory and the Motivated Social Cognition Theory predictions, as
conservatives in this study are neither sensitive to negative affect nor are they
dispositionally avoidant. Overall, I find that liberals and conservatives do not have
differences in emotional sensitivity or in frontal hemispheric asymmetry.
Chapter Six continues the investigation using electroencephalography measures
alongside a behavioral experiment called the Go/No-Go task. My goal was to investigate
conflict monitoring processes in the brain, which have been connected to avoidance and
inhibition in past literature. The Go/No-Go task allowed me to look for differences in
accuracy and anterior cingulate cortex related neural activity between liberals and
conservatives. This study was also an attempt at a direct replication of an important
and ground-breaking study in political neuroscience study by Amodio et al. (2007), by

using a non-student sample and more richly measuring political ideology. I did not
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replicate these findings, however. Liberals in my study did not have better accuracy on
the Go/No-Go task, and did not have statistically different neural activity in the anterior
cingulate cortex.
Next, I will address the implications of my work for our understanding of liberals
and conservatives. My results have large implications for how researchers should
consider and study the work of Amodio et al. 2007. Below, I specifically focus on what
we can learn about the cognitive flexibility of liberals and conservatives from studies of
the Go/No-Go task.
Political Ideology and Cognitive Flexibility
Amodio et al. 2007 introduced the research world to liberal and conservative
differences in behavioral conflict monitoring, as measured with the Go/No-Go task.
They find that liberals are more successful at inhibiting habitual responses with the
introduction of unexpected information. This increased success is also correlated with
increased neural activity related to the Anterior Cingulate Cortex (ACC), a region of the
brain known to be associated with conflict monitoring. Amodio and colleagues review
their evidence, and find that the pattern of their data suggests that liberals are more
cognitively flexible.
Three statistical relationships form the foundation of the paper. The first
measure, purely behavioral, is that liberalism is associated with increased accuracy on
NoGo trials. Liberals are more successful at inhibiting their habituated Go response

when they see a NoGo signal. Conservatives, in contrast, are more persistent in their
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response patterns, causing increased errors when a change in response behavior is
called for.
The next two measures are based on event-related potentials (ERPs), which are
consistent patterns of brain activity observable as electric signal on the scalp in
response to particular stimuli. The second measure is an ERP called error-related
negativity (ERN) during failed NoGo trials. ERN is a component that arises in the
individual when they fail to correctly inhibit the Go button press during a NoGo trial.
Upon realizing the error, there is a distinctive pattern of brain activity that represents a
sharp negative trough about 50 milliseconds after the mistaken button press. Liberals
have a stronger (more negative) ERN component in response to a failed trial, reflecting
greater conflict monitoring neural activity. The third measure is an ERP called the NoGo
N2, which is a component that arises in the brain in response to a successful inhibition
during a NoGo trial. When subjects successfully inhibit the Go button press in response
to a NoGo signal, there is a strong negative trough in the electroencephalography signal,
occurring roughly around 200 milliseconds. This negative trough is the second
observable trough in the signal, giving rise to the name “N2.” Liberals were observed to
have a stronger (more negative) NoGo N2 compared to conservatives. Again, this
neural difference is believed to represent a difference in basic conflict monitoring
sensitivity, with liberals being more sensitive than conservatives. As conservatives have
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less conflict monitoring related neural activity, they are deemed to be less cognitively
flexible and more persistent than liberals.
As of August 2016, the Amodio et al. 2007 paper has been cited over 400 times.
Biology and politics literature in both Political Science and Psychology have relied on this
paper for establishing that physiological and psychological differences between liberals
and conservatives can be observed directly in brain functioning, even during a task that
is completely unrelated to politics. These findings have been cited by Hibbing and
colleagues as an example of how liberals and conservatives are different in their core or
root psychological dispositions, deeply within the biological self (e.g. Hibbing et al.
2014). These findings have also been useful and illustrative for Jost and colleagues, as
liberals being more cognitively flexible fits nicely with the Conservatism as Motivated
Social Cognition theory (e.g. Jost and Amodio 2012; Jost et al. 2003). In fact, revealingly,
the literature that Jost created and inspired is often referred to as the Rigidity-of-theRight hypothesis.
Although Amodio et al. 2007 continues to be widely read and widely cited, there
has been only one published attempt to replicate (Weissflog et al. 2013). There is also
one other published study on religious belief and conflict monitoring using a Stroop task
(Inzlicht et al. 2009). This study was referenced by Jost and Amodio 2012 as being
broadly consistent with Amodio et al. 2007, and they consider it broadly as an extension
of their work (Jost and Amodio 2012, 60). To the best of my knowledge, this dissertation
presents the second attempt to directly replicate Amodio et al. 2007.

In Chapter Six, I reviewed all known data on the relationship between conflict

188

monitoring and political ideology and offered a new study of my own. To review briefly,
I find that Amodio et al. 2007 has not been successfully replicated in full by any
published study. Weissflog et al. 2013 comes closest, and it does contain findings that
are supportive of the Amodio et al. 2007 theory. Some attitudinal measures in this
study (traditionalism and egalitarianism) are conceptually related to political liberalism,
and are shown by Weissflog and colleagues to be correlated with increased behavioral
accuracy and increased neural activity reflected in the ERN and N2. This fits with Amodio
et al. 2007’s three central findings, but used different scales for political ideology.
However, in terms of ideological self-identification, the measure employed by Amodio
et al. 2007, Weissflog and colleagues did not replicate one of the three core Amodio et
al. Findings, specifically that self-reported liberals have stronger (more negative) ERN
during the task. Data from the Weissflog et al. study trends in a consistent direction,
but failed to reach conventional levels of statistical significance (p = 0.13). Weissflog et
al.’s sample was 32 undergraduate students at a Canadian university. This sample size is
not unusually small for a neuroscience study, but the small size could potentially explain
why they failed to replicate (but, then, we would also need to be skeptical about the
relationships that they did show.)
What about the Inzlicht et al. 2009 study? Inzlicht and colleagues studied the
relationship of religious belief to conflict monitoring using a Stroop task in a
conceptually similar way to a Go/No-Go task. Inzlicht and colleagues presented data on

22 undergraduates that showed decreased religious belief to be related to increased
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accuracy on the Stroop task and increased strength of the ERN. Non-believers
performed better on the behavioral task and had a stronger ERN component. Jost and
Amodio 2012 cite this paper as supportive for the theory of Amodio et al. 2007 because
religious belief is closely related to political conservatism. In the view of Jost and
Amodio 2012, Inzlicht’s work demonstrates that religious believers—who are likely
political conservative—do worse on the task and have a weaker ERN response because
they are less cognitively flexible than religious non-believers (who are likely to be liberal)
(Jost and Amodio 2012, 60).
However, this reading of the Inzlicht findings has several problems. First, Inzlicht
et al. specifically find no relationship between religious belief and political conservatism
in their sample (Table 3, 390) They also specifically find no relationship between
political ideology and ERN amplitude (Table 3, 390). Inzlicht and colleagues state that
“the correlation between the ERN and religious conviction did not diminish after we
controlled for conservatism, IQ, or any of the Big Five personality factors” (389), arguing
that political conservatism cannot explain the correlation between ERN and religious
conviction that they found (389). Moreover, religious believers actually had improved
behavioral accuracy on the task, which is contrary to what Amodio et al. 2007 and Jost
and Amodio 2012 would have predicted. Finally, religious believers in Inzlicht et al. had
no relationship to “cognitive closure” (Table 2, 388), which presents problems for
considering the religious believers to be cognitively rigid.
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My study of liberals, conservatives, and the Go/No-Go task attempted to closely
replicate the methods and design choices of Amodio et al. 2007. As described above,
and with great detail in Chapter Six, I ultimately find no support for any differences
between liberals and conservatives on the task. The three important metrics connected
to liberals described in Amodio et al. 2007—increased behavioral accuracy, increased
ERN strength, and increased N2 strength—are not present in my data. Before
considering implications of these failures to replicate, we should consider the strength
and usefulness of the samples across the relevant Go/No-Go studies.
Comparing Samples of Go/No-Go Data

Figure 17: Measures of Ideology in Three Go/No-Go Samples
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Note: Amodio et al. 2007 and Weissflog et al. 2013 utilized a self-report ideology scale
with 11 points instead of the conventional 7 point scale used widely in political science
and public opinion surveys such as the American National Election Studies. I
transformed their data from 11 point to 7 point by multiplying each subject’s score by
(7/11). The histogram bins further smooths out all three distributions to provide a
generalized picture of the data from the studies that allows clear comparison.
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The figure above presents the ideological distribution of the samples employed
by Amodio et al. 2007, Weissflog et al. 2013, and Chapter Six of my dissertation.
Information about the ideological spread of Inzlicht et al. 2009’s sample is unavailable,
unfortunately. Data for the outside studies in this figure were compiled by me through
close viewing of the supplied scatterplots. The raw data from both studies are not
available online.
A key goal of replication of the Amodio et al. 2007 Go/No-Go experiment was to
increase the number of political conservatives in the sample. As can be observed in the
figure above, my sample includes substantially more subjects who self-place on the
conservative side of the scale. Like the prior studies, I had difficulty finding extreme
conservatives (e.g. the sevens) who were willing to come into the lab. However, I was
able to recruit a total of 17 subjects who identified right-of-center. Amodio et al. 2007
and Weissflog et al. 2013 each had 8 subjects who identified right-of-center.
Another key goal was to broaden the sample in age range and size. Both Amodio
et al. 2007 and Weissflog et al. 2013 utilized a convenience sample of college
undergraduates. Amodio et al. 2007 featured 43 students recruited from both UCLA
and New York University, while Weissflog et al. 2013 used 32 students from Brock
University in Canada. I used a convenience sample of 51 non-student employees at
Loyola University Chicago. Consequently, both Amodio and Weissflog have age
distributions in the normal undergraduate college range, while my sample averaged
30.7 years old, with standard deviation of 5.8 years and a range of ages from 24-52
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years. My sample and Amodio et al. 2007 each had 63% females, while Weissflog et al.
2013 was about 94% female (2 males of 32 participants). My sample was also
approximately 18% larger than Amodio et al. 2007 and 60% larger than Weissflog et al.
2013. Overall, thus, my sample has considerable strengths over the other two studies in
terms of representativeness both politically and demographically.
Next Steps
Overall, the results from these studies offer a few important conclusions. First,
in a big picture sense, it does not appear that Gray’s systems of behavioral inhibition
and behavioral activation manifest differently between liberals and conservatives.
Whether measuring disposition towards inhibition and avoidance with a survey
questionnaire, or with emotional valence in hemispheric asymmetry measures, or with
the Go/No-Go task and anterior cingulate cortex measures, the results paint a fairly
robust null finding. This was a worthwhile area of investigation, given the emphasis in
prior literature on base level physiological differences between liberals and
conservatives concerning related phenomena like emotional sensitivity towards threat,
fear, and disgust. Yet, across these studies, we largely get a robust null finding for
conservatives being more inhibited. More work with different samples could
significantly contribute to these questions, but for the moment, generalizing from these
three studies, it appears clear that liberals and conservatives do not have meaningful
differences in behavioral motivations to inhibit (and, approach sensitivity, too, did not
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seem to be related to political ideology, which was a more exploratory objective in this
dissertation).
A second important conclusion is that the work on emotional sensitivity in
Chapter Five fails to find evidence that conservatives are more sensitive to negative
emotion or more sensitive to avoidance. Persuasive work from Hibbing and colleagues
suggest conservatives pay more attention to negative stimuli and are more sensitive to
the effects of negative emotion. Jost and colleagues have research that suggests
conservatives could be more avoidant in cognitive style. In Chapter Five I explore these
ideas by measuring sensitivity to positive and negative affect, as well as measuring
frontal hemispheric asymmetry, which is a well-known neural correlate for sensitivity to
emotion and avoidance. With multiple measures of political ideology, I do not find a
robust correlation between negative emotion and political conservatives on the
emotional scales. I also do not find that conservatives have the hemispheric asymmetry
pattern that has been correlated to negative emotion and avoidance sensitivity.
Finally, a third important conclusion is that the widely cited Amodio et al. 2007
has not been successfully replicated in whole. My experiment fails to replicate, and I
bring attention to two published studies that also struggle to replicate some of the
major findings of the Amodio et al. 2007 article. Given the relatively scarcity of studies
that note important root cognitive differences between liberals and conservatives
outside of Amodio et al. 2007, we continue to have a dire need for more studies in this
area. Go/No-Go task performance and related anterior cingulate cortex activity will
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need additional studies to more firmly establish a connection between liberalism and
cognitive flexibility because critical questions remain about whether a difference
currently exists.
Briefly, we can summarize some of the standard limitations with studies like
mine. First, as already noted in Chapter Four, the sample is not nationally
representative. This pool of participants is drawn from one geographical location at one
specific time and place. Moreover, they were unusual in the sense that they worked at a
university and had a much higher level of education than the general public. As nonstudent adults, they do have the advantage of having a diversity of ages and experiences
that are not typically present in most convenience samples. Second, the recruitment
survey sample size was reasonably large for social science research (at 466 participants)
but still not large enough to effectively capture a deep poll of extreme conservatives.
Peer work in this area also has great difficulty getting strong conservatives into their
study, and this study is an improvement over past studies in this regard.
Another limitation is that the measures in the survey are all self-reported, and
we can only draw correlational inferences. The relationship I find between self-reported
behavioral inhibition and liberalism could have several explanations that the survey data
alone cannot account for. Principally, the challenge for interpretation is over how to
interpret the self-reports. Are conservatives less inhibited, or do they report less
inhibition on surveys, due to social desirability differences or self-perception

differences? Additionally, as always with correlational studies, causation cannot be

196

determined.
Later chapters address the weaknesses of survey data by bring subjects into the
lab, but these studies have standard limitations as well. The sample size of the
neuroscience studies was only 51 people. While 51 subjects is significantly above
average for electroencephalography studies, more statistical power would always be
useful for trying to spot effect sizes that are not expected to be very large.
The project of biology and politics continues to be incredibly promising for
understanding the puzzle of political ideology. As Hatemi and McDermott (2011) write,
biological models of political behavior have vast potential to contribute meaningfully to
studies of political behavior. When I began this work in 2012, I was looking to expand
our understanding of how conservatives and liberals differ dispositionally by looking at
multidimensional ideology. At the conclusion of my work, however, I want to bring
attention to something else entirely. The results of my studies strongly suggest a
compelling case for why we need more work to better understand the dispositional
differences of liberals and conservatives. My dissertation posits that the question of
root psychological differences between liberals and conservatives is still largely open for
consideration.

APPENDIX A
SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE
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